Narrative:

We had completed predep aircraft de-icing at the east de-ice pad and were cleared to taxi to runway 28C. I looked at the airport diagram on my yoke and thought it indicated we had to exit the pad area to access the parallel taxiway east. At that time the captain/instructor stated 'your choice' regarding taxi direction. This reinforced my assumption that we had to exit the pad prior to the parallel taxiway, and I chose to turn right out of de-ice spot X, followed by a left turn onto what I thought was taxiway east. I felt this would avoid the congestion on the de-ice pad caused by the de-ice marshaller and another aircraft on our left, on deice spot Y. After clearing left and right for traffic, I turned onto runway 28C thinking it was taxiway east. I do not recall seeing runway markers on the ground prior to the turn. I realized my mistake immediately when I saw the runway edge lights on either side of me! I announced our situation to the captain and we received clearance from ground control to exit the runway at taxiway right. There was never a conflict with other traffic and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. How did this happen? This was the second day of my IOE as captain on this aircraft. I felt somewhat 'busy' with the tempo of operations but felt it was necessary to proceed at our pace in order to assimilate my new duties/responsibilities in the real world environment. I did not feel our tempo was unsafe or I would have stated so. I had no prior experience with de-icing at pit or the pad operation. I misinterpreted the airport diagram. My misinterp was validated in my mind by the captain's statement. The captain was distraction by running the checklist, as was I while responding to it. How is it prevented? 2 obvious solutions are: 1) to be alert for being 'behind the aircraft' whether due to high tempo operations or unfamiliar territory. 2) hold a checklist while changing txwys or crossing runways. When taxiing straight and established on the new taxiway, continue the checklist. This keeps both pilots in the loop with regard to orientation and location. Specifically, in this case, I feel this being a captain IOE played a role. The lines of command and decision making are somewhat gray. As one is performing as the captain, while the line check airman is actually the captain of the flight. Trying to maintain the high tempo of operation, I feel that I deferred 'control' to the line check airman and did not pay as much attention to the taxi route as I would have had I been the PIC of the flight and in control of its tempo. This is an important point which should be reinforced to pilots receiving an IOE. Beware of the gray area and don't relinquish 'control' unless the other pilot says 'I've got it.' callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this was reporter's first time in the aircraft as captain. He was under instruction from a line check airman. The line check airman wasn't performing his first officer duties as an experienced first officer would do. He also admitted to the reported lack of cockpit coordination. The captain flying as student, felt rushed during his IOE. He feels if he were to do this flight over again, he would deliberately slow the operation to a more acceptable pace. He stated that he was trying to hurry to satisfy the line check airman. When he left the de-ice pad he simply could not locate the runway signs as he was slightly disoriented on his taxi out. He never saw any runway signs or lights. The line check airman flying in the first officer position never saw anything to indicate runway markings or runway lights. Reporter feels that, in same situation, he would slow down the operation of the aircraft in order to better identify runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 HAS RWY INCURSION INTO RWY 28C AFTER LEAVING DE- ICING PAD AT PIT.

