Narrative:

After takeoff from lga runway 13 using the lga 7 with the whitestone climb, we were asked by departure control to verify our heading. We replied that we were turning left to 040 degrees. The controller seemed surprised and told us to continue turn all the way around to 230 degrees. He then stated that he had tried to 'catch' us but we were already in the turn when we switched over from tower. While we were climbing out, the first officer remarked, 'I know we were on the right departure, because I wrote it down.' he then proceeded to show me the scratch pad where he had written down our transponder code and coney climb. We had received our clearance via ACARS with the whitestone climb and a notation to verify transponder and climb with clearance delivery. The WX in the preceding 45- 55 mins had been changing rapidly, with, freezing rain, light ice pellets, and light freezing drizzle. We had been deiced twice, with 2 different takeoff holdover times, and had had to cancel taxi twice due to being unable to legally takeoff. We were trying to talk to clearance delivery while monitoring ATIS, company, deice, ground control, ramp control and our pushback intercom, all at the same time. The takeoff procedure had been briefed prior to our first deice and all the appropriate headings and altitudes had been written down by me on a scratch pad for reference to after takeoff. Due to our workload I was monitoring ground control when the first officer got the amended climb clearance and in the rush to get airborne once we were legal to do so, we briefed the original climb (whitestone) when we were #1 for takeoff. Suggest when workloads get this heavy, that all clrncs be monitored by both pilots and that if a departure is subject to change, that it be given verbally and not put in the ACARS clearance at all.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 THOUGHT CLRED VIA LGA 7, WHITESTONE CLB. MUCH CONFUSION PRIOR TO DEP WITH DEICING AND WX. FO HAD COPIED CHANGE TO CONEY CLB, BUT IN THE DELAYS FAILED TO CHANGE THE FMC. CTLR CAUGHT THE ERROR AND VECTORED TO CORRECT RADIAL.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF FROM LGA RWY 13 USING THE LGA 7 WITH THE WHITESTONE CLB, WE WERE ASKED BY DEP CTL TO VERIFY OUR HEADING. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE TURNING L TO 040 DEGS. THE CTLR SEEMED SURPRISED AND TOLD US TO CONTINUE TURN ALL THE WAY AROUND TO 230 DEGS. HE THEN STATED THAT HE HAD TRIED TO 'CATCH' US BUT WE WERE ALREADY IN THE TURN WHEN WE SWITCHED OVER FROM TWR. WHILE WE WERE CLBING OUT, THE FO REMARKED, 'I KNOW WE WERE ON THE RIGHT DEP, BECAUSE I WROTE IT DOWN.' HE THEN PROCEEDED TO SHOW ME THE SCRATCH PAD WHERE HE HAD WRITTEN DOWN OUR XPONDER CODE AND CONEY CLB. WE HAD RECEIVED OUR CLRNC VIA ACARS WITH THE WHITESTONE CLB AND A NOTATION TO VERIFY XPONDER AND CLB WITH CLRNC DELIVERY. THE WX IN THE PRECEDING 45- 55 MINS HAD BEEN CHANGING RAPIDLY, WITH, FREEZING RAIN, LIGHT ICE PELLETS, AND LIGHT FREEZING DRIZZLE. WE HAD BEEN DEICED TWICE, WITH 2 DIFFERENT TKOF HOLDOVER TIMES, AND HAD HAD TO CANCEL TAXI TWICE DUE TO BEING UNABLE TO LEGALLY TKOF. WE WERE TRYING TO TALK TO CLRNC DELIVERY WHILE MONITORING ATIS, COMPANY, DEICE, GND CTL, RAMP CTL AND OUR PUSHBACK INTERCOM, ALL AT THE SAME TIME. THE TKOF PROC HAD BEEN BRIEFED PRIOR TO OUR FIRST DEICE AND ALL THE APPROPRIATE HEADINGS AND ALTS HAD BEEN WRITTEN DOWN BY ME ON A SCRATCH PAD FOR REF TO AFTER TKOF. DUE TO OUR WORKLOAD I WAS MONITORING GND CTL WHEN THE FO GOT THE AMENDED CLB CLRNC AND IN THE RUSH TO GET AIRBORNE ONCE WE WERE LEGAL TO DO SO, WE BRIEFED THE ORIGINAL CLB (WHITESTONE) WHEN WE WERE #1 FOR TKOF. SUGGEST WHEN WORKLOADS GET THIS HVY, THAT ALL CLRNCS BE MONITORED BY BOTH PLTS AND THAT IF A DEP IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE, THAT IT BE GIVEN VERBALLY AND NOT PUT IN THE ACARS CLRNC AT ALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.