Narrative:

Dispatched sat to afw. Normal VOR navigation until turned over to regional approach. Set up the ILS, tuned and idented, but flags on both sides. Missed localizer. Revectored and radar established us on inbound course. Ok'ed to descend to 2000 ft MSL, MVA. ATC gave us the option to descend past the marker as the aircraft in front descended out of the overcast at 1600 ft MSL and 3 mi visibility. I also broke out at 1600 ft MSL, 3 mi. Not declaring an emergency has put me into the 'action pending' as our jump seater was FAA/principal maintenance inspector for our company. Based on the facts that I have presented in my letter, I feel that my action was prudent and needs to be explained but not penalized. My corrective action is to submit a letter of resignation to this low budget airline and find a good job. During the letdown into afw, I received ATIS information. Localizer unusable more than 30 degrees right of localizer. I briefed the approach as the first officer was flying. Once on vectors, I tuned and idented both the #1 and #2 navigation receivers for the approach. We were vectored right downwind and base. Regional approach turned us to 120 degrees for the intercept and were cleared for approach. My copilot remarked that he had a flag and I responded that I also had a flag. The CDI's were unsteady at 1/2 a DOT to the right. We both agreed that we must be beyond the 30 degree unusable area. We continued the intercept until regional approach said that we had flown through the localizer at which time he vectored us out for another approach. I told approach that we had 2 flags and no needle swing. I then rechked that both navs were tuned and idented for the runway 16L approach and they were. I immediately checked the avionics circuit breaker panel and mr X (pmi) concurred that all circuit breakers were in. I checked the main circuit breaker panel to see if I overlooked any other circuit breaker. I remarked to the controller that if we could not obtain ground contact, we would have to declare 'minimum fuel,' meaning to depart the area and go to our alternate. Going to a further distant airport meant burning into my reserve andhaving to declare an emergency. I reasoned to myself that if I was not able to get ILS indications here, I would not be able to obtain the ILS indications at ft worth-meacham, my alternate. Having perused all the approach charts for dfw and ftw before contract (as these are the 2 closest airports) I knew that my only options after ILS, were NDB and GPS. My ADF is MEL'ed and this aircraft does not have GPS capability. Approach said to stand by while he checked with the control tower. Regional approach had checked with afw tower and returned informing me that the '208' in front of me had broken out at 1600 ft and 3 mi from the runway. Then he stated that 'it's your option.' about this time, we crossed the OM. Not having the time nor the fuel to delay and having flown this same approach day VMC and night VMC 2 days before, and night VMC the night before, knowing this area, north of the airport, to be flat and without obstacles, I made the decision to descend to 1600 ft and pushed over for the descent. Descending through 1800 ft I picked up ground contact and advised 'approach' that 'I have ground contact.' we 'broke out' at 1600 ft and 3 mi from the end of the runway and perhaps 600 ft to the left of centerline. I advised the controller that 'I have the runway' and he told me to contact the tower. My copilot made an easy course realignment while I finished the before landing checklist. I contacted alliance tower and was cleared to land and my copilot made a normal landing. When parked at the ramp, I checked the nearest VOR (ranger) and received normal VHF sensing/reception and centered the needle. Then I again tuned and idented the afw ILS frequency and again received 2 flags and 2 dead needles. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that this was an aircraft equipment problem, not a NAVAID problem. The aircraft in front and behind the reporter did have a usable signal. The aircraft was a CV440 with old navigation equipment. The frequency of the ILS was 110.15 which the reporter felt may have affected the capability of the receivers. The company has yet to check out the problem. The air carrier has had some problems with their operations specifications and the FAA is coming down on them. The reporter has had his check airman's authority/authorized temporarily revoked by the chief pilot. The FAA doesn't know yet if they have a case against him. These older aircraft have had a history of avionics problems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AIR CARGO PIC DSNDS BELOW MVA FOR A CONTACT APCH AT AFW ARPT WHEN HE IS UNABLE TO UTILIZE THE ILS FOR RWY 16L. ACFT FLC HAD FLAGS ON BOTH SIDES OF COCKPIT FOR THEIR CDI'S. PIC ELECTED TO MAKE AN APCH THROUGH THE CLOUDS WHEN INFORMED THAT PRECEDING ACFT HAD GND CONTACT AT 1600 FT MSL. ON BOARD OBSERVER, AN FAA MAINT INSPECTOR, WRITES HIM UP. PIC HAD NOT DECLARED AN EMER.