Narrative: WE HAD COMPLETED PREDEP ACFT DE-ICING AT THE E DE-ICE PAD AND WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 28C. I LOOKED AT THE ARPT DIAGRAM ON MY YOKE AND THOUGHT IT INDICATED WE HAD TO EXIT THE PAD AREA TO ACCESS THE PARALLEL TXWY E. AT THAT TIME THE CAPT/INSTRUCTOR STATED 'YOUR CHOICE' REGARDING TAXI DIRECTION. THIS REINFORCED MY ASSUMPTION THAT WE HAD TO EXIT THE PAD PRIOR TO THE PARALLEL TXWY, AND I CHOSE TO TURN R OUT OF DE-ICE SPOT X, FOLLOWED BY A L TURN ONTO WHAT I THOUGHT WAS TXWY E. I FELT THIS WOULD AVOID THE CONGESTION ON THE DE-ICE PAD CAUSED BY THE DE-ICE MARSHALLER AND ANOTHER ACFT ON OUR L, ON DEICE SPOT Y. AFTER CLRING L AND R FOR TFC, I TURNED ONTO RWY 28C THINKING IT WAS TXWY E. I DO NOT RECALL SEEING RWY MARKERS ON THE GND PRIOR TO THE TURN. I REALIZED MY MISTAKE IMMEDIATELY WHEN I SAW THE RWY EDGE LIGHTS ON EITHER SIDE OF ME! I ANNOUNCED OUR SIT TO THE CAPT AND WE RECEIVED CLRNC FROM GND CTL TO EXIT THE RWY AT TXWY R. THERE WAS NEVER A CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. HOW DID THIS HAPPEN? THIS WAS THE SECOND DAY OF MY IOE AS CAPT ON THIS ACFT. I FELT SOMEWHAT 'BUSY' WITH THE TEMPO OF OPS BUT FELT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROCEED AT OUR PACE IN ORDER TO ASSIMILATE MY NEW DUTIES/RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE REAL WORLD ENVIRONMENT. I DID NOT FEEL OUR TEMPO WAS UNSAFE OR I WOULD HAVE STATED SO. I HAD NO PRIOR EXPERIENCE WITH DE-ICING AT PIT OR THE PAD OP. I MISINTERPRETED THE ARPT DIAGRAM. MY MISINTERP WAS VALIDATED IN MY MIND BY THE CAPT'S STATEMENT. THE CAPT WAS DISTR BY RUNNING THE CHKLIST, AS WAS I WHILE RESPONDING TO IT. HOW IS IT PREVENTED? 2 OBVIOUS SOLUTIONS ARE: 1) TO BE ALERT FOR BEING 'BEHIND THE ACFT' WHETHER DUE TO HIGH TEMPO OPS OR UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY. 2) HOLD A CHKLIST WHILE CHANGING TXWYS OR XING RWYS. WHEN TAXIING STRAIGHT AND ESTABLISHED ON THE NEW TXWY, CONTINUE THE CHKLIST. THIS KEEPS BOTH PLTS IN THE LOOP WITH REGARD TO ORIENTATION AND LOCATION. SPECIFICALLY, IN THIS CASE, I FEEL THIS BEING A CAPT IOE PLAYED A ROLE. THE LINES OF COMMAND AND DECISION MAKING ARE SOMEWHAT GRAY. AS ONE IS PERFORMING AS THE CAPT, WHILE THE LINE CHK AIRMAN IS ACTUALLY THE CAPT OF THE FLT. TRYING TO MAINTAIN THE HIGH TEMPO OF OP, I FEEL THAT I DEFERRED 'CTL' TO THE LINE CHK AIRMAN AND DID NOT PAY AS MUCH ATTN TO THE TAXI RTE AS I WOULD HAVE HAD I BEEN THE PIC OF THE FLT AND IN CTL OF ITS TEMPO. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT POINT WHICH SHOULD BE REINFORCED TO PLTS RECEIVING AN IOE. BEWARE OF THE GRAY AREA AND DON'T RELINQUISH 'CTL' UNLESS THE OTHER PLT SAYS 'I'VE GOT IT.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS WAS RPTR'S FIRST TIME IN THE ACFT AS CAPT. HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTION FROM A LINE CHK AIRMAN. THE LINE CHK AIRMAN WASN'T PERFORMING HIS FO DUTIES AS AN EXPERIENCED FO WOULD DO. HE ALSO ADMITTED TO THE RPTED LACK OF COCKPIT COORD. THE CAPT FLYING AS STUDENT, FELT RUSHED DURING HIS IOE. HE FEELS IF HE WERE TO DO THIS FLT OVER AGAIN, HE WOULD DELIBERATELY SLOW THE OP TO A MORE ACCEPTABLE PACE. HE STATED THAT HE WAS TRYING TO HURRY TO SATISFY THE LINE CHK AIRMAN. WHEN HE LEFT THE DE-ICE PAD HE SIMPLY COULD NOT LOCATE THE RWY SIGNS AS HE WAS SLIGHTLY DISORIENTED ON HIS TAXI OUT. HE NEVER SAW ANY RWY SIGNS OR LIGHTS. THE LINE CHK AIRMAN FLYING IN THE FO POS NEVER SAW ANYTHING TO INDICATE RWY MARKINGS OR RWY LIGHTS. RPTR FEELS THAT, IN SAME SIT, HE WOULD SLOW DOWN THE OP OF THE ACFT IN ORDER TO BETTER IDENT RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.