Narrative:

Company's relatively new passenger operations, with new GPS onboard on a new route. First officer was flying, captain was determining how to enter waypoint in GPS. Flight engineer was calculating cruise EPR for altitude FL310. 1000 ft alert and standard '1000 ft to go' call made. At about 150 ft prior to altitude first officer armed altitude hold, however, autoplt never captured. Seconds later we got 250 ft off altitude warning, first officer disarmed autoplt, leveled off at 31400 ft and began immediate descent to 31000 ft. ATC queried our altitude, informed us we showed 400 ft high. I felt that at a busy time in the cockpit with some unfamiliar equipment on an unfamiliar route we should have been more vigilant. I saw the first officer arm altitude selector and then returned to calculating cruise data instead of watching autoplt leveloff the aircraft. First officer wasn't monitoring autoplt as closely as he should have. Captain needs to familiarize himself more closely with different functions of GPS. Overall I felt familiarity with aircraft and its operations in cargo led to a falsely perceived comfort zone with passenger operations which has different equipment onboard, takes us different flight plan rtes. This misconception led to relaxed crew vigilance. Hence an altitude incursion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 FLC CLBS ABOVE ASSIGNED ALT. ALT HOLD FAILED TO CAPTURE, CAPT WORKING ON SETTING A WAYPOINT IN GPS.

Narrative: COMPANY'S RELATIVELY NEW PAX OPS, WITH NEW GPS ONBOARD ON A NEW RTE. FO WAS FLYING, CAPT WAS DETERMINING HOW TO ENTER WAYPOINT IN GPS. FE WAS CALCULATING CRUISE EPR FOR ALT FL310. 1000 FT ALERT AND STANDARD '1000 FT TO GO' CALL MADE. AT ABOUT 150 FT PRIOR TO ALT FO ARMED ALT HOLD, HOWEVER, AUTOPLT NEVER CAPTURED. SECONDS LATER WE GOT 250 FT OFF ALT WARNING, FO DISARMED AUTOPLT, LEVELED OFF AT 31400 FT AND BEGAN IMMEDIATE DSCNT TO 31000 FT. ATC QUERIED OUR ALT, INFORMED US WE SHOWED 400 FT HIGH. I FELT THAT AT A BUSY TIME IN THE COCKPIT WITH SOME UNFAMILIAR EQUIP ON AN UNFAMILIAR RTE WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE VIGILANT. I SAW THE FO ARM ALT SELECTOR AND THEN RETURNED TO CALCULATING CRUISE DATA INSTEAD OF WATCHING AUTOPLT LEVELOFF THE ACFT. FO WASN'T MONITORING AUTOPLT AS CLOSELY AS HE SHOULD HAVE. CAPT NEEDS TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF MORE CLOSELY WITH DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF GPS. OVERALL I FELT FAMILIARITY WITH ACFT AND ITS OPS IN CARGO LED TO A FALSELY PERCEIVED COMFORT ZONE WITH PAX OPS WHICH HAS DIFFERENT EQUIP ONBOARD, TAKES US DIFFERENT FLT PLAN RTES. THIS MISCONCEPTION LED TO RELAXED CREW VIGILANCE. HENCE AN ALT INCURSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.