Narrative:

We departed the gate at ord and discovered that the anti- skid was inoperative. After trying all remedies suggested by radio from maintenance, it was decided and agreed to by dispatch that the flight could be released to cle with the anti-skid deferred. The so made that necessary adjustment to the takeoff speeds and checked the landing weights for our arrival. When we got to the cle area, the so announced that, upon rechking our landing weight, we were too heavy to land with the runway length available and the anti-skid inoperative. At this point I felt that, given the amount of fuel remaining, the safest course of action was to land at cle. The landing was accomplished with no further problem and the aircraft inspected by our local mechanics as prescribed in the maintenance manual. After the anti-skid was repaired we flew the return flight to ord. Obviously, the solution to this problem lay in double checking all figures in terms of the allowable landing weight in cle. I thought that this was the case in that both the dispatcher and the so concurred that all was in order. Apparently we were all too concerned with the takeoff weight and not the landing weight. The entire procedure is quite cumbersome and it is evident that mistakes can occur. Other distrs that contributed were a late departure because of an unrelated mechanical problem and extensive thunderstorm activity in the area.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A DC10-30 LANDED OVERWT DUE TO A LACK OF SUFFICIENT FUEL FOR A SUITABLE ALTERNATE. THE ANTI-SKID SYS WAS DEFERRED AND INOP. THE FLC HAD NOT CONSIDERED THE DEST RWY LENGTH REQUIRED FOR THE ANTI-SKID SYS NOT BEING AVAILABLE.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED THE GATE AT ORD AND DISCOVERED THAT THE ANTI- SKID WAS INOP. AFTER TRYING ALL REMEDIES SUGGESTED BY RADIO FROM MAINT, IT WAS DECIDED AND AGREED TO BY DISPATCH THAT THE FLT COULD BE RELEASED TO CLE WITH THE ANTI-SKID DEFERRED. THE SO MADE THAT NECESSARY ADJUSTMENT TO THE TKOF SPDS AND CHKED THE LNDG WTS FOR OUR ARR. WHEN WE GOT TO THE CLE AREA, THE SO ANNOUNCED THAT, UPON RECHKING OUR LNDG WT, WE WERE TOO HVY TO LAND WITH THE RWY LENGTH AVAILABLE AND THE ANTI-SKID INOP. AT THIS POINT I FELT THAT, GIVEN THE AMOUNT OF FUEL REMAINING, THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO LAND AT CLE. THE LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH NO FURTHER PROB AND THE ACFT INSPECTED BY OUR LCL MECHS AS PRESCRIBED IN THE MAINT MANUAL. AFTER THE ANTI-SKID WAS REPAIRED WE FLEW THE RETURN FLT TO ORD. OBVIOUSLY, THE SOLUTION TO THIS PROB LAY IN DOUBLE CHKING ALL FIGURES IN TERMS OF THE ALLOWABLE LNDG WT IN CLE. I THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS THE CASE IN THAT BOTH THE DISPATCHER AND THE SO CONCURRED THAT ALL WAS IN ORDER. APPARENTLY WE WERE ALL TOO CONCERNED WITH THE TKOF WT AND NOT THE LNDG WT. THE ENTIRE PROC IS QUITE CUMBERSOME AND IT IS EVIDENT THAT MISTAKES CAN OCCUR. OTHER DISTRS THAT CONTRIBUTED WERE A LATE DEP BECAUSE OF AN UNRELATED MECHANICAL PROB AND EXTENSIVE TSTM ACTIVITY IN THE AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.