Narrative:

The main and standby frequencys for the campbell high sector became unusable and were OTS and during my shift the sector went on red alert status twice. This means that the traffic management unit at ZME receives information showing that the number of actual aircraft in the sector exceeds the normal workable capacity of that airspace for a given time period. These time periods occur in 15 min intervals, so for at least 30 mins that day the sector exceeded its normal workable load of aircraft and was operating with absolutely no backup frequencys. And it was using the worse of its normal 3 frequency system. During no portion of that time period were other frequencys patched in. It is speculation on my part but I would guess that traffic management was unaware of the frequency situation and that they did nothing other than advise the supervisor in charge of the sector that it was about to go 'red.' the possible solutions to this scenario are many, however, my primary concern is the complete disregard by management for the safety of air traffic at ZME. When the graham low sector's frequencys were initially turned on none of them worked. The backup emergency communications of buec became usable at XA50 then failed at XA55. They returned at priority 4 at XB00. Each day the air traffic system has scheduled maintenance outages of certain navaids and of course we also have failures. On mar/sun/98 2 radar outages were scheduled. Qpc XG00-XJ00 and qoj XK00-XP00. Each of these radar outages has a significant impact on the air traffic operating in the graham low sector. After the frequencys failed it was apparent that the sector could not be operated by itself with the planned radar outages. Instead of canceling and rescheduling these outages, a decision was made to operate this sector together with another sector just north of it. This action provided some frequency overlap to the sector, but basically from ghm to MSL and syi to jks there was no radar coverage below 6000 ft and spotty radar coverage between 6000 ft and 10000 ft. The frequency coverage between those points was poor -- buec priority 4 and no backup. Aircraft operating below 6000 ft were on their own. ATC could not communicate with them or see them. Both radar outages should have been postponed until the frequencys could be fixed. Management at any level could have done this but chose not to. The main and standby frequencys for both the graham low and the campbell high sector were out for over 10 hours. This is completely unacceptable. Other frequencys could have and should have been brought over to these sectors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTED PRIMARY AND BACKUP FREQ OUTAGE AND SCHEDULED OFFSET SHUTDOWN OF 2 RADAR SYS AFFECTING TFC COVERAGE.

Narrative: THE MAIN AND STANDBY FREQS FOR THE CAMPBELL HIGH SECTOR BECAME UNUSABLE AND WERE OTS AND DURING MY SHIFT THE SECTOR WENT ON RED ALERT STATUS TWICE. THIS MEANS THAT THE TFC MGMNT UNIT AT ZME RECEIVES INFO SHOWING THAT THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL ACFT IN THE SECTOR EXCEEDS THE NORMAL WORKABLE CAPACITY OF THAT AIRSPACE FOR A GIVEN TIME PERIOD. THESE TIME PERIODS OCCUR IN 15 MIN INTERVALS, SO FOR AT LEAST 30 MINS THAT DAY THE SECTOR EXCEEDED ITS NORMAL WORKABLE LOAD OF ACFT AND WAS OPERATING WITH ABSOLUTELY NO BACKUP FREQS. AND IT WAS USING THE WORSE OF ITS NORMAL 3 FREQ SYS. DURING NO PORTION OF THAT TIME PERIOD WERE OTHER FREQS PATCHED IN. IT IS SPECULATION ON MY PART BUT I WOULD GUESS THAT TFC MGMNT WAS UNAWARE OF THE FREQ SIT AND THAT THEY DID NOTHING OTHER THAN ADVISE THE SUPVR IN CHARGE OF THE SECTOR THAT IT WAS ABOUT TO GO 'RED.' THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THIS SCENARIO ARE MANY, HOWEVER, MY PRIMARY CONCERN IS THE COMPLETE DISREGARD BY MGMNT FOR THE SAFETY OF AIR TFC AT ZME. WHEN THE GRAHAM LOW SECTOR'S FREQS WERE INITIALLY TURNED ON NONE OF THEM WORKED. THE BACKUP EMER COMS OF BUEC BECAME USABLE AT XA50 THEN FAILED AT XA55. THEY RETURNED AT PRIORITY 4 AT XB00. EACH DAY THE AIR TFC SYS HAS SCHEDULED MAINT OUTAGES OF CERTAIN NAVAIDS AND OF COURSE WE ALSO HAVE FAILURES. ON MAR/SUN/98 2 RADAR OUTAGES WERE SCHEDULED. QPC XG00-XJ00 AND QOJ XK00-XP00. EACH OF THESE RADAR OUTAGES HAS A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE AIR TFC OPERATING IN THE GRAHAM LOW SECTOR. AFTER THE FREQS FAILED IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE SECTOR COULD NOT BE OPERATED BY ITSELF WITH THE PLANNED RADAR OUTAGES. INSTEAD OF CANCELING AND RESCHEDULING THESE OUTAGES, A DECISION WAS MADE TO OPERATE THIS SECTOR TOGETHER WITH ANOTHER SECTOR JUST N OF IT. THIS ACTION PROVIDED SOME FREQ OVERLAP TO THE SECTOR, BUT BASICALLY FROM GHM TO MSL AND SYI TO JKS THERE WAS NO RADAR COVERAGE BELOW 6000 FT AND SPOTTY RADAR COVERAGE BTWN 6000 FT AND 10000 FT. THE FREQ COVERAGE BTWN THOSE POINTS WAS POOR -- BUEC PRIORITY 4 AND NO BACKUP. ACFT OPERATING BELOW 6000 FT WERE ON THEIR OWN. ATC COULD NOT COMMUNICATE WITH THEM OR SEE THEM. BOTH RADAR OUTAGES SHOULD HAVE BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL THE FREQS COULD BE FIXED. MGMNT AT ANY LEVEL COULD HAVE DONE THIS BUT CHOSE NOT TO. THE MAIN AND STANDBY FREQS FOR BOTH THE GRAHAM LOW AND THE CAMPBELL HIGH SECTOR WERE OUT FOR OVER 10 HRS. THIS IS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. OTHER FREQS COULD HAVE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT OVER TO THESE SECTORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.