Narrative:

We were en route to lns for a VOR runway 31 approach. I looked over at the turn coordinator and saw the ball was fully deflected, either to the left or right. On noting that, the aircraft went into, if not a spin, a violent spiral. I almost gave up trying to save the aircraft, death seemed a certainty, all the while I kept thinking of my wife and children. I did recover finally, it was in IMC, and I think we lost about 1200-1500 ft. Approach noted our loss exactly, and asked what happened. At that point I asked to return to make the approach to millard airport and thence to riegel -- I did not get down to minimum approach altitude for millard, and then asked for ILS runway 8 at cxy. After having recovered from the spin/spiral I had absolutely no presence of mind. I was so absolutely terrified by having almost crashed, I could not apply rational thought to flying, I could not find the plate for cxy, which proved to be in the binder, in the plane at the time. We then elected to land at mdt on ILS runway 31. I was in such a condition of shock I could not apply standard procedures using the approach plate, I just basically responded to highly detailed instructions from the tower. It was several missed approachs later that the tower finally talked me through the approach. I owed my life that day to the people in the tower. Several things are apparent from this incident. 1) I obviously am at fault for the entire incident, otherwise there would be no need of this letter. Being current is not the same as being comfortable in what was a fairly low IFR environment. I have been limited to approachs now with WX conditions of 2000 ft and minimum 3 mi visibility. I'm not certain that I will even entertain notions of instrument instruction in any environment. If I do, there will be no actual IFR until at least 30 hours under the hood for the student. It bears repetition, I bear sole responsibility for the entire flight. The student, while competent under the hood had only 10-12 hours on simulated instruments. Possibly lastly, I'm advised by our chief pilot that currency is not synonymous with an ongoing ease that I'm sure should be felt in an IFR environment. He advises me it takes a great deal of time, and in the meantime, he will be working with me in constantly advising and evaluating me on my progress towards becoming a vastly more experienced and, comfortable instrument pilot/instructor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR PLT SUFFERS A LOSS OF ACFT CTL IN HIS C172 DURING IMC FLT. HE SUFFERS A LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONCENTRATE AND FINALLY DIVERTS TO MDT WHERE THE CTLR HAS TO TALK HIM THROUGH THE APCH PROCS IN ORDER TO GET THE ACFT ONTO THE RWY.

Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE TO LNS FOR A VOR RWY 31 APCH. I LOOKED OVER AT THE TURN COORDINATOR AND SAW THE BALL WAS FULLY DEFLECTED, EITHER TO THE L OR R. ON NOTING THAT, THE ACFT WENT INTO, IF NOT A SPIN, A VIOLENT SPIRAL. I ALMOST GAVE UP TRYING TO SAVE THE ACFT, DEATH SEEMED A CERTAINTY, ALL THE WHILE I KEPT THINKING OF MY WIFE AND CHILDREN. I DID RECOVER FINALLY, IT WAS IN IMC, AND I THINK WE LOST ABOUT 1200-1500 FT. APCH NOTED OUR LOSS EXACTLY, AND ASKED WHAT HAPPENED. AT THAT POINT I ASKED TO RETURN TO MAKE THE APCH TO MILLARD ARPT AND THENCE TO RIEGEL -- I DID NOT GET DOWN TO MINIMUM APCH ALT FOR MILLARD, AND THEN ASKED FOR ILS RWY 8 AT CXY. AFTER HAVING RECOVERED FROM THE SPIN/SPIRAL I HAD ABSOLUTELY NO PRESENCE OF MIND. I WAS SO ABSOLUTELY TERRIFIED BY HAVING ALMOST CRASHED, I COULD NOT APPLY RATIONAL THOUGHT TO FLYING, I COULD NOT FIND THE PLATE FOR CXY, WHICH PROVED TO BE IN THE BINDER, IN THE PLANE AT THE TIME. WE THEN ELECTED TO LAND AT MDT ON ILS RWY 31. I WAS IN SUCH A CONDITION OF SHOCK I COULD NOT APPLY STANDARD PROCS USING THE APCH PLATE, I JUST BASICALLY RESPONDED TO HIGHLY DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE TWR. IT WAS SEVERAL MISSED APCHS LATER THAT THE TWR FINALLY TALKED ME THROUGH THE APCH. I OWED MY LIFE THAT DAY TO THE PEOPLE IN THE TWR. SEVERAL THINGS ARE APPARENT FROM THIS INCIDENT. 1) I OBVIOUSLY AM AT FAULT FOR THE ENTIRE INCIDENT, OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE NO NEED OF THIS LETTER. BEING CURRENT IS NOT THE SAME AS BEING COMFORTABLE IN WHAT WAS A FAIRLY LOW IFR ENVIRONMENT. I HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO APCHS NOW WITH WX CONDITIONS OF 2000 FT AND MINIMUM 3 MI VISIBILITY. I'M NOT CERTAIN THAT I WILL EVEN ENTERTAIN NOTIONS OF INST INSTRUCTION IN ANY ENVIRONMENT. IF I DO, THERE WILL BE NO ACTUAL IFR UNTIL AT LEAST 30 HRS UNDER THE HOOD FOR THE STUDENT. IT BEARS REPETITION, I BEAR SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ENTIRE FLT. THE STUDENT, WHILE COMPETENT UNDER THE HOOD HAD ONLY 10-12 HRS ON SIMULATED INSTS. POSSIBLY LASTLY, I'M ADVISED BY OUR CHIEF PLT THAT CURRENCY IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH AN ONGOING EASE THAT I'M SURE SHOULD BE FELT IN AN IFR ENVIRONMENT. HE ADVISES ME IT TAKES A GREAT DEAL OF TIME, AND IN THE MEANTIME, HE WILL BE WORKING WITH ME IN CONSTANTLY ADVISING AND EVALUATING ME ON MY PROGRESS TOWARDS BECOMING A VASTLY MORE EXPERIENCED AND, COMFORTABLE INST PLT/INSTRUCTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.