Narrative:

On jan/xx/98 aircraft YYY was released for revenue service from air carrier maintenance base after completion of an il check. On jan/xa/97 in xyz, a tailcone indicator light was logged. After maintenance check, tailcone light was MEL'ed. On jan/xb/97 tailcone fell off aircraft YYY on landing rollout in abc. Numerous checks and inspections were performed on the tailcone release system in ZZZ. I was involved in the check of the aft cabin door tailcone emergency release system. Upon lubrication of aft door, release handle test pulled at 19 pounds. Svcable limits are 15 +/-5 pounds pull. After test, rigging was checked and tailcone was placed onto fuselage per maintenance manual. I turned over job to next shift. It is my belief that aircraft YYY left ZZZ with a properly rigged tailcone system. The only way the tailcone was to depart the aircraft would be if the locking cable ball end was to come mislodged or deployed from the switch assembly. When properly rigged the only way this happens is if any one of 3 handles/cables is pulled enough to partially or totally dislodge cable ball ends. Personnel working around this aircraft should be properly trained that even a partial pull of any of the emergency release handles could cause tailcone displacement. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated after the routine work form is accomplished on the tailcone and all repairs finished the tailcone is drop-checked to check the locking and release mechanism. The reporter said the tailcone is attached and all locking devices reinspected again. Callback conversation with reporter acn 392192 revealed the following information: the reporter stated that at some point after leaving the maintenance check station one of the tailcone release handles may have been pulled out enough to partially dislodge the release mechanism then returned to the stowed position. Callback conversation with reporter acn 392521 revealed the following information: the reporter stated the final inspection was performed by the reporter and was complete in every detail, locking mechanism and cable system all checked good. The reporter said when the tailcone annunciator light was deferred in xyz the MEL requires the visual check of the locking mechanism to insure the light is the problem and not the tailcone lock. The reporter said if this were done correctly there could be no doubt of the tailcone security.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 RECENTLY RELEASED FOR REVENUE SVC FROM A HVY MAINT CHK EXPERIENCED THE DEP OF THE FUSELAGE TAILCONE ON LNDG ROLLOUT.

Narrative: ON JAN/XX/98 ACFT YYY WAS RELEASED FOR REVENUE SVC FROM ACR MAINT BASE AFTER COMPLETION OF AN IL CHK. ON JAN/XA/97 IN XYZ, A TAILCONE INDICATOR LIGHT WAS LOGGED. AFTER MAINT CHK, TAILCONE LIGHT WAS MEL'ED. ON JAN/XB/97 TAILCONE FELL OFF ACFT YYY ON LNDG ROLLOUT IN ABC. NUMEROUS CHKS AND INSPECTIONS WERE PERFORMED ON THE TAILCONE RELEASE SYS IN ZZZ. I WAS INVOLVED IN THE CHK OF THE AFT CABIN DOOR TAILCONE EMER RELEASE SYS. UPON LUBRICATION OF AFT DOOR, RELEASE HANDLE TEST PULLED AT 19 LBS. SVCABLE LIMITS ARE 15 +/-5 LBS PULL. AFTER TEST, RIGGING WAS CHKED AND TAILCONE WAS PLACED ONTO FUSELAGE PER MAINT MANUAL. I TURNED OVER JOB TO NEXT SHIFT. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT ACFT YYY LEFT ZZZ WITH A PROPERLY RIGGED TAILCONE SYS. THE ONLY WAY THE TAILCONE WAS TO DEPART THE ACFT WOULD BE IF THE LOCKING CABLE BALL END WAS TO COME MISLODGED OR DEPLOYED FROM THE SWITCH ASSEMBLY. WHEN PROPERLY RIGGED THE ONLY WAY THIS HAPPENS IS IF ANY ONE OF 3 HANDLES/CABLES IS PULLED ENOUGH TO PARTIALLY OR TOTALLY DISLODGE CABLE BALL ENDS. PERSONNEL WORKING AROUND THIS ACFT SHOULD BE PROPERLY TRAINED THAT EVEN A PARTIAL PULL OF ANY OF THE EMER RELEASE HANDLES COULD CAUSE TAILCONE DISPLACEMENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED AFTER THE ROUTINE WORK FORM IS ACCOMPLISHED ON THE TAILCONE AND ALL REPAIRS FINISHED THE TAILCONE IS DROP-CHKED TO CHK THE LOCKING AND RELEASE MECHANISM. THE RPTR SAID THE TAILCONE IS ATTACHED AND ALL LOCKING DEVICES REINSPECTED AGAIN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 392192 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT AT SOME POINT AFTER LEAVING THE MAINT CHK STATION ONE OF THE TAILCONE RELEASE HANDLES MAY HAVE BEEN PULLED OUT ENOUGH TO PARTIALLY DISLODGE THE RELEASE MECHANISM THEN RETURNED TO THE STOWED POS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 392521 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE FINAL INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED BY THE RPTR AND WAS COMPLETE IN EVERY DETAIL, LOCKING MECHANISM AND CABLE SYS ALL CHKED GOOD. THE RPTR SAID WHEN THE TAILCONE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT WAS DEFERRED IN XYZ THE MEL REQUIRES THE VISUAL CHK OF THE LOCKING MECHANISM TO INSURE THE LIGHT IS THE PROB AND NOT THE TAILCONE LOCK. THE RPTR SAID IF THIS WERE DONE CORRECTLY THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT OF THE TAILCONE SECURITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.