Narrative:

I was a crew member on a B767, operating anchorage-tokyo. At approximately XX30Z, about the time we were approaching coast out near bethel, we overheard a conversation that took place between air carrier Y, a B747, and zan. The call was initiated by air carrier Y, who informed center that they had just been passed by a B747 at nearly the same altitude as they, in what was a near miss situation. There was a short pause before zan responded that, in fact, there was another B747 in their vicinity, but that its distance was greater than 5 mi and altitude separation was greater than 2000 ft. As zan unkeyed his microphone, air carrier Z reported level at FL330 (the same altitude as air carrier Y). Air carrier Y responded that their TCASII indicated a distance of less than 3 mi and 500 ft separation, and that before evasive action could be taken, the threat had materialized visually and was now passed. Zan continued to insist that the aforementioned separation was there, and that neither aircraft was ever in danger. Several times, zan indicated that they were having trouble understanding radio xmissions from air carrier Z, although did not mention any VHF difficulties from any other aircraft, including the air carrier Z. 15 mins later, as air carrier Y was given a new frequency, the pilots acknowledged the handoff and indicated to zan that they would not file any type of report or action, other than a company safety report. The controller thanked them for understanding, and went on to say that he was sorry, and that he was very busy at the time of the incident. While our aircraft was not actually a participant in the incident, we happened to be in a position of witness. I am concerned that you will hear of this incident only from the perspective of the controller, as it is quite possible that neither air carrier Y nor air carrier Z participate in the safety program. Probably only 10 mins prior to the incident, we commented to each other (inside the cockpit) that the controller seemed to be terribly busy, working not only a large number of high altitude aircraft entering and exiting the north pacific tracks, but at the same time, he was also the final controller for 2 light aircraft that were shooting simultaneous approachs at 2 different airports on the west coast of alaska. It also appeared that he was working multiple frequencys, as we could not always hear aircraft respond.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THIRD PARTY CARGO B767 FLC RPT SIT OF APPARENT LTSS BTWN 2 B747'S AT THE SAME ALT AND LESS THAN 5 MI APART. CTLR CLAIMS SEPARATION OF 5 MI. FLC OVERHEARD CONVERSATION BTWN CTLR AND FLC OF THE B747'S.

Narrative: I WAS A CREW MEMBER ON A B767, OPERATING ANCHORAGE-TOKYO. AT APPROX XX30Z, ABOUT THE TIME WE WERE APCHING COAST OUT NEAR BETHEL, WE OVERHEARD A CONVERSATION THAT TOOK PLACE BTWN ACR Y, A B747, AND ZAN. THE CALL WAS INITIATED BY ACR Y, WHO INFORMED CTR THAT THEY HAD JUST BEEN PASSED BY A B747 AT NEARLY THE SAME ALT AS THEY, IN WHAT WAS A NEAR MISS SIT. THERE WAS A SHORT PAUSE BEFORE ZAN RESPONDED THAT, IN FACT, THERE WAS ANOTHER B747 IN THEIR VICINITY, BUT THAT ITS DISTANCE WAS GREATER THAN 5 MI AND ALT SEPARATION WAS GREATER THAN 2000 FT. AS ZAN UNKEYED HIS MIKE, ACR Z RPTED LEVEL AT FL330 (THE SAME ALT AS ACR Y). ACR Y RESPONDED THAT THEIR TCASII INDICATED A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 3 MI AND 500 FT SEPARATION, AND THAT BEFORE EVASIVE ACTION COULD BE TAKEN, THE THREAT HAD MATERIALIZED VISUALLY AND WAS NOW PASSED. ZAN CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED SEPARATION WAS THERE, AND THAT NEITHER ACFT WAS EVER IN DANGER. SEVERAL TIMES, ZAN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE HAVING TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING RADIO XMISSIONS FROM ACR Z, ALTHOUGH DID NOT MENTION ANY VHF DIFFICULTIES FROM ANY OTHER ACFT, INCLUDING THE ACR Z. 15 MINS LATER, AS ACR Y WAS GIVEN A NEW FREQ, THE PLTS ACKNOWLEDGED THE HDOF AND INDICATED TO ZAN THAT THEY WOULD NOT FILE ANY TYPE OF RPT OR ACTION, OTHER THAN A COMPANY SAFETY RPT. THE CTLR THANKED THEM FOR UNDERSTANDING, AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE WAS SORRY, AND THAT HE WAS VERY BUSY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. WHILE OUR ACFT WAS NOT ACTUALLY A PARTICIPANT IN THE INCIDENT, WE HAPPENED TO BE IN A POS OF WITNESS. I AM CONCERNED THAT YOU WILL HEAR OF THIS INCIDENT ONLY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CTLR, AS IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT NEITHER ACR Y NOR ACR Z PARTICIPATE IN THE SAFETY PROGRAM. PROBABLY ONLY 10 MINS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT, WE COMMENTED TO EACH OTHER (INSIDE THE COCKPIT) THAT THE CTLR SEEMED TO BE TERRIBLY BUSY, WORKING NOT ONLY A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGH ALT ACFT ENTERING AND EXITING THE NORTH PACIFIC TRACKS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, HE WAS ALSO THE FINAL CTLR FOR 2 LIGHT ACFT THAT WERE SHOOTING SIMULTANEOUS APCHS AT 2 DIFFERENT ARPTS ON THE WEST COAST OF ALASKA. IT ALSO APPEARED THAT HE WAS WORKING MULTIPLE FREQS, AS WE COULD NOT ALWAYS HEAR ACFT RESPOND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.