Narrative:

Our aircraft X was on the expressway visual (charted) to runway 31 at lga. As we approached the turn-on to final point at the shea stadium area, tower issued the interval traffic we were to follow. This traffic, instead of being on the ground track expected, was 3 mi or so extended on the 130 degree radial or extended centerline of runway 31. We, therefore, had to turn right, then 180 degrees back around to provide separation. As we came around and began an extended final and descent to the runway, tower issued a traffic call at our 10 O'clock unknown aircraft Y at 1700 ft, approximately 2 1/2 mi, not talking to tower. We continued toward the runway and watched the traffic coming directly toward us apparently on the expressway visual for runway 31. Tower tried to notify aircraft Y of his need to sequence behind us but was blocked by the other aircraft finally transmitting for clearance to land. Our separation was getting unsatisfactory and it became obvious that the other aircraft (air carrier Y) was going for the runway at the same time and we would collide. So we executed a missed approach and finally were able to get an altitude and heading from tower for another approach. The contributing factors were (in my opinion): 1) charted visual used when traffic density was too great. Each aircraft sequenced should be able to follow interval ahead on the same track, otherwise pilot workload becomes too high looking for visual cues, traffic, runway, etc. 2) other aircraft not immediately contacting tower for sequencing. When it did communicate, it was slow and frequency congesting not allowing for advisories. 3) possible poor coordination between ny approach and lga tower, allowing density in the air traffic area to become unmanageable. Supplemental information from acn 361991: while we were on 3 mi final, aircraft Y did not expect us to be on an extended final while following their depicted ground track. They were not in constant contact with tower and assumed they were #1 after being cleared the expressway visual runway 31 and did not look for us. It is easy to become preoccupied with trying to identify the landmarks and runway among all of the ground lights and not clear for traffic not flying the ground track. I do not think tower should extend our final while still calling it the expressway visual runway 31. Tower and aircraft Y were not in constant contact. Either aircraft Y did not check in or tower missed the handoff from approach control. Tower should cancel the expressway visual runway 31 once planes deviate from the depicted ground track. They should also tell them that the traffic is on extended final and no longer flying the expressway visual.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 FLC ON EXPRESSWAY CHARTED VISUAL APCH TO LGA RWY 31 EXTENDED THEIR FLT PATH TO ACCOMMODATE ADDITIONAL TFC SEQUENCED AHEAD OF THEM. A GAR WAS INITIATED ON FINAL APCH DUE TO THE CLOSE PROX OF THE ACFT IN FRONT AND A TCASII RA. BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE CRITICAL OF ATC HANDLING.

Narrative: OUR ACFT X WAS ON THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL (CHARTED) TO RWY 31 AT LGA. AS WE APCHED THE TURN-ON TO FINAL POINT AT THE SHEA STADIUM AREA, TWR ISSUED THE INTERVAL TFC WE WERE TO FOLLOW. THIS TFC, INSTEAD OF BEING ON THE GND TRACK EXPECTED, WAS 3 MI OR SO EXTENDED ON THE 130 DEG RADIAL OR EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY 31. WE, THEREFORE, HAD TO TURN R, THEN 180 DEGS BACK AROUND TO PROVIDE SEPARATION. AS WE CAME AROUND AND BEGAN AN EXTENDED FINAL AND DSCNT TO THE RWY, TWR ISSUED A TFC CALL AT OUR 10 O'CLOCK UNKNOWN ACFT Y AT 1700 FT, APPROX 2 1/2 MI, NOT TALKING TO TWR. WE CONTINUED TOWARD THE RWY AND WATCHED THE TFC COMING DIRECTLY TOWARD US APPARENTLY ON THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL FOR RWY 31. TWR TRIED TO NOTIFY ACFT Y OF HIS NEED TO SEQUENCE BEHIND US BUT WAS BLOCKED BY THE OTHER ACFT FINALLY XMITTING FOR CLRNC TO LAND. OUR SEPARATION WAS GETTING UNSATISFACTORY AND IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THE OTHER ACFT (ACR Y) WAS GOING FOR THE RWY AT THE SAME TIME AND WE WOULD COLLIDE. SO WE EXECUTED A MISSED APCH AND FINALLY WERE ABLE TO GET AN ALT AND HDG FROM TWR FOR ANOTHER APCH. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE (IN MY OPINION): 1) CHARTED VISUAL USED WHEN TFC DENSITY WAS TOO GREAT. EACH ACFT SEQUENCED SHOULD BE ABLE TO FOLLOW INTERVAL AHEAD ON THE SAME TRACK, OTHERWISE PLT WORKLOAD BECOMES TOO HIGH LOOKING FOR VISUAL CUES, TFC, RWY, ETC. 2) OTHER ACFT NOT IMMEDIATELY CONTACTING TWR FOR SEQUENCING. WHEN IT DID COMMUNICATE, IT WAS SLOW AND FREQ CONGESTING NOT ALLOWING FOR ADVISORIES. 3) POSSIBLE POOR COORD BTWN NY APCH AND LGA TWR, ALLOWING DENSITY IN THE ATA TO BECOME UNMANAGEABLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 361991: WHILE WE WERE ON 3 MI FINAL, ACFT Y DID NOT EXPECT US TO BE ON AN EXTENDED FINAL WHILE FOLLOWING THEIR DEPICTED GND TRACK. THEY WERE NOT IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH TWR AND ASSUMED THEY WERE #1 AFTER BEING CLRED THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL RWY 31 AND DID NOT LOOK FOR US. IT IS EASY TO BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH TRYING TO IDENT THE LANDMARKS AND RWY AMONG ALL OF THE GND LIGHTS AND NOT CLR FOR TFC NOT FLYING THE GND TRACK. I DO NOT THINK TWR SHOULD EXTEND OUR FINAL WHILE STILL CALLING IT THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL RWY 31. TWR AND ACFT Y WERE NOT IN CONSTANT CONTACT. EITHER ACFT Y DID NOT CHK IN OR TWR MISSED THE HDOF FROM APCH CTL. TWR SHOULD CANCEL THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL RWY 31 ONCE PLANES DEVIATE FROM THE DEPICTED GND TRACK. THEY SHOULD ALSO TELL THEM THAT THE TFC IS ON EXTENDED FINAL AND NO LONGER FLYING THE EXPRESSWAY VISUAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.