Narrative:

On departure at approximately 3500 ft MSL, I noticed a musty smell in the cockpit. The captain looked back and confirmed smoke in the aircraft. The captain handled the passenger plus normal and emergency checklists. An emergency was declared. I flew the aircraft back to iad and made a normal landing against traffic. The aircraft was evacuate/evacuationed on a taxiway without event. Oxygen masks and smoke goggles were removed but not utilized as situation would have compromised safety if crew communications were further impaired. Supplemental information from acn 399327: the taxi was normal to runway 30, with the recirculation fan, freon air conditioner, and both flows used for cabin cooling (manual mode). No abnormalities noted. The departure was normal at XA55 with the first officer acting as the PF. We began to notice an odor of smoke in the cockpit at approximately 3500 ft. The smoke appeared heavier in the rear of the passenger cabin. I advised dulles departure of smoke in the cabin and requested a return vector to iad, then declared an emergency. The passenger oxygen masks were deployed. No central annunciator panel lights were ever noted. The passenger were advised of the intent to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft immediately upon landing and the procedure to follow. I requested dulles departure notify our company dispatch center, summon crash fire rescue equipment and notify dulles tower of our intent to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft on a taxiway. We landed at approximately XB07 on runway 19L and stopped the aircraft on the first reverse taxiway. The evacuate/evacuation checklist was performed and all passenger exited through the main cabin door without injury. The passenger were attended to by crash fire rescue equipment. I pulled the cockpit voice recorder circuit breaker before exiting the aircraft. Smoke of unknown origin, no fire ever detected. No aircraft damage noted. I notified dispatch supervisor and chief pilot at XC00. There were 4 areas of the aircraft deferred, which we reviewed and discussed in the preflight briefing. The deferred items per the MEL were: cabin ground heater, air conditioner group (r- hand), DME, synchrophase system. Of concern to us was the cabin heater regarding a potential fire as the write-up indicated the heater would not shut off when switched off.the corrective action indicated the cannon plug was disconnected from the power source and capped. Next, there was some confusion regarding the r-hand air conditioning group. The previous crew briefed us when leaving the aircraft that the r-hand flow or pneumatic air conditioning system was inoperative. We found the r-hand flow was not deferred, but the automatic mode of the heating/air conditioning system. The original write-up stated the r-hand flow would not hold the cabin pressurization to below 500 FPM climb with the l- hand flow off. I bring this to your attention as the right pneumatic air conditioning system could have been the source of smoke in this situation. We, as a flight crew, could have inadvertently contributed to a maintenance deficiency or ambiguous MEL. Numerous flts back, possibly 8 or 10 or more, I noticed a left engine oil leak problem. I bring this up because it is my belief that a left engine oil leak was the source of the smoke in this incident. Reason being, the postflt inspection revealed a significant amount of fresh new oil on the left engine cowling. My first officer had just 100 hours total time in make/model, accumulated over the course of the previous 90 days. He was an ex-military fighter pilot, an ex-air carrier pilot (B737 flight engineer and first officer), but had not flown commercially in approximately 7 yrs. We had 7 passenger on board including 2 unaccompanied minors. I placed the unaccompanied minors in row X to be able to see and control them better. When the emergency was idented, I decided to have the first officer continue as the PF. I felt this would allow me time to run checklists, assist the passenger, and troubleshoot the problem. The smoke was accumulating very rapidly and very thick. The passenger were obviously having trouble breathing and seeing. 