Narrative:

I was returning from visiting some relatives in eau. MVFR WX was reported at eau and along the direct route to my home airport, pwk. I got to the airport and got an updated WX briefing for my route. By this time the WX en route was 'VFR not recommended.' however, conditions at eau were still VFR and better conditions were reported to the south. I decided to depart to the south towards lse and then head ese towards pwk. I generally consider myself a good aeronautical decision maker. I read many aviation pubs and am aware of the dangers of VFR flight in IMC, particularly for non instrument rated pilots, such as myself. Several factors contributed to my poor decision to depart: 1) case of get-home-itis. 2) believing that I would simply land if conditions deteriorated. 3) overconfidence in my abilities because I am actively working on an instrument rating, although I am only 1/2 done. While I did not intend to enter IMC, I felt overconfident about flying in the MVFR WX as a result of my training. Conditions from eau to lse were poor, but acceptable. After lse, I planned on my next leg being from lse to lnr, then to jvl then to pwk. About 15- 20 NM after lse on the way to lnr, conditions began to deteriorate steadily. I was flying at 2000-2500 ft MSL for most of the route, but lowering ceilings forced me down to 1500 ft MSL (500-1000 ft AGL). Visibility had also decreased from 5-10 mi down to less than 3 mi. By this point I felt that an immediate landing was needed. The WX was significantly worse than forecast in every direction, and the nearest airport (lnr) was 15 mi away. I was concerned about the terrain in the area and felt that the best course of action would be to climb to the MSA near the lnr VOR and get some help from ATC. I was very reluctant to enter the clouds and to confess to ATC, but I thought that the risk of the terrain was too great, so I began a climb on instruments. Next, I attempted to contact ATC on 121.5 but didn't get a reply. I tried ZAU next and got a reply. However, I failed to communicate the situation clearly -- this was a mistake. I should have declared an emergency, but was embarrassed to confess my stupidity. I asked for vectors to the lnr airport (the closest), and said that I was 'a VFR pilot' and was at 4000 ft, mistakenly assuming that she would understand the situation, since the low ceilings were across the area. She gave me a vector to the airport. When I was close to the airport she called out the airport, and I realized that she was unaware that I was in IMC. I told her that I was in IMC and would need an approach. Obviously, she was very surprised and said to expect the VOR-a approach (the only approach to the airport). While flying the vector to the airport I began to have doubts about my ability to fly the VOR approach, given my level of instrument training. I asked the controller where the nearest ILS approach was. She replied that 'lnr doesn't have an ILS approach.' she asked if I had the chart and could fly the VOR-a approach. By this point I am certain that my decision making process was very poor. My focus was only on getting on the ground and out of the clouds. I told the controller that the VOR-a would be fine. A better course of action would have been to fly for 10-15 mins more to a simpler ASR or ILS approach that was within radar coverage. My desire to get this ordeal over with as quickly as possible led me to accept the VOR approach without declaring an emergency or explaining the situation clearly. The controller cleared me for the approach in a standard fashion and I flew the approach sloppily, but correctly. I landed without incident and canceled the IFR clearance. I am uncertain as to whether the controller realized the true situation, or if she thought that I was just a poor instrument pilot. A chain of several errors led to this incident: 1) my decision to depart into poor conditions. 2) my decision to continue past lse, even though conditions were worse than forecast. 3) not turning around sooner, when conditions began to deteriorate. 4) overall, an inappropriate increase in my confidence level from my normally conservative approach, due to my recent training. 5) when it was clear that an emergency existed, I was reluctant to 'confess.' 6) I should have chosen a better course of action than rushing to get on the ground with the VOR-a approach. Given the situation, several factors contributed to an outcome that didn't end in tragedy, although the situation should have been avoided and dealt with differently. 1) my recent instrument training. 2) my wife, an experienced (but not licensed) 'copilot' was able to assist with such things as charts, radios, and watching altitudes. 3) a resolution on my part to fight my hardest to survive. I have learned a lot from this experience, but I am ashamed that I had to experience this firsthand, when I should have learned the lesson from the similar stories I have read about time and time again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF A PA28-181 DEPARTS WITH QUESTIONABLE WX ENRTE TO DEST. AS CEILINGS LOWER HE CONTINUES UNTIL HE MUST CLB ABOVE TERRAIN AND ENTER CLOUDS. CALLS CTR FOR ASSIST TO LAND.

