Narrative:

Following an overweight landing in tpa (154300 pounds versus 142198 maximum landing weight) due to medical emergency air turn back. My first officer and I contacted our airline's maintenance control for required maintenance resulting from use of the onboard emergency medical kit, 1 passenger oxygen bottle, and overweight landing resolution. In accordance with maintenance controller instructions, we inventoried the emergency medical kit since the station did not have another one. We complied with the MEL concerning passenger oxygen bottles, and we furnished landing conditions, including weight (154300 pounds), ivsi 83 FPM at touchdown, side load, and braking (automatic brake) for the overweight landing. The maintenance controller released us from tpa based on no overweight landing inspection required due to parameters at touchdown being within MEL maintenance manual limits (touchdown less than 360 FPM). We accepted the release, especially since I had done an overweight landing 9 months ago and our flight operations manual allowed for such a release at that time wherein no overweight landing inspection was required if the landing was within maintenance manual limits. We departed from tpa and I decided to doublechk the flight operations manual. Something I should have done on the ground -- only to find out that the overweight landing inspection requirements were revised since my last experience. The wording has been substantially changed and no longer reflects using maintenance manual guidelines to excuse an overweight landing inspection. The first officer and I had inspected the aircraft of course on postflt walkaround and there were no discrepancies. I found that every maintenance controller and manager I spoke with agreed with our original maintenance release when speaking with them on the phone after arrival in las, our destination. I called the flight manager's office for further clarification and advice, and asked las maintenance to perform an inspection, which they called precautionary and not required. I believe that there is a serious discrepancy between what our flight operations manual requires and what maintenance control requires concerning overweight lndgs. We should have and use the same information concerning this and any other matters. We departed tpa believing our procedures were safe, correct, and complete having communicated fully with our dispatch and maintenance control, only to find that the rules had been changed, but only in our flight operations manuals. For some unknown reason, our dispatcher and all of maintenance control were unaware of our flight operations manual requirement. The maintenance controllers I spoke with also seemed totally unaware of the regulatory nature of our flight operations manual by maintaining their position of no overweight landing inspection required after reading the flight operations manual. It was only after the flight manager called las maintenance and subsequently per my request as well that the overweight landing inspection was performed because I was not leaving las until this whole matter was fully resolved. We left tpa after diverting back there 1 hour and 50 mins later than the original departure time and arrived in las 1 hour 30 mins late. Time was definitely a factor in this matter. We would have cut our delay to 1 hour by our next stop (phx) except we took the time to assure strict compliance with FARS, ie, operations manual. We arrived at phx 1 hour 50 mins late. As a captain, I have to be able to depend on information provided to me by my support system to do an effective job. My trust in that support system has been significantly degraded. I wish I had taken the time to verify the operations manual procedure before we left tpa.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 ACFT LANDED OVERWT DUE TO A MEDICAL EMER. RPTR CAPT'S COMPANY MAINT RELEASED THE ACFT WITHOUT AN OVERWT INSPECTION ACCORDING TO THEIR MANUAL PARAMETERS. FLC LATER DISCOVERED THAT A RECENT CHANGE TO THEIR OPS MANUAL REQUIRES AN INSPECTION REGARDLESS OF OTHER PARAMETERS.

