Narrative:

Prior to departure from seeb, departure clearance was changed from standard departure taxiway M runway 8 to turn 360 degrees and maintain 2000 ft, and contact seeb radar. Upon departure from runway 8, we turned to 360 degrees and while climbing to 2000 ft we contacted seeb radar which in turn advised us we were in radar contact and subsequently amended our clearance to turn 090 degrees and maintain 3000 ft, we responded 090 degrees and 3000 ft. TA's were given which indicated an aircraft was approaching from the east, otherwise, the advisories were unintelligible due to the controller's heavy english accent. Subsequently we began to track the opposing F27 aircraft on TCASII and had him visually at 3 mi and in close proximity and same altitude. He was surprised as were we. I queried seeb radar as to 090 degrees and 3000 ft clearance and received no reply. The reaction of the F27 aircraft seemed to indicate that we should have been at 2000 ft, but we read back 3000 ft and 090 degree heading, which turned us into him, without correction from seeb, and established ourselves at 3000 ft well in advance of the conflict without any altitude warning. It was my impression that seeb has mode C interrogation capability, but even if they do not, they should not turn 2 aircraft into the same flight path in an area with such light traffic density. We were the only 2 aircraft in the entire area and the original 360 degree heading served only to align us more. A conflict could have been completely avoided if we were just cleared on course after takeoff. And also, I might've been able to realize the controller's mistake earlier and question him prior to the conflict by his TA's to the other aircraft if his english had not been so poor. This is a continual problem in international operations. Supplemental information from acn 370460: this report is in reference to a near miss incident between a BA31 and an F27 after departing the seeb international airport, sultanate of oman, in may 1997. My initial feeling was to confirm the instructions, however after the captain's reply and no response from the controller, as in the previous transmission, my momentary feeling of uncertainty quickly vanished and I proceeded to complete the last items on the checklist. There was another transmission almost immediately after the last regarding traffic on the downwind leg, which once again, due to the language difference, I could not completely assimilate, but did hear 'call when in sight.' again the captain replied 'air carrier is looking.' the only possibility that I can come up with, other than the controller assigning the wrong altitude to us, is, that perhaps he was giving us a TA. Might he have been relating the traffic on the downwind in relation to a heading, example, at 090 degrees 3000 ft was interpreted to 'right 090 degrees and climb to 3000 ft.' nevertheless our response was to turn and climb and there was nothing said to disavow our actions. In conclusion, there is no doubt that language barriers/accents have led to misinterp which have led to other incidents and accidents. Knowing this, and realizing this first hand, it is even more important when operating in a foreign country to have a higher level of concentration when receiving xmissions and to confirm any communication if there is even the slightest shred of doubt, even if the person you are flying with answers with confidence and conviction. Finally, the one positive, if there can be one, is the knowledge that the TCASII system does what it was designed to and does it well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BA31 ON DEP VECTOR OF OOM WAS TURNED TO A CONFLICTING HEADING AND CLBED TO THE SAME ALT AS AN INBOUND F27. BA31 FLC SAYS ACFT PASSED REAL CLOSE, BUT FO RPTR THINKS IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE CAPT FLYING TOOK A TA FOR A CLRNC. CTLR'S ENGLISH WAS REPORTEDLY NOT VERY GOOD. TCASII PICKED UP THE F27 AND THE BA31 FLC ALSO HAD A VISUAL SIGHTING ON THE ACFT. THE CTLR SAID THE BA31 SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 2000 FT VERSUS 3000 FT.