Narrative: I WAS RETURNING FROM VISITING SOME RELATIVES IN EAU. MVFR WX WAS RPTED AT EAU AND ALONG THE DIRECT RTE TO MY HOME ARPT, PWK. I GOT TO THE ARPT AND GOT AN UPDATED WX BRIEFING FOR MY RTE. BY THIS TIME THE WX ENRTE WAS 'VFR NOT RECOMMENDED.' HOWEVER, CONDITIONS AT EAU WERE STILL VFR AND BETTER CONDITIONS WERE RPTED TO THE S. I DECIDED TO DEPART TO THE S TOWARDS LSE AND THEN HEAD ESE TOWARDS PWK. I GENERALLY CONSIDER MYSELF A GOOD AERONAUTICAL DECISION MAKER. I READ MANY AVIATION PUBS AND AM AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF VFR FLT IN IMC, PARTICULARLY FOR NON INST RATED PLTS, SUCH AS MYSELF. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO MY POOR DECISION TO DEPART: 1) CASE OF GET-HOME-ITIS. 2) BELIEVING THAT I WOULD SIMPLY LAND IF CONDITIONS DETERIORATED. 3) OVERCONFIDENCE IN MY ABILITIES BECAUSE I AM ACTIVELY WORKING ON AN INST RATING, ALTHOUGH I AM ONLY 1/2 DONE. WHILE I DID NOT INTEND TO ENTER IMC, I FELT OVERCONFIDENT ABOUT FLYING IN THE MVFR WX AS A RESULT OF MY TRAINING. CONDITIONS FROM EAU TO LSE WERE POOR, BUT ACCEPTABLE. AFTER LSE, I PLANNED ON MY NEXT LEG BEING FROM LSE TO LNR, THEN TO JVL THEN TO PWK. ABOUT 15- 20 NM AFTER LSE ON THE WAY TO LNR, CONDITIONS BEGAN TO DETERIORATE STEADILY. I WAS FLYING AT 2000-2500 FT MSL FOR MOST OF THE RTE, BUT LOWERING CEILINGS FORCED ME DOWN TO 1500 FT MSL (500-1000 FT AGL). VISIBILITY HAD ALSO DECREASED FROM 5-10 MI DOWN TO LESS THAN 3 MI. BY THIS POINT I FELT THAT AN IMMEDIATE LNDG WAS NEEDED. THE WX WAS SIGNIFICANTLY WORSE THAN FORECAST IN EVERY DIRECTION, AND THE NEAREST ARPT (LNR) WAS 15 MI AWAY. I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE TERRAIN IN THE AREA AND FELT THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE TO CLB TO THE MSA NEAR THE LNR VOR AND GET SOME HELP FROM ATC. I WAS VERY RELUCTANT TO ENTER THE CLOUDS AND TO CONFESS TO ATC, BUT I THOUGHT THAT THE RISK OF THE TERRAIN WAS TOO GREAT, SO I BEGAN A CLB ON INSTS. NEXT, I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT ATC ON 121.5 BUT DIDN'T GET A REPLY. I TRIED ZAU NEXT AND GOT A REPLY. HOWEVER, I FAILED TO COMMUNICATE THE SIT CLRLY -- THIS WAS A MISTAKE. I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER, BUT WAS EMBARRASSED TO CONFESS MY STUPIDITY. I ASKED FOR VECTORS TO THE LNR ARPT (THE CLOSEST), AND SAID THAT I WAS 'A VFR PLT' AND WAS AT 4000 FT, MISTAKENLY ASSUMING THAT SHE WOULD UNDERSTAND THE SIT, SINCE THE LOW CEILINGS WERE ACROSS THE AREA. SHE GAVE ME A VECTOR TO THE ARPT. WHEN I WAS CLOSE TO THE ARPT SHE CALLED OUT THE ARPT, AND I REALIZED THAT SHE WAS UNAWARE