Narrative: FOLLOWING AN OVERWT LNDG IN TPA (154300 LBS VERSUS 142198 MAX LNDG WT) DUE TO MEDICAL EMER AIR TURN BACK. MY FO AND I CONTACTED OUR AIRLINE'S MAINT CTL FOR REQUIRED MAINT RESULTING FROM USE OF THE ONBOARD EMER MEDICAL KIT, 1 PAX OXYGEN BOTTLE, AND OVERWT LNDG RESOLUTION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MAINT CTLR INSTRUCTIONS, WE INVENTORIED THE EMER MEDICAL KIT SINCE THE STATION DID NOT HAVE ANOTHER ONE. WE COMPLIED WITH THE MEL CONCERNING PAX OXYGEN BOTTLES, AND WE FURNISHED LNDG CONDITIONS, INCLUDING WT (154300 LBS), IVSI 83 FPM AT TOUCHDOWN, SIDE LOAD, AND BRAKING (AUTO BRAKE) FOR THE OVERWT LNDG. THE MAINT CTLR RELEASED US FROM TPA BASED ON NO OVERWT LNDG INSPECTION REQUIRED DUE TO PARAMETERS AT TOUCHDOWN BEING WITHIN MEL MAINT MANUAL LIMITS (TOUCHDOWN LESS THAN 360 FPM). WE ACCEPTED THE RELEASE, ESPECIALLY SINCE I HAD DONE AN OVERWT LNDG 9 MONTHS AGO AND OUR FLT OPS MANUAL ALLOWED FOR SUCH A RELEASE AT THAT TIME WHEREIN NO OVERWT LNDG INSPECTION WAS REQUIRED IF THE LNDG WAS WITHIN MAINT MANUAL LIMITS. WE DEPARTED FROM TPA AND I DECIDED TO DOUBLECHK THE FLT OPS MANUAL. SOMETHING I SHOULD HAVE DONE ON THE GND -- ONLY TO FIND OUT THAT THE OVERWT LNDG INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS WERE REVISED SINCE MY LAST EXPERIENCE. THE WORDING HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED AND NO LONGER REFLECTS USING MAINT MANUAL GUIDELINES TO EXCUSE AN OVERWT LNDG INSPECTION. THE FO AND I HAD INSPECTED THE ACFT OF COURSE ON POSTFLT WALKAROUND AND THERE WERE NO DISCREPANCIES. I FOUND THAT EVERY MAINT CTLR AND MGR I SPOKE WITH AGREED WITH OUR ORIGINAL MAINT RELEASE WHEN SPEAKING WITH THEM ON THE PHONE AFTER ARR IN LAS, OUR DEST. I CALLED THE FLT MGR'S OFFICE FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION AND ADVICE, AND ASKED LAS MAINT TO PERFORM AN INSPECTION, WHICH THEY CALLED PRECAUTIONARY AND NOT REQUIRED. I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A SERIOUS DISCREPANCY BTWN WHAT OUR FLT OPS MANUAL REQUIRES AND WHAT MAINT CTL REQUIRES CONCERNING OVERWT LNDGS. WE SHOULD HAVE AND USE THE SAME INFO CONCERNING THIS AND ANY OTHER MATTERS. WE DEPARTED TPA BELIEVING OUR PROCS WERE SAFE, CORRECT, AND COMPLETE HAVING COMMUNICATED FULLY WITH OUR DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL, ONLY TO FIND THAT THE RULES HAD BEEN CHANGED, BUT ONLY IN OUR FLT OPS MANUALS. FOR SOME UNKNOWN REASON, OUR DISPATCHER AND ALL OF MAINT CTL WERE UNAWARE OF OUR FLT OPS MANUAL REQUIREMENT. THE MAINT CTLRS I SPOKE WITH ALSO SEEMED TOTALLY UNAWARE OF THE REGULATORY NATURE OF OUR FLT OPS MANUAL BY MAINTAINING THEIR POS OF NO OVERWT LNDG INSPECTION REQUIRED AFTER READING THE FLT OPS MANUAL. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE FLT MGR CALLED LAS MAINT AND SUBSEQUENTLY PER MY REQUEST AS WELL THAT THE OVERWT LNDG INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED BECAUSE I WAS NOT LEAVING LAS UNTIL THIS WHOLE MATTER WAS FULLY RESOLVED. WE LEFT TPA AFTER DIVERTING BACK THERE 1 HR AND 50 MINS LATER THAN THE ORIGINAL DEP TIME AND ARRIVED IN LAS 1 HR 30 MINS LATE. TIME WAS DEFINITELY A FACTOR IN THIS MATTER. WE WOULD HAVE CUT OUR DELAY TO 1 HR BY OUR NEXT STOP (PHX) EXCEPT WE TOOK THE TIME TO ASSURE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH FARS, IE, OPS MANUAL. WE ARRIVED AT PHX 1 HR 50 MINS LATE. AS A CAPT, I HAVE TO BE ABLE TO DEPEND ON INFO PROVIDED TO ME BY MY SUPPORT SYS TO DO AN EFFECTIVE JOB. MY TRUST IN THAT SUPPORT SYS HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED. I WISH I HAD TAKEN THE TIME TO VERIFY THE OPS MANUAL PROC BEFORE WE LEFT TPA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.