An air carrier E120 flight crew lost a main hydraulic system just after takeoff and were unable to r...

Attributes
ACN	385462
Time
Date	199711
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	airport : aby
State Reference	GA
Altitude	agl bound lower : 50 agl bound upper : 5500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : aby
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Brasilia EMB-120 All Series
Navigation In Use	Other
Flight Phase	climbout : initial
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : cfi pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 11900 flight time type : 7200
ASRS Report	385462
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : private pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 280 flight time total : 4100 flight time type : 2000
ASRS Report	385479
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far other anomaly other
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	flight crew : declared emergency none taken : detected after the fact other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Aircraft

Narrative:

After takeoff and gear retraction I noticed a hydraulic light illuminate on the warning panel. Gear did not retract normally, and hydraulic quantity gauge read almost zero. After performing the after takeoff checklist and the loss of (1) hydraulic system checklist I proceeded to put the gear handle down and the left main gear locked into place. Right main and nose gear was already down and indicating locked. After weighing options and conferring with the first officer I elected to continue the short flight to atlanta for a wider, longer runway. Loss of this hydraulic system disables the normal gear extension/retraction, half available brakes, flaps, (partial flaps), and nosewheel steering. I felt the flight could have a safer conclusion in atlanta with a well lit 11000 ft runway and response vehicles available. After reviewing the entire situation with our training department a couple of days later, I feel as though a better course of action would have been to return to albany for landing provided this could be done safely and within established written guidelines. Even though I felt like I had everything covered with my original decision to fly to atlanta I can see in retrospect how it may not have been the best decision if we had encountered another problem or unknown factor. (This was the last leg of a 12 hour duty day). Supplemental information from acn 385479: our biggest mistake was that we did not contact our dispatcher. Having a dispatcher is very new to us and it just didn't occur to us to do so. We did contact maintenance. Additionally, we probably should have landed at aby since the gear was stuck down. We do have landing data for a zero flap landing and the runway was sufficient. The only problem with the checklist is that, with gear stuck down, there is no cut and dried 'land as soon as practical' statement.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR E120 FLC LOST A MAIN HYD SYS JUST AFTER TKOF AND WERE UNABLE TO RAISE THE LNDG GEAR. THE FLC DECIDED TO CONTINUE TO THEIR DEST WITH THE LNDG GEAR EXTENDED. THEY HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED BY THEIR TRAINING DEPT AND NOW REALIZE THEIR ERROR.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF AND GEAR RETRACTION I NOTICED A HYD LIGHT ILLUMINATE ON THE WARNING PANEL. GEAR DID NOT RETRACT NORMALLY, AND HYD QUANTITY GAUGE READ ALMOST ZERO. AFTER PERFORMING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND THE LOSS OF (1) HYD SYS CHKLIST I PROCEEDED TO PUT THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN AND THE L MAIN GEAR LOCKED INTO PLACE. R MAIN AND NOSE GEAR WAS ALREADY DOWN AND INDICATING LOCKED. AFTER WEIGHING OPTIONS AND CONFERRING WITH THE FO I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE SHORT FLT TO ATLANTA FOR A WIDER, LONGER RWY. LOSS OF THIS HYD SYS DISABLES THE NORMAL GEAR EXTENSION/RETRACTION, HALF AVAILABLE BRAKES, FLAPS, (PARTIAL FLAPS), AND NOSEWHEEL STEERING. I FELT THE FLT COULD HAVE A SAFER CONCLUSION IN ATLANTA WITH A WELL LIT 11000 FT RWY AND RESPONSE VEHICLES AVAILABLE. AFTER REVIEWING THE ENTIRE SIT WITH OUR TRAINING DEPT A COUPLE OF DAYS LATER, I FEEL AS THOUGH A BETTER COURSE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RETURN TO ALBANY FOR LNDG PROVIDED THIS COULD BE DONE SAFELY AND WITHIN ESTABLISHED WRITTEN GUIDELINES. EVEN THOUGH I FELT LIKE I HAD EVERYTHING COVERED WITH MY ORIGINAL DECISION TO FLY TO ATLANTA I CAN SEE IN RETROSPECT HOW IT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN THE BEST DECISION IF WE HAD ENCOUNTERED ANOTHER PROB OR UNKNOWN FACTOR. (THIS WAS THE LAST LEG OF A 12 HR DUTY DAY). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 385479: OUR BIGGEST MISTAKE WAS THAT WE DID NOT CONTACT OUR DISPATCHER. HAVING A DISPATCHER IS VERY NEW TO US AND IT JUST DIDN'T OCCUR TO US TO DO SO. WE DID CONTACT MAINT. ADDITIONALLY, WE PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE LANDED AT ABY SINCE THE GEAR WAS STUCK DOWN. WE DO HAVE LNDG DATA FOR A ZERO FLAP LNDG AND THE RWY WAS SUFFICIENT. THE ONLY PROB WITH THE CHKLIST IS THAT, WITH GEAR STUCK DOWN, THERE IS NO CUT AND DRIED 'LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICAL' STATEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

An air carrier E120 flight crew lost a main hydraulic system just after takeoff and were unable to raise the landing gear. The flight crew decided to continue to their destination with the landing gear extended. They have been criticized by their training department and now realize their error.