Narrative:

Shortly after takeoff the gear was retracted and as the flaps were being retracted from 5 degrees to 2 degrees, flight engineer advised me that we had suffered a complete system 'a' hydraulic fluid and pressure loss. I advised him to perform the 'hydraulic pressure/fluid loss' checklist. ATC was advised, and we requested radar vectors to remain in the bwi airspace while appropriate action was being taken and communications with the company were established. Numerous attempts to contact the company on all published communication frequencys were unsuccessful. Numerous attempts to contact the company on bwi ramp radio were unsuccessful. Finally contact was established with dca ramp radio. I requested dca to call air carrier X dispatch on the telephone and advise them of our situation and to also call bwi air carrier X and request them to man their VHF radio in the event a return to bwi was necessary. Communications with bwi were then established via VHF, and they (bwi) contacted dispatch via telephone and were able to relay messages from dispatch to us. Dispatch advised that they preferred we fly the aircraft to jfk, and relayed a fuel burn and time en route. At this time we requested and were cleared to jfk at 10000 ft and 230 KTS. This recommendation by dispatch, I concurred with for the following reasons: there was a strong gusty crosswind at bwi, and we would be limited to a 19 KT crosswind. We would be landing with 15 degrees flaps with a 15 KT speed additive on final. Jfk had a much longer runway and more closely aligned with the wind. If manual extension of the gear was unsuccessful, jfk was a far more desirable facility, all factors considered, and the closest, suitable airport in point of time. Aircraft weight would be considerably below landing weight, thus reducing our final approach speed. Air carrier maintenance personnel would be available to meet the aircraft and pin the main landing gear, and tow the aircraft to the terminal, as we would be unable to taxi, being without nosewheel steering. Approximately 20 mi from jfk the landing gear and flaps were successfully extended using the alternate methods. Although no emergency was declared, the emergency equipment was requested to stand by as a precautionary measure. WX at jfk was VFR with the wind reported 200 degrees at 14 KTS. The aircraft landing weight was 145000 pounds. Clearance was received to land on runway 22R. The landing and stopping were normal. Gear pins were inserted and the aircraft was towed to the terminal area without further incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC FOUND THAT THEY HAD LOST COMPLETE HYD FLUID AND PRESSURE UPON LIFTOFF CAUSING THEM TO DIVERT TO AN ARPT WITH A LONGER RWY AND PUT THE GEAR AND FLAPS DOWN BY ALTERNATE MEANS.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER TKOF THE GEAR WAS RETRACTED AND AS THE FLAPS WERE BEING RETRACTED FROM 5 DEGS TO 2 DEGS, FE ADVISED ME THAT WE HAD SUFFERED A COMPLETE SYS 'A' HYD FLUID AND PRESSURE LOSS. I ADVISED HIM TO PERFORM THE 'HYD PRESSURE/FLUID LOSS' CHKLIST. ATC WAS ADVISED, AND WE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS TO REMAIN IN THE BWI AIRSPACE WHILE APPROPRIATE ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN AND COMS WITH THE COMPANY WERE ESTABLISHED. NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE COMPANY ON ALL PUBLISHED COM FREQS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE COMPANY ON BWI RAMP RADIO WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. FINALLY CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED WITH DCA RAMP RADIO. I REQUESTED DCA TO CALL ACR X DISPATCH ON THE TELEPHONE AND ADVISE THEM OF OUR SIT AND TO ALSO CALL BWI ACR X AND REQUEST THEM TO MAN THEIR VHF RADIO IN THE EVENT A RETURN TO BWI WAS NECESSARY. COMS WITH BWI WERE THEN ESTABLISHED VIA VHF, AND THEY (BWI) CONTACTED DISPATCH VIA TELEPHONE AND WERE ABLE TO RELAY MESSAGES FROM DISPATCH TO US. DISPATCH ADVISED THAT THEY PREFERRED WE FLY THE ACFT TO JFK, AND RELAYED A FUEL BURN AND TIME ENRTE. AT THIS TIME WE REQUESTED AND WERE CLRED TO JFK AT 10000 FT AND 230 KTS. THIS RECOMMENDATION BY DISPATCH, I CONCURRED WITH FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: THERE WAS A STRONG GUSTY XWIND AT BWI, AND WE WOULD BE LIMITED TO A 19 KT XWIND. WE WOULD BE LNDG WITH 15 DEGS FLAPS WITH A 15 KT SPD ADDITIVE ON FINAL. JFK HAD A MUCH LONGER RWY AND MORE CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH THE WIND. IF MANUAL EXTENSION OF THE GEAR WAS UNSUCCESSFUL, JFK WAS A FAR MORE DESIRABLE FACILITY, ALL FACTORS CONSIDERED, AND THE CLOSEST, SUITABLE ARPT IN POINT OF TIME. ACFT WT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY BELOW LNDG WT, THUS REDUCING OUR FINAL APCH SPD. ACR MAINT PERSONNEL WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MEET THE ACFT AND PIN THE MAIN LNDG GEAR, AND TOW THE ACFT TO THE TERMINAL, AS WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO TAXI, BEING WITHOUT NOSEWHEEL STEERING. APPROX 20 MI FROM JFK THE LNDG GEAR AND FLAPS WERE SUCCESSFULLY EXTENDED USING THE ALTERNATE METHODS. ALTHOUGH NO EMER WAS DECLARED, THE EMER EQUIP WAS REQUESTED TO STAND BY AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. WX AT JFK WAS VFR WITH THE WIND RPTED 200 DEGS AT 14 KTS. THE ACFT LNDG WT WAS 145000 LBS. CLRNC WAS RECEIVED TO LAND ON RWY 22R. THE LNDG AND STOPPING WERE NORMAL. GEAR PINS WERE INSERTED AND THE ACFT WAS TOWED TO THE TERMINAL AREA WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.