Narrative:

The PA44 departed runway 4 and climbed out to northeast, out of sight, then he reported traffic 3 mi northeast of airport sbound at 1800 ft, a white airplane 'like a piper cub' (small aircraft Y). The PA44 reported that they'd almost collided. I informed the PA44 that I was not aware of any traffic in that vicinity, but that if I had had radar I certainly would have issued an advisory. Later I asked the PA44 if evasive action had been taken, to which he replied that he had reduced both throttles to idle and turned hard left to pass behind the other aircraft by about 500 ft, same altitude. Human performance considerations: our congressman, unfortunately, doesn't live in this district to use his influence to get us radar as he has for sfb. Also, the multi-engine training environment in which the PA44 was engaged demands much attention inside the cockpit, and I can't see that far while still scanning my other traffic. Contributing factors: intensive student training activity (6000-8000 hours per month) originates from this airport, yet there's not so much as a little gold STAR on the sectional chart to alert transient pilots to this fact. Also, the FAA's failure to institute/endorse/permit low cost, user friendly airborne collision avoidance equipment for light aircraft. Lastly, the failure of the FAA to establish a dedicated radar approach control environment to serve the vrb-fpr area which routinely records traffic activity in the range of 1/3 of a million operations per yr.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATCT LCL CTLR WAS ADVISED BY A PA44 THAT HAD DEPARTED HIS ARPT, THAT HE HAD AN NMAC WITH AN UNKNOWN SMA APPROX 3 MI NE OF THE ARPT. THE CTLR HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE SMA AND CITES THE FACT THAT HIS TWR DOES NOT HAVE RADAR.

Narrative: THE PA44 DEPARTED RWY 4 AND CLBED OUT TO NE, OUT OF SIGHT, THEN HE RPTED TFC 3 MI NE OF ARPT SBOUND AT 1800 FT, A WHITE AIRPLANE 'LIKE A PIPER CUB' (SMA Y). THE PA44 RPTED THAT THEY'D ALMOST COLLIDED. I INFORMED THE PA44 THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY TFC IN THAT VICINITY, BUT THAT IF I HAD HAD RADAR I CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE ISSUED AN ADVISORY. LATER I ASKED THE PA44 IF EVASIVE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN, TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD REDUCED BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE AND TURNED HARD L TO PASS BEHIND THE OTHER ACFT BY ABOUT 500 FT, SAME ALT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: OUR CONGRESSMAN, UNFORTUNATELY, DOESN'T LIVE IN THIS DISTRICT TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO GET US RADAR AS HE HAS FOR SFB. ALSO, THE MULTI-ENG TRAINING ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THE PA44 WAS ENGAGED DEMANDS MUCH ATTN INSIDE THE COCKPIT, AND I CAN'T SEE THAT FAR WHILE STILL SCANNING MY OTHER TFC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: INTENSIVE STUDENT TRAINING ACTIVITY (6000-8000 HRS PER MONTH) ORIGINATES FROM THIS ARPT, YET THERE'S NOT SO MUCH AS A LITTLE GOLD STAR ON THE SECTIONAL CHART TO ALERT TRANSIENT PLTS TO THIS FACT. ALSO, THE FAA'S FAILURE TO INSTITUTE/ENDORSE/PERMIT LOW COST, USER FRIENDLY AIRBORNE COLLISION AVOIDANCE EQUIP FOR LIGHT ACFT. LASTLY, THE FAILURE OF THE FAA TO ESTABLISH A DEDICATED RADAR APCH CTL ENVIRONMENT TO SERVE THE VRB-FPR AREA WHICH ROUTINELY RECORDS TFC ACTIVITY IN THE RANGE OF 1/3 OF A MILLION OPS PER YR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.