Narrative:

On takeoff and subsequent climb out I experienced partial loss of power on the left engine. All other indications normal. Only manifold dropped off. I declared an emergency and returned to elp. I performed several run-ups and found no irregularities. I elected to fly to dal as originally intended. The problem is my operations specifications manual states that this was in error. Only the director of maintenance can release the aircraft for flight even if no actual fault can be determined. I performed a visual inspection of aircraft before this second flight. I was informed by my employer that I erred in continuing flight. Suggestion is more recurrent and frequent training on policies and procedures. This aircraft was then released to a second pilot to continue on another run. The pilot was aware of the event described. He too erred in accepting the aircraft. Dispatch was aware of the occurrence upon my landing in el paso and suggested testing and continuing the flight as well as releasing aircraft to the second pilot. Again training and recurrent review of policies and procedures would help to avoid possible hazardous flight conditions. Note: the flight from el paso to dallas (the second flight) was uneventful.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT CARGO FLT HAS PARTIAL LOSS OF PWR ON CLBOUT. PLT RETURNS TO ARPT AND CHKS ENG WITH NO REPEAT OF THE PROB. HE DEPARTS AGAIN AND AT DEST IS INFORMED THAT HE SHOULD NOT HAVE DEPARTED WITHOUT A MAINT INSPECTION.

Narrative: ON TKOF AND SUBSEQUENT CLBOUT I EXPERIENCED PARTIAL LOSS OF PWR ON THE L ENG. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS NORMAL. ONLY MANIFOLD DROPPED OFF. I DECLARED AN EMER AND RETURNED TO ELP. I PERFORMED SEVERAL RUN-UPS AND FOUND NO IRREGULARITIES. I ELECTED TO FLY TO DAL AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED. THE PROB IS MY OPS SPECS MANUAL STATES THAT THIS WAS IN ERROR. ONLY THE DIRECTOR OF MAINT CAN RELEASE THE ACFT FOR FLT EVEN IF NO ACTUAL FAULT CAN BE DETERMINED. I PERFORMED A VISUAL INSPECTION OF ACFT BEFORE THIS SECOND FLT. I WAS INFORMED BY MY EMPLOYER THAT I ERRED IN CONTINUING FLT. SUGGESTION IS MORE RECURRENT AND FREQUENT TRAINING ON POLICIES AND PROCS. THIS ACFT WAS THEN RELEASED TO A SECOND PLT TO CONTINUE ON ANOTHER RUN. THE PLT WAS AWARE OF THE EVENT DESCRIBED. HE TOO ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE ACFT. DISPATCH WAS AWARE OF THE OCCURRENCE UPON MY LNDG IN EL PASO AND SUGGESTED TESTING AND CONTINUING THE FLT AS WELL AS RELEASING ACFT TO THE SECOND PLT. AGAIN TRAINING AND RECURRENT REVIEW OF POLICIES AND PROCS WOULD HELP TO AVOID POSSIBLE HAZARDOUS FLT CONDITIONS. NOTE: THE FLT FROM EL PASO TO DALLAS (THE SECOND FLT) WAS UNEVENTFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.