Narrative:

We were in cruise flight at FL240 en route from cleveland hopkins international to nashville in IMC conditions (light rain, in clouds, light turbulence) when '#1 engine control a' and 'engine #1 control B' caution messages illuminated on EICAS. We completed the appropriate 'engine control fail' QRH that called for resetting the full authority/authorized digital engine controls, and when this had no impact, proceeded to next step that called for alternating the full authority/authorized digital engine control on the affected engine. Shortly upon alternating the full authority/authorized digital engine control, 'engine #1 low N1' master warning illuminated and the #1 engine shut itself down. Appropriate QRH for 'precautionary engine shutdown' was completed, emergency declared, flight attendant notified and the company advised. We were then vectored for an ILS runway 17R approach to sdf. On a 5 mi final, 'generator bearing #1 fail' advisory message illuminated. After an uneventful landing, 'generator bearing #3 fail' illuminated. Aircraft was taxied to the gate and deplaned. Callback conversation with reporter on acn 404407 revealed the following information: reporter stated the engine was an allison model A3007A (no dash #), and did have installed the 4TH full authority/authorized digital engine control computer change which was approved by the FAA. However, the latest alert bulletin which added an additional starting checklist procedure was not yet updated to their aircraft's checklist. This allowed the pre-start procedure to be double-checked since it tested to see that each of the 2 full authority/authorized digital engine control system were turned on. When checked, if the engine after start kept running, it proved that both were turned on, which was the cause of the engine complete shutdown when attempting to reset the engine full authority/authorized digital engine control problem in-flight, since the first officer did not do the prescribed test before starting engines and the checklist did not contain the new procedure to check after engines were started on the ground. As far as the captain reporter knows, all the engine models have the same full authority/authorized digital engine control, as the full authority/authorized digital engine control system is the same. There are two for each engine for a total 4 and do give some information from the other engine pair, ie, if 1 engine is shut down due to precautionary parameters not within normal limits, the other engine full authority/authorized digital engine control records this and then holds the remaining engine to a higher standard so it will not shut down so easily. The reporter further stated that he believes that the FAA approved this 4TH change too hastily since the additional ground check is vital and should be incorporated on the checklist before operating the aircraft. The allison manufacturer had 2 representatives at his aircraft within 2 hours after this incident. He believes that the FAA and manufacturer are well concerned. There have been 28 engine replacements last yr on this aircraft which did not relate to this problem. It was because of faulty main bearings causing excessive oil pressure. He further stated that the generator bearings were not a real problem since they were for 20 hour maintenance alert.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN EMB145 DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED TO LAND WHILE CRUISING AT FL240 WHEN THE #1 ENG WAS AUTOMATICALLY SHUT DOWN BY FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL DUE TO ENG CTL WARNING LIGHTS CAME ON AFTER RESETTING THE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL CALLED FOR IN THE QRH (QUICK REF HANDBOOK).

Narrative: WE WERE IN CRUISE FLT AT FL240 ENRTE FROM CLEVELAND HOPKINS INTL TO NASHVILLE IN IMC CONDITIONS (LIGHT RAIN, IN CLOUDS, LIGHT TURB) WHEN '#1 ENG CTL A' AND 'ENG #1 CTL B' CAUTION MESSAGES ILLUMINATED ON EICAS. WE COMPLETED THE APPROPRIATE 'ENG CTL FAIL' QRH THAT CALLED FOR RESETTING THE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTLS, AND WHEN THIS HAD NO IMPACT, PROCEEDED TO NEXT STEP THAT CALLED FOR ALTERNATING THE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL ON THE AFFECTED ENG. SHORTLY UPON ALTERNATING THE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL, 'ENG #1 LOW N1' MASTER WARNING ILLUMINATED AND THE #1 ENG SHUT ITSELF DOWN. APPROPRIATE QRH FOR 'PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN' WAS COMPLETED, EMER DECLARED, FLT ATTENDANT NOTIFIED AND THE COMPANY ADVISED. WE WERE THEN VECTORED FOR AN ILS RWY 17R APCH TO SDF. ON A 5 MI FINAL, 'GENERATOR BEARING #1 FAIL' ADVISORY MESSAGE ILLUMINATED. AFTER AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG, 'GENERATOR BEARING #3 FAIL' ILLUMINATED. ACFT WAS TAXIED TO THE GATE AND DEPLANED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ON ACN 404407 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THE ENG WAS AN ALLISON MODEL A3007A (NO DASH #), AND DID HAVE INSTALLED THE 4TH FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL COMPUTER CHANGE WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE FAA. HOWEVER, THE LATEST ALERT BULLETIN WHICH ADDED AN ADDITIONAL STARTING CHKLIST PROC WAS NOT YET UPDATED TO THEIR ACFT'S CHKLIST. THIS ALLOWED THE PRE-START PROC TO BE DOUBLE-CHKED SINCE IT TESTED TO SEE THAT EACH OF THE 2 FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL SYS WERE TURNED ON. WHEN CHKED, IF THE ENG AFTER START KEPT RUNNING, IT PROVED THAT BOTH WERE TURNED ON, WHICH WAS THE CAUSE OF THE ENG COMPLETE SHUTDOWN WHEN ATTEMPTING TO RESET THE ENG FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL PROB INFLT, SINCE THE FO DID NOT DO THE PRESCRIBED TEST BEFORE STARTING ENGS AND THE CHKLIST DID NOT CONTAIN THE NEW PROC TO CHK AFTER ENGS WERE STARTED ON THE GND. AS FAR AS THE CAPT RPTR KNOWS, ALL THE ENG MODELS HAVE THE SAME FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL, AS THE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL SYS IS THE SAME. THERE ARE TWO FOR EACH ENG FOR A TOTAL 4 AND DO GIVE SOME INFO FROM THE OTHER ENG PAIR, IE, IF 1 ENG IS SHUT DOWN DUE TO PRECAUTIONARY PARAMETERS NOT WITHIN NORMAL LIMITS, THE OTHER ENG FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL RECORDS THIS AND THEN HOLDS THE REMAINING ENG TO A HIGHER STANDARD SO IT WILL NOT SHUT DOWN SO EASILY. THE RPTR FURTHER STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE FAA APPROVED THIS 4TH CHANGE TOO HASTILY SINCE THE ADDITIONAL GND CHK IS VITAL AND SHOULD BE INCORPORATED ON THE CHKLIST BEFORE OPERATING THE ACFT. THE ALLISON MANUFACTURER HAD 2 REPRESENTATIVES AT HIS ACFT WITHIN 2 HRS AFTER THIS INCIDENT. HE BELIEVES THAT THE FAA AND MANUFACTURER ARE WELL CONCERNED. THERE HAVE BEEN 28 ENG REPLACEMENTS LAST YR ON THIS ACFT WHICH DID NOT RELATE TO THIS PROB. IT WAS BECAUSE OF FAULTY MAIN BEARINGS CAUSING EXCESSIVE OIL PRESSURE. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THE GENERATOR BEARINGS WERE NOT A REAL PROB SINCE THEY WERE FOR 20 HR MAINT ALERT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.