Narrative: DISPATCHED SAT TO AFW. NORMAL VOR NAV UNTIL TURNED OVER TO REGIONAL APCH. SET UP THE ILS, TUNED AND IDENTED, BUT FLAGS ON BOTH SIDES. MISSED LOC. REVECTORED AND RADAR ESTABLISHED US ON INBOUND COURSE. OK'ED TO DSND TO 2000 FT MSL, MVA. ATC GAVE US THE OPTION TO DSND PAST THE MARKER AS THE ACFT IN FRONT DSNDED OUT OF THE OVCST AT 1600 FT MSL AND 3 MI VISIBILITY. I ALSO BROKE OUT AT 1600 FT MSL, 3 MI. NOT DECLARING AN EMER HAS PUT ME INTO THE 'ACTION PENDING' AS OUR JUMP SEATER WAS FAA/PRINCIPAL MAINT INSPECTOR FOR OUR COMPANY. BASED ON THE FACTS THAT I HAVE PRESENTED IN MY LETTER, I FEEL THAT MY ACTION WAS PRUDENT AND NEEDS TO BE EXPLAINED BUT NOT PENALIZED. MY CORRECTIVE ACTION IS TO SUBMIT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION TO THIS LOW BUDGET AIRLINE AND FIND A GOOD JOB. DURING THE LETDOWN INTO AFW, I RECEIVED ATIS INFO. LOC UNUSABLE MORE THAN 30 DEGS R OF LOC. I BRIEFED THE APCH AS THE FO WAS FLYING. ONCE ON VECTORS, I TUNED AND IDENTED BOTH THE #1 AND #2 NAV RECEIVERS FOR THE APCH. WE WERE VECTORED R DOWNWIND AND BASE. REGIONAL APCH TURNED US TO 120 DEGS FOR THE INTERCEPT AND WERE CLRED FOR APCH. MY COPLT REMARKED THAT HE HAD A FLAG AND I RESPONDED THAT I ALSO HAD A FLAG. THE CDI'S WERE UNSTEADY AT 1/2 A DOT TO THE R. WE BOTH AGREED THAT WE MUST BE BEYOND THE 30 DEG UNUSABLE AREA. WE CONTINUED THE INTERCEPT UNTIL REGIONAL APCH SAID THAT WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE LOC AT WHICH TIME HE VECTORED US OUT FOR ANOTHER APCH. I TOLD APCH THAT WE HAD 2 FLAGS AND NO NEEDLE SWING. I THEN RECHKED THAT BOTH NAVS WERE TUNED AND IDENTED FOR THE RWY 16L APCH AND THEY WERE. I IMMEDIATELY CHKED THE AVIONICS CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL AND MR X (PMI) CONCURRED THAT ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE IN. I CHKED THE MAIN CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL TO SEE IF I OVERLOOKED ANY OTHER CIRCUIT BREAKER. I REMARKED TO THE CTLR THAT IF WE COULD NOT OBTAIN GND CONTACT, WE WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE 'MINIMUM FUEL,' MEANING TO DEPART THE AREA AND GO TO OUR ALTERNATE. GOING TO A FURTHER DISTANT ARPT MEANT BURNING INTO MY RESERVE ANDHAVING TO DECLARE AN EMER. I REASONED TO MYSELF THAT IF I WAS NOT ABLE TO GET ILS INDICATIONS HERE, I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THE ILS INDICATIONS AT FT WORTH-MEACHAM, MY ALTERNATE. HAVING PERUSED ALL THE APCH CHARTS FOR DFW AND FTW BEFORE CONTRACT (AS THESE ARE THE 2 CLOSEST ARPTS) I KNEW THAT MY ONLY OPTIONS AFTER ILS, WERE NDB AND GPS. MY ADF IS MEL'ED AND THIS ACFT DOES NOT HAVE GPS CAPABILITY. APCH SAID TO STAND BY WHILE HE CHKED WITH THE CTL TWR. REGIONAL APCH HAD CHKED WITH AFW TWR AND RETURNED INFORMING ME THAT THE '208' IN FRONT OF ME HAD BROKEN OUT AT 1600 FT AND 3 MI FROM THE RWY. THEN HE STATED THAT 'IT'S YOUR OPTION.' ABOUT THIS TIME, WE CROSSED THE OM. NOT HAVING THE TIME NOR THE FUEL TO DELAY AND HAVING FLOWN THIS SAME APCH DAY VMC AND NIGHT VMC 2 DAYS BEFORE, AND NIGHT VMC THE NIGHT BEFORE, KNOWING THIS AREA, N OF THE ARPT, TO BE FLAT AND WITHOUT OBSTACLES, I MADE THE DECISION TO DSND TO 1600 FT AND PUSHED OVER FOR THE DSCNT. DSNDING THROUGH 1800 FT I PICKED UP GND CONTACT AND ADVISED 'APCH' THAT 'I HAVE GND CONTACT.' WE 'BROKE OUT' AT 1600 FT AND 3 MI FROM THE END OF THE RWY AND PERHAPS 600 FT TO THE L OF CTRLINE. I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT 'I HAVE THE RWY' AND HE TOLD ME TO CONTACT THE TWR. MY COPLT MADE AN EASY COURSE REALIGNMENT WHILE I FINISHED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. I CONTACTED ALLIANCE TWR AND WAS CLRED TO LAND AND MY COPLT MADE A NORMAL LNDG. WHEN PARKED AT THE RAMP, I CHKED THE NEAREST VOR (RANGER) AND RECEIVED NORMAL VHF SENSING/RECEPTION AND CTRED THE NEEDLE. THEN I AGAIN TUNED AND IDENTED THE AFW ILS FREQ AND AGAIN RECEIVED 2 FLAGS AND 2 DEAD NEEDLES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THIS WAS AN ACFT EQUIP PROB, NOT A NAVAID PROB. THE ACFT IN FRONT AND BEHIND THE RPTR DID HAVE A USABLE SIGNAL. THE ACFT WAS A CV440 WITH OLD NAV EQUIP. THE FREQ OF THE ILS WAS 110.15 WHICH THE RPTR FELT MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE CAPABILITY OF THE RECEIVERS. THE COMPANY HAS YET TO CHK OUT THE PROB. THE ACR HAS HAD SOME PROBS WITH THEIR OPS SPECS AND THE FAA IS COMING DOWN ON THEM. THE RPTR HAS HAD HIS CHK AIRMAN'S AUTH TEMPORARILY REVOKED BY THE CHIEF PLT. THE FAA DOESN'T KNOW YET IF THEY HAVE A CASE AGAINST HIM. THESE OLDER ACFT HAVE HAD A HISTORY OF AVIONICS PROBS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.