THAT I WAS IN IMC. I TOLD HER THAT I WAS IN IMC AND WOULD NEED AN APCH. OBVIOUSLY, SHE WAS VERY SURPRISED AND SAID TO EXPECT THE VOR-A APCH (THE ONLY APCH TO THE ARPT). WHILE FLYING THE VECTOR TO THE ARPT I BEGAN TO HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT MY ABILITY TO FLY THE VOR APCH, GIVEN MY LEVEL OF INST TRAINING. I ASKED THE CTLR WHERE THE NEAREST ILS APCH WAS. SHE REPLIED THAT 'LNR DOESN'T HAVE AN ILS APCH.' SHE ASKED IF I HAD THE CHART AND COULD FLY THE VOR-A APCH. BY THIS POINT I AM CERTAIN THAT MY DECISION MAKING PROCESS WAS VERY POOR. MY FOCUS WAS ONLY ON GETTING ON THE GND AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT THE VOR-A WOULD BE FINE. A BETTER COURSE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO FLY FOR 10-15 MINS MORE TO A SIMPLER ASR OR ILS APCH THAT WAS WITHIN RADAR COVERAGE. MY DESIRE TO GET THIS ORDEAL OVER WITH AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE LED ME TO ACCEPT THE VOR APCH WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER OR EXPLAINING THE SIT CLRLY. THE CTLR CLRED ME FOR THE APCH IN A STANDARD FASHION AND I FLEW THE APCH SLOPPILY, BUT CORRECTLY. I LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND CANCELED THE IFR CLRNC. I AM UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER THE CTLR REALIZED THE TRUE SIT, OR IF SHE THOUGHT THAT I WAS JUST A POOR INST PLT. A CHAIN OF SEVERAL ERRORS LED TO THIS INCIDENT: 1) MY DECISION TO DEPART INTO POOR CONDITIONS. 2) MY DECISION TO CONTINUE PAST LSE, EVEN THOUGH CONDITIONS WERE WORSE THAN FORECAST. 3) NOT TURNING AROUND SOONER, WHEN CONDITIONS BEGAN TO DETERIORATE. 4) OVERALL, AN INAPPROPRIATE INCREASE IN MY CONFIDENCE LEVEL FROM MY NORMALLY CONSERVATIVE APCH, DUE TO MY RECENT TRAINING. 5) WHEN IT WAS CLR THAT AN EMER EXISTED, I WAS RELUCTANT TO 'CONFESS.' 6) I SHOULD HAVE CHOSEN A BETTER COURSE OF ACTION THAN RUSHING TO GET ON THE GND WITH THE VOR-A APCH. GIVEN THE SIT, SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO AN OUTCOME THAT DIDN'T END IN TRAGEDY, ALTHOUGH THE SIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED AND DEALT WITH DIFFERENTLY. 1) MY RECENT INST TRAINING. 2) MY WIFE, AN EXPERIENCED (BUT NOT LICENSED) 'COPLT' WAS ABLE TO ASSIST WITH SUCH THINGS AS CHARTS, RADIOS, AND WATCHING ALTS. 3) A RESOLUTION ON MY PART TO FIGHT MY HARDEST TO SURVIVE. I HAVE LEARNED A LOT FROM THIS EXPERIENCE, BUT I AM ASHAMED THAT I HAD TO EXPERIENCE THIS FIRSTHAND, WHEN I SHOULD HAVE LEARNED THE LESSON FROM THE SIMILAR STORIES I HAVE READ ABOUT TIME AND TIME AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.