4 of the passenger were obviously very distressed and panicked -- the 2 unaccompanied minors and 2 teenagers in the rear of the cabin. I believed no fire to be involved, however felt it could be imminent, as well as the rate of smoke accumulation could have been life threatening or compromise flight and/or landing. I had to interrupt my thought processes and actions to assist the first officer with PF responsibilities. He missed an ATC instruction to leave heading 090 degrees and proceed direct (approximately 170 degrees) to iad. He missed an ATC instruction to plan a landing on runway 19L, and aligned the aircraft with runway 19R. His approach speed was 10 KTS off profile and had to be reminded to return to normal approach speed. I believe the safety of this flight during this emergency was compromised by the lack of a flight attendant to assist the passenger. The passenger were the responsibility of the flight crew, distracting, delaying, and interrupting us from our cockpit/flying responsibilities. I had to physically assist the unaccompanied minors don their oxygen masks, and restrain them to remain seated. I had to solicit assistance from another passenger to assist me with the unaccompanied minors. I had to brief the passenger on what was happening, what our intention was (return to land and evacuate/evacuation), and the evacuate/evacuation procedure. If I had not had to divert and divide my attention to the passenger, it would have allowed for a more precise, less confused, safe coordination and handling of the cockpit responsibilities. It was our individual decisions not to don the smoke goggles or oxygen masks per the checklist. They simply were not necessary for the level of smoke in the cockpit at the time the checklist was initiated. The oxygen mask microphones are, at best, poor and I did not wish to create a communication problem with ATC, my first officer or the passenger. After the flight and some research, I discovered differences between 2 QRH checklists and the flight standards manual checklists. The 'smoke or fire, flight deck or cabin' had differences with regard to troubleshooting involving the flow (pneumatic air conditioning system) selectors. The QRH version essentially required troubleshooting by turning off and on each of the flow selectors in an effort to identify the smoke source. The fsm version deleted this procedure and simply had the flow selectors set to full on. I followed the fsm version which appeared more recent, as well as less time consuming due to our time constraints. The 'smoke or fire, flight deck or cabin' checklist requires the pulling of several circuit breakers for electrical equipment which could be potential sources of the smoke or fire. I chose not to take the time to attempt to locate and pull any of those circuit breakers. I felt we were already in the approach phase of flight and in the interest of safety did not feel it was a priority at that time. As well as we did not feel the smoke was of an electrical origin. I believe this event was complicated by the inexperience of the flight crew, ambiguous outdated checklists, lack of a flight attendant, and a poor procedure for dispatch notification. The flight crew parameter can be improved by providing more frequent and diverse emergency training. The checklist parameter can be corrected by ensuring current checklists are disseminated, as well as a procedure for resolving discrepancies noted in checklists. The flight attendant parameter can be corrected by placing a flight attendant on all passenger carrying operations under far part 121, or removing such type of aircraft (19 seat) from part 121 operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BAE 3200 JETSTREAM HAS SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND COCKPIT AFTER TKOF AT IAD. AT 3500 FT AN EMER IS DECLARED, THE ACFT RETURNED, LANDED AND EVACED. THERE WERE SOME DEVS FROM ATC INSTRUCTIONS. THE ACFT HAD A NUMBER OF MEL ITEMS AND, ON THE POSTFLT, OIL WAS OBSERVED ON THE COWLING OF #1 ENG.

