Narrative:

We were at 6000 ft, being vectored for an approach to runway 6R. Approach cleared us to 3000 ft and advised us to expect approach to runway 6L. We completed the approach and landed on runway 6L. After landing, I started to turn-off on high speed taxiway. I xferred the controls to the captain and took over the communications. We turned off the high speed taxiway, A3, and turned left onto the parallel taxiway H. Captain said we were to hold short of runway 33R and he started to slow down. Tower cleared us to cross runway 33R and contact ground controller on 121.9 on the other side. I read back the clearance. Captain increased thrust to continue taxi. Captain and I visually cleared runway 33R on left and right. As we crossed the runway, we saw an airplane pass overhead. After clearing the runway, I switched to the ground controller frequency. He cleared us on taxiway B to hold short of the entry point to emergency ramp. Ground controller told us to telephone the tower controller. Tower controller told us that we crossed runway 33R without a clearance. He told us he would review the tapes at night and to call back next morning and talk to another controller. Next morning we talked to the other controller. He said that previous night's controller never heard my reply to his clearance to cross runway 33R. Ground controller called us on his frequency, but he did not get a reply, because we were still on tower frequency as we were crossing the runway. After reviewing the events, I cannot see anything that we did wrong procedurally. Tower may have thought our taxi speed may have been high enough where we could not hold short of the runway. We were definitely slowing to hold short. Captain had to increase thrust to continue taxi. The only thing I can think of doing differently is reviewing our runway exit plan more thoroughly than we did. We should take into account not only how we expect to taxi to our ramp but also look at possible hold short position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT FLC CROSSED RWY 33R AT ATCT LCL CTLR'S INSTRUCTION, HOWEVER, WHEN THEY SWITCHED TO GND CTL THE CTLR ACCUSED THEM OF AN UNAUTH XING. THE FLC NOTICED AN ACFT FLY OVERHEAD AS THEY CROSSED.

Narrative: WE WERE AT 6000 FT, BEING VECTORED FOR AN APCH TO RWY 6R. APCH CLRED US TO 3000 FT AND ADVISED US TO EXPECT APCH TO RWY 6L. WE COMPLETED THE APCH AND LANDED ON RWY 6L. AFTER LNDG, I STARTED TO TURN-OFF ON HIGH SPD TXWY. I XFERRED THE CTLS TO THE CAPT AND TOOK OVER THE COMS. WE TURNED OFF THE HIGH SPD TXWY, A3, AND TURNED L ONTO THE PARALLEL TXWY H. CAPT SAID WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 33R AND HE STARTED TO SLOW DOWN. TWR CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 33R AND CONTACT GND CTLR ON 121.9 ON THE OTHER SIDE. I READ BACK THE CLRNC. CAPT INCREASED THRUST TO CONTINUE TAXI. CAPT AND I VISUALLY CLRED RWY 33R ON L AND R. AS WE CROSSED THE RWY, WE SAW AN AIRPLANE PASS OVERHEAD. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, I SWITCHED TO THE GND CTLR FREQ. HE CLRED US ON TXWY B TO HOLD SHORT OF THE ENTRY POINT TO EMER RAMP. GND CTLR TOLD US TO TELEPHONE THE TWR CTLR. TWR CTLR TOLD US THAT WE CROSSED RWY 33R WITHOUT A CLRNC. HE TOLD US HE WOULD REVIEW THE TAPES AT NIGHT AND TO CALL BACK NEXT MORNING AND TALK TO ANOTHER CTLR. NEXT MORNING WE TALKED TO THE OTHER CTLR. HE SAID THAT PREVIOUS NIGHT'S CTLR NEVER HEARD MY REPLY TO HIS CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 33R. GND CTLR CALLED US ON HIS FREQ, BUT HE DID NOT GET A REPLY, BECAUSE WE WERE STILL ON TWR FREQ AS WE WERE XING THE RWY. AFTER REVIEWING THE EVENTS, I CANNOT SEE ANYTHING THAT WE DID WRONG PROCEDURALLY. TWR MAY HAVE THOUGHT OUR TAXI SPD MAY HAVE BEEN HIGH ENOUGH WHERE WE COULD NOT HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY. WE WERE DEFINITELY SLOWING TO HOLD SHORT. CAPT HAD TO INCREASE THRUST TO CONTINUE TAXI. THE ONLY THING I CAN THINK OF DOING DIFFERENTLY IS REVIEWING OUR RWY EXIT PLAN MORE THOROUGHLY THAN WE DID. WE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY HOW WE EXPECT TO TAXI TO OUR RAMP BUT ALSO LOOK AT POSSIBLE HOLD SHORT POS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.