Narrative: PRIOR TO DEP FROM SEEB, DEP CLRNC WAS CHANGED FROM STANDARD DEP TXWY M RWY 8 TO TURN 360 DEGS AND MAINTAIN 2000 FT, AND CONTACT SEEB RADAR. UPON DEP FROM RWY 8, WE TURNED TO 360 DEGS AND WHILE CLBING TO 2000 FT WE CONTACTED SEEB RADAR WHICH IN TURN ADVISED US WE WERE IN RADAR CONTACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED OUR CLRNC TO TURN 090 DEGS AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT, WE RESPONDED 090 DEGS AND 3000 FT. TA'S WERE GIVEN WHICH INDICATED AN ACFT WAS APCHING FROM THE E, OTHERWISE, THE ADVISORIES WERE UNINTELLIGIBLE DUE TO THE CTLR'S HVY ENGLISH ACCENT. SUBSEQUENTLY WE BEGAN TO TRACK THE OPPOSING F27 ACFT ON TCASII AND HAD HIM VISUALLY AT 3 MI AND IN CLOSE PROX AND SAME ALT. HE WAS SURPRISED AS WERE WE. I QUERIED SEEB RADAR AS TO 090 DEGS AND 3000 FT CLRNC AND RECEIVED NO REPLY. THE REACTION OF THE F27 ACFT SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT 2000 FT, BUT WE READ BACK 3000 FT AND 090 DEG HDG, WHICH TURNED US INTO HIM, WITHOUT CORRECTION FROM SEEB, AND ESTABLISHED OURSELVES AT 3000 FT WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE CONFLICT WITHOUT ANY ALT WARNING. IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT SEEB HAS MODE C INTERROGATION CAPABILITY, BUT EVEN IF THEY DO NOT, THEY SHOULD NOT TURN 2 ACFT INTO THE SAME FLT PATH IN AN AREA WITH SUCH LIGHT TFC DENSITY. WE WERE THE ONLY 2 ACFT IN THE ENTIRE AREA AND THE ORIGINAL 360 DEG HDG SERVED ONLY TO ALIGN US MORE. A CONFLICT COULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY AVOIDED IF WE WERE JUST CLRED ON COURSE AFTER TKOF. AND ALSO, I MIGHT'VE BEEN ABLE TO REALIZE THE CTLR'S MISTAKE EARLIER AND QUESTION HIM PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT BY HIS TA'S TO THE OTHER ACFT IF HIS ENGLISH HAD NOT BEEN SO POOR. THIS IS A CONTINUAL PROB IN INTERNATIONAL OPS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 370460: THIS RPT IS IN REF TO A NEAR MISS INCIDENT BTWN A BA31 AND AN F27 AFTER DEPARTING THE SEEB INTL ARPT, SULTANATE OF OMAN, IN MAY 1997. MY INITIAL FEELING WAS TO CONFIRM THE INSTRUCTIONS, HOWEVER AFTER THE CAPT'S REPLY AND NO RESPONSE FROM THE CTLR, AS IN THE PREVIOUS XMISSION, MY MOMENTARY FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY QUICKLY VANISHED AND I PROCEEDED TO COMPLETE THE LAST ITEMS ON THE CHKLIST. THERE WAS ANOTHER XMISSION ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE LAST REGARDING TFC ON THE DOWNWIND LEG, WHICH ONCE AGAIN, DUE TO THE LANGUAGE DIFFERENCE, I COULD NOT COMPLETELY ASSIMILATE, BUT DID HEAR 'CALL WHEN IN SIGHT.' AGAIN THE CAPT REPLIED 'ACR IS LOOKING.' THE ONLY POSSIBILITY THAT I CAN COME UP WITH, OTHER THAN THE CTLR ASSIGNING THE WRONG ALT TO US, IS, THAT PERHAPS HE WAS GIVING US A TA. MIGHT HE HAVE BEEN RELATING THE TFC ON THE DOWNWIND IN RELATION TO A HEADING, EXAMPLE, AT 090 DEGS 3000 FT WAS INTERPRETED TO 'R 090 DEGS AND CLB TO 3000 FT.' NEVERTHELESS OUR RESPONSE WAS TO TURN AND CLB AND THERE WAS NOTHING SAID TO DISAVOW OUR ACTIONS. IN CONCLUSION, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT LANGUAGE BARRIERS/ACCENTS HAVE LED TO MISINTERP WHICH HAVE LED TO OTHER INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS. KNOWING THIS, AND REALIZING THIS FIRST HAND, IT IS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT WHEN OPERATING IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY TO HAVE A HIGHER LEVEL OF CONCENTRATION WHEN RECEIVING XMISSIONS AND TO CONFIRM ANY COM IF THERE IS EVEN THE SLIGHTEST SHRED OF DOUBT, EVEN IF THE PERSON YOU ARE FLYING WITH ANSWERS WITH CONFIDENCE AND CONVICTION. FINALLY, THE ONE POSITIVE, IF THERE CAN BE ONE, IS THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE TCASII SYS DOES WHAT IT WAS DESIGNED TO AND DOES IT WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.