Narrative:

Route eyw-mco. Leg #6, 13 hour duty day. During execution of descent checklist, it was noted by PNF/first officer that fuel gauges read: left 1100 pounds, right +/-100 pounds. First officer immediately selected left boost pumps 'on' and xfeed open, right boost pumps 'off.' this was to immediately start xferring fuel to right tank. During initial start of descent a 'doors' master caution light and 'service' doors light intermittently came on with increased airspeed. Light extinguished upon speed reduction. About the time the fuel imbal was noted a 'fuel' caution light briefly illuminated. CRM between captain and first officer determined that even with extreme imbal and low #2 tank reading, #2 engine would not quit due to fuel starvation. Next was discussed limitation of fuel imbal for landing. First officer accessed flight standards manual and confirmed maximum imbal was 'demonstrated only.' it was further discussed and agreed to extend flight to land near the maximum demonstration imbal figure while keeping minimum required reserve fuel on board at touchdown. ATC was notified of imbal situation, requesting vectors to burn down fuel to landing limits. Vectors and burndown completed, landing was made without incident. Extenuating factors: 1) aircraft had problem with right wing fuel vent valve. Valve was deferred, requiring overwing refueling. 2) after 8 yrs of checklist on multi function display, FAA recently made company stop using that practice and go to paper checklist. Captain laid his checklist on center console, over fuel gauges resulting in gauges not being scanned (clutter in cockpit). 3) 'doors' light was caused by improperly fastened 'dzeus' fastener on fuel service door. 4) fuel imbal cause: undetermined by maintenance.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB120 ACFT IN DSCNT TO DEST FLC NOTED FUEL IMBAL AND TOOK ACTION TO CORRECT. IN ORDER TO GET THE IMBAL WITHIN LNDG CRITERIA, THEY EXTENDED THE FLT IN THE ARPT VICINITY UNTIL CORRECTED.

Narrative: RTE EYW-MCO. LEG #6, 13 HR DUTY DAY. DURING EXECUTION OF DSCNT CHKLIST, IT WAS NOTED BY PNF/FO THAT FUEL GAUGES READ: L 1100 LBS, R +/-100 LBS. FO IMMEDIATELY SELECTED L BOOST PUMPS 'ON' AND XFEED OPEN, R BOOST PUMPS 'OFF.' THIS WAS TO IMMEDIATELY START XFERRING FUEL TO R TANK. DURING INITIAL START OF DSCNT A 'DOORS' MASTER CAUTION LIGHT AND 'SVC' DOORS LIGHT INTERMITTENTLY CAME ON WITH INCREASED AIRSPD. LIGHT EXTINGUISHED UPON SPEED REDUCTION. ABOUT THE TIME THE FUEL IMBAL WAS NOTED A 'FUEL' CAUTION LIGHT BRIEFLY ILLUMINATED. CRM BTWN CAPT AND FO DETERMINED THAT EVEN WITH EXTREME IMBAL AND LOW #2 TANK READING, #2 ENG WOULD NOT QUIT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. NEXT WAS DISCUSSED LIMITATION OF FUEL IMBAL FOR LNDG. FO ACCESSED FLT STANDARDS MANUAL AND CONFIRMED MAX IMBAL WAS 'DEMONSTRATED ONLY.' IT WAS FURTHER DISCUSSED AND AGREED TO EXTEND FLT TO LAND NEAR THE MAX DEMO IMBAL FIGURE WHILE KEEPING MINIMUM REQUIRED RESERVE FUEL ON BOARD AT TOUCHDOWN. ATC WAS NOTIFIED OF IMBAL SIT, REQUESTING VECTORS TO BURN DOWN FUEL TO LNDG LIMITS. VECTORS AND BURNDOWN COMPLETED, LNDG WAS MADE WITHOUT INCIDENT. EXTENUATING FACTORS: 1) ACFT HAD PROB WITH R WING FUEL VENT VALVE. VALVE WAS DEFERRED, REQUIRING OVERWING REFUELING. 2) AFTER 8 YRS OF CHKLIST ON MULTI FUNCTION DISPLAY, FAA RECENTLY MADE COMPANY STOP USING THAT PRACTICE AND GO TO PAPER CHKLIST. CAPT LAID HIS CHKLIST ON CTR CONSOLE, OVER FUEL GAUGES RESULTING IN GAUGES NOT BEING SCANNED (CLUTTER IN COCKPIT). 3) 'DOORS' LIGHT WAS CAUSED BY IMPROPERLY FASTENED 'DZEUS' FASTENER ON FUEL SVC DOOR. 4) FUEL IMBAL CAUSE: UNDETERMINED BY MAINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.