Narrative:

We were arriving from pdx so opted to take the VOR DME B approach from the east. First officer flying, captain monitoring. Approach was proceeding normally up to 'oth' VOR. My intent was to complete approach, circle at CAT B minimums over the airport and make right traffic for runway 13 since winds were 160 degrees at 7 KTS. After reaching the VOR, I descended to 1000 ft MSL. I was required to maintain 1000 ft until reaching 2 DME. At 1 DME, the captain could see the ground and part of the airport through a hole in the cloud. He said 'descend lower, I can see it, you got to get lower, descend.' I said nothing and maintained my altitude until 2 DME at which time I descended to minimums of 760 ft. At this point, we had broken out of the clouds, and were directly over the airport. I briefly looked right (towards where I was going to circle) and saw the ceiling appeared lower. I didn't believe we could maintain VMC. I looked straight ahead and left and found the same scenario, lower and sporadic ceiling bases. I remembering saying, 'well what do you think?' captain said, 'better make a left turn for runway 31 now, don't go in that cloud.' my altitude is now at minimums with a slight descent. It appeared obvious that I would not be able to maintain VMC in any direction without descending below minimums. We were just crossing over the centerline of the runway and not in a position to land. My next maneuver was to be a modified missed approach, modified only because I was now beyond the missed approach point. Then the captain said 'my airplane' and slammed the trim selector to his side, and began a 50 degree left banked turn while descending. I remember saying, 'no cowboy shit, captain.' he said nothing. He then yanked the airplane into a 60 degree bank turn to final and overshot because we were so close in. He landed the aircraft and on rollout said 'sorry.' I said nothing until at the gate. In my opinion the violations that occurred were: 1) descending below minimums when not in a position to make normal descent to landing. 2) performing steep turns (45 degrees) and aerobatic maneuvers (60 degree turns) in the vicinity of the airport. Pilot operations specifications expressly prohibit bank angles beyond 30 degrees. 3) careless and reckless operations. I believe that I should have executed a missed approach immediately upon breaking out and having realized I probably could not maintain visual at minimums. After as I discussed this with captain, he remarked that I was indecisive and that's why he took the airplane. I paused at MDA just before the missed approach point to ask the captain, 'well what do you think.' I asked him that only to solicit input as to whether he saw a viable, legal, and safe route to the airport, yet he took this as an inability to make a proper decision. Also, we should have briefed a captain monitored approach due to the ceiling being so close to minimums. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that she reported this event to the chief pilot of the air carrier. The chief pilot did not set this captain up for a line check or any other 'remedial' treatment. He did warn this captain that one more transgression of this nature would result in his termination with the air carrier. Reporter said that this captain had previous violations or unusual behavioral patterns in the past. The problem, as she saw it, was that this captain didn't even seem to realize he had done anything wrong. The professional standards committee of the air carrier is also on top of this one.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO RPT OF A MAVERICK CAPT'S HANDLING OF THEIR SA227 DURING A CIRCLING APCH INTO NORTH BEND, OR. THE ACFT WAS DSNDED TO LESS THAN CIRCLING MINIMUM ALT, WITH A BANK ANGLE OF 60 DEGS TO INSURE LNDG.