Narrative: ON DEP AT APPROX 3500 FT MSL, I NOTICED A MUSTY SMELL IN THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT LOOKED BACK AND CONFIRMED SMOKE IN THE ACFT. THE CAPT HANDLED THE PAX PLUS NORMAL AND EMER CHKLISTS. AN EMER WAS DECLARED. I FLEW THE ACFT BACK TO IAD AND MADE A NORMAL LNDG AGAINST TFC. THE ACFT WAS EVACED ON A TXWY WITHOUT EVENT. OXYGEN MASKS AND SMOKE GOGGLES WERE REMOVED BUT NOT UTILIZED AS SIT WOULD HAVE COMPROMISED SAFETY IF CREW COMS WERE FURTHER IMPAIRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 399327: THE TAXI WAS NORMAL TO RWY 30, WITH THE RECIRCULATION FAN, FREON AIR CONDITIONER, AND BOTH FLOWS USED FOR CABIN COOLING (MANUAL MODE). NO ABNORMALITIES NOTED. THE DEP WAS NORMAL AT XA55 WITH THE FO ACTING AS THE PF. WE BEGAN TO NOTICE AN ODOR OF SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AT APPROX 3500 FT. THE SMOKE APPEARED HEAVIER IN THE REAR OF THE PAX CABIN. I ADVISED DULLES DEP OF SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND REQUESTED A RETURN VECTOR TO IAD, THEN DECLARED AN EMER. THE PAX OXYGEN MASKS WERE DEPLOYED. NO CENTRAL ANNUNCIATOR PANEL LIGHTS WERE EVER NOTED. THE PAX WERE ADVISED OF THE INTENT TO EVAC THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY UPON LNDG AND THE PROC TO FOLLOW. I REQUESTED DULLES DEP NOTIFY OUR COMPANY DISPATCH CTR, SUMMON CFR AND NOTIFY DULLES TWR OF OUR INTENT TO EVAC THE ACFT ON A TXWY. WE LANDED AT APPROX XB07 ON RWY 19L AND STOPPED THE ACFT ON THE FIRST REVERSE TXWY. THE EVAC CHKLIST WAS PERFORMED AND ALL PAX EXITED THROUGH THE MAIN CABIN DOOR WITHOUT INJURY. THE PAX WERE ATTENDED TO BY CFR. I PULLED THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER CIRCUIT BREAKER BEFORE EXITING THE ACFT. SMOKE OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN, NO FIRE EVER DETECTED. NO ACFT DAMAGE NOTED. I NOTIFIED DISPATCH SUPVR AND CHIEF PLT AT XC00. THERE WERE 4 AREAS OF THE ACFT DEFERRED, WHICH WE REVIEWED AND DISCUSSED IN THE PREFLT BRIEFING. THE DEFERRED ITEMS PER THE MEL WERE: CABIN GND HEATER, AIR CONDITIONER GROUP (R- HAND), DME, SYNCHROPHASE SYS. OF CONCERN TO US WAS THE CABIN HEATER REGARDING A POTENTIAL FIRE AS THE WRITE-UP INDICATED THE HEATER WOULD NOT SHUT OFF WHEN SWITCHED OFF.THE CORRECTIVE ACTION INDICATED THE CANNON PLUG WAS DISCONNECTED FROM THE PWR SOURCE AND CAPPED. NEXT, THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION REGARDING THE R-HAND AIR CONDITIONING GROUP. THE PREVIOUS CREW BRIEFED US WHEN LEAVING THE ACFT THAT THE R-HAND FLOW OR PNEUMATIC AIR CONDITIONING SYS WAS INOP. WE FOUND THE R-HAND FLOW WAS NOT DEFERRED, BUT THE AUTO MODE OF THE HEATING/AIR CONDITIONING SYS. THE ORIGINAL WRITE-UP STATED THE R-HAND FLOW WOULD NOT HOLD THE CABIN PRESSURIZATION TO BELOW 500 FPM CLB WITH THE L- HAND FLOW OFF. I BRING THIS TO YOUR ATTN AS THE R PNEUMATIC AIR CONDITIONING SYS COULD HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF SMOKE IN THIS SIT. WE, AS A FLC, COULD HAVE INADVERTENTLY CONTRIBUTED TO A MAINT DEFICIENCY OR AMBIGUOUS MEL. NUMEROUS FLTS BACK, POSSIBLY 8 OR 10 OR MORE, I NOTICED A L ENG OIL LEAK PROB. I BRING THIS UP BECAUSE IT IS MY BELIEF THAT A L ENG OIL LEAK WAS THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE IN THIS INCIDENT. REASON BEING, THE POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF FRESH NEW OIL ON THE L ENG COWLING. MY FO HAD JUST 100 HRS TOTAL TIME IN MAKE/MODEL, ACCUMULATED OVER THE COURSE OF THE PREVIOUS 90 DAYS. HE WAS AN EX-MIL FIGHTER PLT, AN EX-ACR PLT (B737 FE AND FO), BUT HAD NOT FLOWN COMMERCIALLY IN APPROX 7 YRS. WE HAD 7 PAX ON BOARD INCLUDING 2 UNACCOMPANIED MINORS. I PLACED THE UNACCOMPANIED MINORS IN ROW X TO BE ABLE TO SEE AND CTL THEM BETTER. WHEN THE EMER WAS IDENTED, I DECIDED TO HAVE THE FO CONTINUE AS THE PF. I FELT THIS WOULD ALLOW ME TIME TO RUN CHKLISTS, ASSIST THE PAX, AND TROUBLESHOOT THE PROB. THE SMOKE WAS ACCUMULATING VERY RAPIDLY AND VERY THICK. THE PAX WERE OBVIOUSLY HAVING TROUBLE BREATHING AND SEEING. 