Narrative:

We departed modesto en route to phoenix. My first officer was new to the airplane and english is his second language. These 2 factors would ultimately contribute to our error. What occurred (as we discovered later) was a 2000 ft altitude deviation. What led up to the error was a sequence of events, each on their own subtle in nature. I had been giving tips, advice and general instruction to my copilot all along, trying to make him more comfortable in the learjet. Considering his accent, I paid particular attention to his radio phraseology. I've always been very 'picky' about altitude readbacks. Many pilots new to jets make common errors such as misstating 'climbing to two-three thousand' instead of the proper call 'two-three-zero' or 'descending to one- four-zero' instead of the correct 'one-four thousand.' I was to find out later that, upon our departure from mod, stockton departure issued us a clearance to 'climb to and maintain one-zero thousand, ten-thousand sir.' for reasons still unknown to me or my copilot, my copilot responded with a readback of 'climbing to one-two-zero thousand.' as soon as I heard him say one-two-zero thousand, I immediately corrected him by saying that there is no such altitude as one- two-zero thousand unless you're in the space shuttle or SR71! In the meantime, he set 12000 ft into our altitude alerter and I proceeded to climb to 12000 ft. I got so caught up in correcting his phraseology that I completely missed the actual altitude assignment. A contributing factor was also his accent combined with his tendency to talk too fast on the radio. He and I both discussed this massive error at great length and came to the conclusion that, for his part, he should speak slower and more deliberately. For my part, I must recognize when it is the proper time to instruct and when it is more appropriate to accomplish the task at hand and save my instructing for a more appropriate flight segment, time permitting. In summary, I've always been a 'verifier' whenever there was ever a doubt about any kind of communication. That's why I think this error was so sinister. I never had a doubt. I concentrated solely on my copilot's words and totally lost track of what the controller said. I also believe the controller may have missed the 'two' in my copilot's readback and only heard the 'one' and the 'zero,' which is completely understandable considering the erroneous language to begin with. Outside of my paying much closer attention (perhaps I was becoming complacent), I'm at a loss as to how to suggest avoidance of this kind of episode, other than refraining from cockpit instruction until a more appropriate time, which I will definitely put into practice from now on. Supplemental information from acn 403490: I also think that more training should be given to pilots on how to use proper phraseology and communication techniques.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN LR35 FLC CLBS TO THE WRONG ALT AFTER THE FO MISREADS THE CLRNC. DEP CTLR FAILS TO CATCH ERROR. THE CAPT WAS TOO CAUGHT UP IN CORRECTING THE PHRASEOLOGY THAT HE MISSED THE ERROR IN THE READBACK.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED MODESTO ENRTE TO PHOENIX. MY FO WAS NEW TO THE AIRPLANE AND ENGLISH IS HIS SECOND LANGUAGE. THESE 2 FACTORS WOULD ULTIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO OUR ERROR. WHAT OCCURRED (AS WE DISCOVERED LATER) WAS A 2000 FT ALTDEV. WHAT LED UP TO THE ERROR WAS A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, EACH ON THEIR OWN SUBTLE IN NATURE. I HAD BEEN GIVING TIPS, ADVICE AND GENERAL INSTRUCTION TO MY COPLT ALL ALONG, TRYING TO MAKE HIM MORE COMFORTABLE IN THE LEARJET. CONSIDERING HIS ACCENT, I PAID PARTICULAR ATTN TO HIS RADIO PHRASEOLOGY. I'VE ALWAYS BEEN VERY 'PICKY' ABOUT ALT READBACKS. MANY PLTS NEW TO JETS MAKE COMMON ERRORS SUCH AS MISSTATING 'CLBING TO TWO-THREE THOUSAND' INSTEAD OF THE PROPER CALL 'TWO-THREE-ZERO' OR 'DSNDING TO ONE- FOUR-ZERO' INSTEAD OF THE CORRECT 'ONE-FOUR THOUSAND.' I WAS TO FIND OUT LATER THAT, UPON OUR DEP FROM MOD, STOCKTON DEP ISSUED US A CLRNC TO 'CLB TO AND MAINTAIN ONE-ZERO THOUSAND, TEN-THOUSAND SIR.' FOR REASONS STILL UNKNOWN TO ME OR MY COPLT, MY COPLT RESPONDED WITH A READBACK OF 'CLBING TO ONE-TWO-ZERO THOUSAND.' AS SOON AS I HEARD HIM SAY ONE-TWO-ZERO THOUSAND, I IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED HIM BY SAYING THAT THERE IS NO SUCH ALT AS ONE- TWO-ZERO THOUSAND UNLESS YOU'RE IN THE SPACE SHUTTLE OR SR71! IN THE MEANTIME, HE SET 12000 FT INTO OUR ALT ALERTER AND I PROCEEDED TO CLB TO 12000 FT. I GOT SO CAUGHT UP IN CORRECTING HIS PHRASEOLOGY THAT I COMPLETELY MISSED THE ACTUAL ALT ASSIGNMENT. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS ALSO HIS ACCENT COMBINED WITH HIS TENDENCY TO TALK TOO FAST ON THE RADIO. HE AND I BOTH DISCUSSED THIS MASSIVE ERROR AT GREAT LENGTH AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, FOR HIS PART, HE SHOULD SPEAK SLOWER AND MORE DELIBERATELY. FOR MY PART, I MUST RECOGNIZE WHEN IT IS THE PROPER TIME TO INSTRUCT AND WHEN IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE TO ACCOMPLISH THE TASK AT HAND AND SAVE MY INSTRUCTING FOR A MORE APPROPRIATE FLT SEGMENT, TIME PERMITTING. IN SUMMARY, I'VE ALWAYS BEEN A 'VERIFIER' WHENEVER THERE WAS EVER A DOUBT ABOUT ANY KIND OF COM. THAT'S WHY I THINK THIS ERROR WAS SO SINISTER. I NEVER HAD A DOUBT. I CONCENTRATED SOLELY ON MY COPLT'S WORDS AND TOTALLY LOST TRACK OF WHAT THE CTLR SAID. I ALSO BELIEVE THE CTLR MAY HAVE MISSED THE 'TWO' IN MY COPLT'S READBACK AND ONLY HEARD THE 'ONE' AND THE 'ZERO,' WHICH IS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE CONSIDERING THE ERRONEOUS LANGUAGE TO BEGIN WITH. OUTSIDE OF MY PAYING MUCH CLOSER ATTN (PERHAPS I WAS BECOMING COMPLACENT), I'M AT A LOSS AS TO HOW TO SUGGEST AVOIDANCE OF THIS KIND OF EPISODE, OTHER THAN REFRAINING FROM COCKPIT INSTRUCTION UNTIL A MORE APPROPRIATE TIME, WHICH I WILL DEFINITELY PUT INTO PRACTICE FROM NOW ON. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 403490: I ALSO THINK THAT MORE TRAINING SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PLTS ON HOW TO USE PROPER PHRASEOLOGY AND COM TECHNIQUES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.