|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : sdf|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||DC-9 30|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : preflight|
ground : parked
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 220|
flight time total : 17000
flight time type : 11000
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : instrument|
pilot : commercial
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
Scene: aircraft (DC9) at the gate for a 40 min scheduled stop and turnaround. WX: ceiling at 1500-2000 ft AGL with light snow, blowing snow. Visibility was variable from 3- 7 mi. Snow fall varied from light snow to none at all. Problem: the FAA seemed to disagree with the captain (me) regarding the need to spray (deice) the aircraft. The FAA seemed to be saying, in a subtle way, that I should have my aircraft sprayed because another carrier was having their aircraft sprayed. I explained that my decision must focus on my aircraft and I then showed the FAA person (we were on the ramp and beside the aircraft) what I was inspecting and what I was basing my decision on and, that no ice or snow was adhering to the aircraft. But, I still felt that the FAA was pushing me to change my decision, although the FAA would never clearly state that, when asked. The flight departed but I was left feeling very uncomfortable about the way this 'ramp check' had been conducted. The above scenario took place in less than 15 mins, including the time spent in the cockpit inspecting my license and medical. In the realm of CRM, I feel that the FAA might have had some concerns about my decision but would not share the details of that information with me. To me, this type of action is not in the best interest of safety. Corrective action: give flcs (pilots) the FAA guidelines regarding an FAA ramp check/inspection. With this information, the captain (the final authority/authorized) would be better informed to possibly press for more, and more clear information if a question arises. In this way, the captain could be more sure that the final decision was made after reviewing all available information. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he had not heard further from the FAA regarding this incident. He had been given further advice from a friend captain that had now joined the FAA that the FAA inspector should have been more clear about his concerning question about whether the captain was going to deice the aircraft. He stated that he did ask the inspector in the cockpit, after he was asked again, if he was going to deice, if the inspector observed something he did not that would further affect his decision in this matter.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CAPT OF A DC9-30 WAS LEFT WONDERING IF HE HAD MISSED SOMETHING THE FAA INSPECTOR, CONDUCTING A RAMP INSPECTION, HAD OBSERVED THAT HE HAD NOT DURING A PREFLT WALKAROUND INSPECTION FOR ACFT ICE. THE INSPECTOR ASKED 2 TIMES IF HE, THE CAPT, WAS GOING TO DEICE THE ACFT AFTER THE CAPT SAYING 'NO,' AND EXPLAINING WHY. THE INSPECTOR COMMENTED THAT ANOTHER ACR WAS DEICING.
Narrative: SCENE: ACFT (DC9) AT THE GATE FOR A 40 MIN SCHEDULED STOP AND TURNAROUND. WX: CEILING AT 1500-2000 FT AGL WITH LIGHT SNOW, BLOWING SNOW. VISIBILITY WAS VARIABLE FROM 3- 7 MI. SNOW FALL VARIED FROM LIGHT SNOW TO NONE AT ALL. PROB: THE FAA SEEMED TO DISAGREE WITH THE CAPT (ME) REGARDING THE NEED TO SPRAY (DEICE) THE ACFT. THE FAA SEEMED TO BE SAYING, IN A SUBTLE WAY, THAT I SHOULD HAVE MY ACFT SPRAYED BECAUSE ANOTHER CARRIER WAS HAVING THEIR ACFT SPRAYED. I EXPLAINED THAT MY DECISION MUST FOCUS ON MY ACFT AND I THEN SHOWED THE FAA PERSON (WE WERE ON THE RAMP AND BESIDE THE ACFT) WHAT I WAS INSPECTING AND WHAT I WAS BASING MY DECISION ON AND, THAT NO ICE OR SNOW WAS ADHERING TO THE ACFT. BUT, I STILL FELT THAT THE FAA WAS PUSHING ME TO CHANGE MY DECISION, ALTHOUGH THE FAA WOULD NEVER CLRLY STATE THAT, WHEN ASKED. THE FLT DEPARTED BUT I WAS LEFT FEELING VERY UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE WAY THIS 'RAMP CHK' HAD BEEN CONDUCTED. THE ABOVE SCENARIO TOOK PLACE IN LESS THAN 15 MINS, INCLUDING THE TIME SPENT IN THE COCKPIT INSPECTING MY LICENSE AND MEDICAL. IN THE REALM OF CRM, I FEEL THAT THE FAA MIGHT HAVE HAD SOME CONCERNS ABOUT MY DECISION BUT WOULD NOT SHARE THE DETAILS OF THAT INFO WITH ME. TO ME, THIS TYPE OF ACTION IS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF SAFETY. CORRECTIVE ACTION: GIVE FLCS (PLTS) THE FAA GUIDELINES REGARDING AN FAA RAMP CHK/INSPECTION. WITH THIS INFO, THE CAPT (THE FINAL AUTH) WOULD BE BETTER INFORMED TO POSSIBLY PRESS FOR MORE, AND MORE CLR INFO IF A QUESTION ARISES. IN THIS WAY, THE CAPT COULD BE MORE SURE THAT THE FINAL DECISION WAS MADE AFTER REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE INFO. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD NOT HEARD FURTHER FROM THE FAA REGARDING THIS INCIDENT. HE HAD BEEN GIVEN FURTHER ADVICE FROM A FRIEND CAPT THAT HAD NOW JOINED THE FAA THAT THE FAA INSPECTOR SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CLR ABOUT HIS CONCERNING QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE CAPT WAS GOING TO DEICE THE ACFT. HE STATED THAT HE DID ASK THE INSPECTOR IN THE COCKPIT, AFTER HE WAS ASKED AGAIN, IF HE WAS GOING TO DEICE, IF THE INSPECTOR OBSERVED SOMETHING HE DID NOT THAT WOULD FURTHER AFFECT HIS DECISION IN THIS MATTER.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.