4 OF THE PAX WERE OBVIOUSLY VERY DISTRESSED AND PANICKED -- THE 2 UNACCOMPANIED MINORS AND 2 TEENAGERS IN THE REAR OF THE CABIN. I BELIEVED NO FIRE TO BE INVOLVED, HOWEVER FELT IT COULD BE IMMINENT, AS WELL AS THE RATE OF SMOKE ACCUMULATION COULD HAVE BEEN LIFE THREATENING OR COMPROMISE FLT AND/OR LNDG. I HAD TO INTERRUPT MY THOUGHT PROCESSES AND ACTIONS TO ASSIST THE FO WITH PF RESPONSIBILITIES. HE MISSED AN ATC INSTRUCTION TO LEAVE HDG 090 DEGS AND PROCEED DIRECT (APPROX 170 DEGS) TO IAD. HE MISSED AN ATC INSTRUCTION TO PLAN A LNDG ON RWY 19L, AND ALIGNED THE ACFT WITH RWY 19R. HIS APCH SPD WAS 10 KTS OFF PROFILE AND HAD TO BE REMINDED TO RETURN TO NORMAL APCH SPD. I BELIEVE THE SAFETY OF THIS FLT DURING THIS EMER WAS COMPROMISED BY THE LACK OF A FLT ATTENDANT TO ASSIST THE PAX. THE PAX WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FLC, DISTRACTING, DELAYING, AND INTERRUPTING US FROM OUR COCKPIT/FLYING RESPONSIBILITIES. I HAD TO PHYSICALLY ASSIST THE UNACCOMPANIED MINORS DON THEIR OXYGEN MASKS, AND RESTRAIN THEM TO REMAIN SEATED. I HAD TO SOLICIT ASSISTANCE FROM ANOTHER PAX TO ASSIST ME WITH THE UNACCOMPANIED MINORS. I HAD TO BRIEF THE PAX ON WHAT WAS HAPPENING, WHAT OUR INTENTION WAS (RETURN TO LAND AND EVAC), AND THE EVAC PROC. IF I HAD NOT HAD TO DIVERT AND DIVIDE MY ATTN TO THE PAX, IT WOULD HAVE ALLOWED FOR A MORE PRECISE, LESS CONFUSED, SAFE COORD AND HANDLING OF THE COCKPIT RESPONSIBILITIES. IT WAS OUR INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS NOT TO DON THE SMOKE GOGGLES OR OXYGEN MASKS PER THE CHKLIST. THEY SIMPLY WERE NOT NECESSARY FOR THE LEVEL OF SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AT THE TIME THE CHKLIST WAS INITIATED. THE OXYGEN MASK MICROPHONES ARE, AT BEST, POOR AND I DID NOT WISH TO CREATE A COM PROB WITH ATC, MY FO OR THE PAX. AFTER THE FLT AND SOME RESEARCH, I DISCOVERED DIFFERENCES BTWN 2 QRH CHKLISTS AND THE FLT STANDARDS MANUAL CHKLISTS. THE 'SMOKE OR FIRE, FLT DECK OR CABIN' HAD DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO TROUBLESHOOTING INVOLVING THE FLOW (PNEUMATIC AIR CONDITIONING SYS) SELECTORS. THE QRH VERSION ESSENTIALLY REQUIRED TROUBLESHOOTING BY TURNING OFF AND ON EACH OF THE FLOW SELECTORS IN AN EFFORT TO IDENT THE SMOKE SOURCE. THE FSM VERSION DELETED THIS PROC AND SIMPLY HAD THE FLOW SELECTORS SET TO FULL ON. I FOLLOWED THE FSM VERSION WHICH APPEARED MORE RECENT, AS WELL AS LESS TIME CONSUMING DUE TO OUR TIME CONSTRAINTS. THE 'SMOKE OR FIRE, FLT DECK OR CABIN' CHKLIST REQUIRES THE PULLING OF SEVERAL CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR ELECTRICAL EQUIP WHICH COULD BE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF THE SMOKE OR FIRE. I CHOSE NOT TO TAKE THE TIME TO ATTEMPT TO LOCATE AND PULL ANY OF THOSE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. I FELT WE WERE ALREADY IN THE APCH PHASE OF FLT AND IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY DID NOT FEEL IT WAS A PRIORITY AT THAT TIME. AS WELL AS WE DID NOT FEEL THE SMOKE WAS OF AN ELECTRICAL ORIGIN. I BELIEVE THIS EVENT WAS COMPLICATED BY THE INEXPERIENCE OF THE FLC, AMBIGUOUS OUTDATED CHKLISTS, LACK OF A FLT ATTENDANT, AND A POOR PROC FOR DISPATCH NOTIFICATION. THE FLC PARAMETER CAN BE IMPROVED BY PROVIDING MORE FREQUENT AND DIVERSE EMER TRAINING. THE CHKLIST PARAMETER CAN BE CORRECTED BY ENSURING CURRENT CHKLISTS ARE DISSEMINATED, AS WELL AS A PROC FOR RESOLVING DISCREPANCIES NOTED IN CHKLISTS. THE FLT ATTENDANT PARAMETER CAN BE CORRECTED BY PLACING A FLT ATTENDANT ON ALL PAX CARRYING OPS UNDER FAR PART 121, OR REMOVING SUCH TYPE OF ACFT (19 SEAT) FROM PART 121 OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.