Narrative: WE WERE ARRIVING FROM PDX SO OPTED TO TAKE THE VOR DME B APCH FROM THE E. FO FLYING, CAPT MONITORING. APCH WAS PROCEEDING NORMALLY UP TO 'OTH' VOR. MY INTENT WAS TO COMPLETE APCH, CIRCLE AT CAT B MINIMUMS OVER THE ARPT AND MAKE R TFC FOR RWY 13 SINCE WINDS WERE 160 DEGS AT 7 KTS. AFTER REACHING THE VOR, I DSNDED TO 1000 FT MSL. I WAS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN 1000 FT UNTIL REACHING 2 DME. AT 1 DME, THE CAPT COULD SEE THE GND AND PART OF THE ARPT THROUGH A HOLE IN THE CLOUD. HE SAID 'DSND LOWER, I CAN SEE IT, YOU GOT TO GET LOWER, DSND.' I SAID NOTHING AND MAINTAINED MY ALT UNTIL 2 DME AT WHICH TIME I DSNDED TO MINIMUMS OF 760 FT. AT THIS POINT, WE HAD BROKEN OUT OF THE CLOUDS, AND WERE DIRECTLY OVER THE ARPT. I BRIEFLY LOOKED R (TOWARDS WHERE I WAS GOING TO CIRCLE) AND SAW THE CEILING APPEARED LOWER. I DIDN'T BELIEVE WE COULD MAINTAIN VMC. I LOOKED STRAIGHT AHEAD AND L AND FOUND THE SAME SCENARIO, LOWER AND SPORADIC CEILING BASES. I REMEMBERING SAYING, 'WELL WHAT DO YOU THINK?' CAPT SAID, 'BETTER MAKE A L TURN FOR RWY 31 NOW, DON'T GO IN THAT CLOUD.' MY ALT IS NOW AT MINIMUMS WITH A SLIGHT DSCNT. IT APPEARED OBVIOUS THAT I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN VMC IN ANY DIRECTION WITHOUT DSNDING BELOW MINIMUMS. WE WERE JUST XING OVER THE CTRLINE OF THE RWY AND NOT IN A POS TO LAND. MY NEXT MANEUVER WAS TO BE A MODIFIED MISSED APCH, MODIFIED ONLY BECAUSE I WAS NOW BEYOND THE MISSED APCH POINT. THEN THE CAPT SAID 'MY AIRPLANE' AND SLAMMED THE TRIM SELECTOR TO HIS SIDE, AND BEGAN A 50 DEG L BANKED TURN WHILE DSNDING. I REMEMBER SAYING, 'NO COWBOY SHIT, CAPT.' HE SAID NOTHING. HE THEN YANKED THE AIRPLANE INTO A 60 DEG BANK TURN TO FINAL AND OVERSHOT BECAUSE WE WERE SO CLOSE IN. HE LANDED THE ACFT AND ON ROLLOUT SAID 'SORRY.' I SAID NOTHING UNTIL AT THE GATE. IN MY OPINION THE VIOLATIONS THAT OCCURRED WERE: 1) DSNDING BELOW MINIMUMS WHEN NOT IN A POS TO MAKE NORMAL DSCNT TO LNDG. 2) PERFORMING STEEP TURNS (45 DEGS) AND AEROBATIC MANEUVERS (60 DEG TURNS) IN THE VICINITY OF THE ARPT. PLT OPS SPECS EXPRESSLY PROHIBIT BANK ANGLES BEYOND 30 DEGS. 3) CARELESS AND RECKLESS OPS. I BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD HAVE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH IMMEDIATELY UPON BREAKING OUT AND HAVING REALIZED I PROBABLY COULD NOT MAINTAIN VISUAL AT MINIMUMS. AFTER AS I DISCUSSED THIS WITH CAPT, HE REMARKED THAT I WAS INDECISIVE AND THAT'S WHY HE TOOK THE AIRPLANE. I PAUSED AT MDA JUST BEFORE THE MISSED APCH POINT TO ASK THE CAPT, 'WELL WHAT DO YOU THINK.' I ASKED HIM THAT ONLY TO SOLICIT INPUT AS TO WHETHER HE SAW A VIABLE, LEGAL, AND SAFE RTE TO THE ARPT, YET HE TOOK THIS AS AN INABILITY TO MAKE A PROPER DECISION. ALSO, WE SHOULD HAVE BRIEFED A CAPT MONITORED APCH DUE TO THE CEILING BEING SO CLOSE TO MINIMUMS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT SHE RPTED THIS EVENT TO THE CHIEF PLT OF THE ACR. THE CHIEF PLT DID NOT SET THIS CAPT UP FOR A LINE CHK OR ANY OTHER 'REMEDIAL' TREATMENT. HE DID WARN THIS CAPT THAT ONE MORE TRANSGRESSION OF THIS NATURE WOULD RESULT IN HIS TERMINATION WITH THE ACR. RPTR SAID THAT THIS CAPT HAD PREVIOUS VIOLATIONS OR UNUSUAL BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS IN THE PAST. THE PROB, AS SHE SAW IT, WAS THAT THIS CAPT DIDN'T EVEN SEEM TO REALIZE HE HAD DONE ANYTHING WRONG. THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF THE ACR IS ALSO ON TOP OF THIS ONE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.