Narrative:

Situation: I was the PF. We departed roa runway 24, tower advised us to change to departure control. The first officer acknowledged the change of frequency. I continued climbing with the expectation of being cleared to 8000 ft. The first officer failed to contact departure control, or make the required altitude callouts. (Our standard operating procedures require callouts at 1000 ft and 200 ft prior to assigned altitude.) I also neglected to properly monitor our altitude. The tower queried us about contacting departure and also advised us that our assigned altitude was 5000 ft. By this time I was passing through 5700 ft. I reduced power to flight idle and began descending to 5000 ft. The first officer contacted departure control advising them of our present altitude of 5400 ft, and descending. We received clearance to 8000 ft. Departure advised us that we had not caused any problems by our deviation. The WX was very good VFR and there was no other traffic in the area. Contributing factors: complacency of both crew members due to a number of circumstances. The good WX and visibility, no other traffic in the area, familiarity with the route and aircraft. We fly the same route 5 nights a week and become accustomed to the clrncs we get. I was climbing out of the airport like I've done at least 100 times previously. This time however we failed to contact departure and had not received clearance to 8000 ft. The terrain in the area creates a strong desire to continue climbing. There was light to moderate chop in the area which caused strong up and downdrafts. I was busy flying the airplane and trying to take advantage of the available updrafts to obtain as much lift as possible. The vsi showed 3000 FPM occasionally. Flying in the turbulence and chop created a distraction causing me to concentrate more on flying the airplane rather than monitoring the first officer's duties. The first officer was busy completing the climb checklist, watching me fly the airplane and even commented on the vsi and how fast we were climbing. The aircraft is not equipped with a visual or aural altitude deviation warning. There is no autoplt. Corrective action: we now wait until after contacting departure control to complete the climb checklist. All important climb procedures are completed by the PNF during the climb. Therefore it is not critical to complete the checklist immediately, but instead in a timely manner as our workload permits. We better monitor our altitude in accordance with company SOP. We use the standby transponder (not in use) to display the assigned altitude. When we receive a new assigned altitude it is read back to ATC then the PF reads it back to the PNF for confirmation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SD360 CLBING TO 5000 FT. CAPT FLYING EXPECTED CLRNC TO 8000 FT AND FO HAD FAILED TO CHANGE FROM TWR TO DEP CTL. GOT TO 5700 FT BEFORE RECOVERING.

Narrative: SIT: I WAS THE PF. WE DEPARTED ROA RWY 24, TWR ADVISED US TO CHANGE TO DEP CTL. THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHANGE OF FREQ. I CONTINUED CLBING WITH THE EXPECTATION OF BEING CLRED TO 8000 FT. THE FO FAILED TO CONTACT DEP CTL, OR MAKE THE REQUIRED ALT CALLOUTS. (OUR STANDARD OPERATING PROCS REQUIRE CALLOUTS AT 1000 FT AND 200 FT PRIOR TO ASSIGNED ALT.) I ALSO NEGLECTED TO PROPERLY MONITOR OUR ALT. THE TWR QUERIED US ABOUT CONTACTING DEP AND ALSO ADVISED US THAT OUR ASSIGNED ALT WAS 5000 FT. BY THIS TIME I WAS PASSING THROUGH 5700 FT. I REDUCED PWR TO FLT IDLE AND BEGAN DSNDING TO 5000 FT. THE FO CONTACTED DEP CTL ADVISING THEM OF OUR PRESENT ALT OF 5400 FT, AND DSNDING. WE RECEIVED CLRNC TO 8000 FT. DEP ADVISED US THAT WE HAD NOT CAUSED ANY PROBS BY OUR DEV. THE WX WAS VERY GOOD VFR AND THERE WAS NO OTHER TFC IN THE AREA. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: COMPLACENCY OF BOTH CREW MEMBERS DUE TO A NUMBER OF CIRCUMSTANCES. THE GOOD WX AND VISIBILITY, NO OTHER TFC IN THE AREA, FAMILIARITY WITH THE RTE AND ACFT. WE FLY THE SAME RTE 5 NIGHTS A WK AND BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO THE CLRNCS WE GET. I WAS CLBING OUT OF THE ARPT LIKE I'VE DONE AT LEAST 100 TIMES PREVIOUSLY. THIS TIME HOWEVER WE FAILED TO CONTACT DEP AND HAD NOT RECEIVED CLRNC TO 8000 FT. THE TERRAIN IN THE AREA CREATES A STRONG DESIRE TO CONTINUE CLBING. THERE WAS LIGHT TO MODERATE CHOP IN THE AREA WHICH CAUSED STRONG UP AND DOWNDRAFTS. I WAS BUSY FLYING THE AIRPLANE AND TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE AVAILABLE UPDRAFTS TO OBTAIN AS MUCH LIFT AS POSSIBLE. THE VSI SHOWED 3000 FPM OCCASIONALLY. FLYING IN THE TURB AND CHOP CREATED A DISTR CAUSING ME TO CONCENTRATE MORE ON FLYING THE AIRPLANE RATHER THAN MONITORING THE FO'S DUTIES. THE FO WAS BUSY COMPLETING THE CLB CHKLIST, WATCHING ME FLY THE AIRPLANE AND EVEN COMMENTED ON THE VSI AND HOW FAST WE WERE CLBING. THE ACFT IS NOT EQUIPPED WITH A VISUAL OR AURAL ALTDEV WARNING. THERE IS NO AUTOPLT. CORRECTIVE ACTION: WE NOW WAIT UNTIL AFTER CONTACTING DEP CTL TO COMPLETE THE CLB CHKLIST. ALL IMPORTANT CLB PROCS ARE COMPLETED BY THE PNF DURING THE CLB. THEREFORE IT IS NOT CRITICAL TO COMPLETE THE CHKLIST IMMEDIATELY, BUT INSTEAD IN A TIMELY MANNER AS OUR WORKLOAD PERMITS. WE BETTER MONITOR OUR ALT IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY SOP. WE USE THE STANDBY XPONDER (NOT IN USE) TO DISPLAY THE ASSIGNED ALT. WHEN WE RECEIVE A NEW ASSIGNED ALT IT IS READ BACK TO ATC THEN THE PF READS IT BACK TO THE PNF FOR CONFIRMATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.