Narrative:

My student was flying solo and approximately 1 hour into the flight he experienced engine trouble. He explained to me after he landed what happened. He said he was practicing some mi west of point dume. He made the decision it was time to bring the airplane back to the flight school and initiated a full power climb. At the moment he added full power, the engine did not respond. It continued to run at approximately 2000 RPM's. He tried to figure out the problem but was unable to get the engine back to full power. On his final descent into santa monica's runway, he made the decision to reduce all the remaining power. At that time he noticed the engine continuing to run at the same 2000 RPM. He touched down once and bounced back into the air. He realized he was too fast and decided to take out some flaps to decrease the lift. He said he touched down next and applied full pressure to the brakes. The aircraft is damaged with a collapsed nose gear, propeller strike, and a post crash fire. At this point in time it has not been determined if this is substantial damage or not. I, as well as many others, were witness to this event. I was first informed of my student's trouble by the examiner of our flight school. At the moment I heard of the trouble I called santa monica tower to find out the problem. They related to me that he was experiencing engine roughness and he was on his way back to santa monica airport, and his ground speed was approximately 90 KTS. I watched as he made his final descent to the runway. Approximately 1/2 mi final he looked to me, high. I watched as he descended quickly to the runway. He bounced and the next touchdown the aircraft was in a nose over, tail high attitude. I spoke to him after, and he realized that he should have pulled the mixture before landing, after he realized he could not reduce any more power. But, he said at the moment it occurred, he did not think to do that. He said he noticed the end of the runway getting closer and needed to stop the aircraft. Maintenance and operator inspected the aircraft and noticed the throttle cable detached from the carburetor. I practiced with my student simulated engine failures out at the practice area as well as short approachs in the traffic pattern. My student is very aware of restart (problem solving) and shutdown procedures. My student did not determine the cause of engine roughness until short final, and at that point still did not react with the proper action. My student's inaction to either pull the mixture to lean, turn the ignition off or turn off the fuel valve, resulted in a very hard landing. I believe his lack of flight experience and his lack of real emergency sits contributed to his hard landing. It would be good practice for instructor to teach students what to do if throttle cable becomes detached from the carburetor. It should be in emergency section of aircraft operating handbooks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INSTRUCTOR RPT REGARDING STUDENT PLT ON PRACTICE FLT WHO HAS PROB WITH PWR AND RETURNS TO ARPT. ON LNDG, HE DISCOVERS HE CANNOT BRING PWR TO IDLE. HE BOUNCES THE FIRST LNDG AND ON SECOND LNDG APPLIES BRAKES AND NOSES OVER. PROB IS A THROTTLE CABLE DETACHED FROM CARB.

Narrative: MY STUDENT WAS FLYING SOLO AND APPROX 1 HR INTO THE FLT HE EXPERIENCED ENG TROUBLE. HE EXPLAINED TO ME AFTER HE LANDED WHAT HAPPENED. HE SAID HE WAS PRACTICING SOME MI W OF POINT DUME. HE MADE THE DECISION IT WAS TIME TO BRING THE AIRPLANE BACK TO THE FLT SCHOOL AND INITIATED A FULL PWR CLB. AT THE MOMENT HE ADDED FULL PWR, THE ENG DID NOT RESPOND. IT CONTINUED TO RUN AT APPROX 2000 RPM'S. HE TRIED TO FIGURE OUT THE PROB BUT WAS UNABLE TO GET THE ENG BACK TO FULL PWR. ON HIS FINAL DSCNT INTO SANTA MONICA'S RWY, HE MADE THE DECISION TO REDUCE ALL THE REMAINING PWR. AT THAT TIME HE NOTICED THE ENG CONTINUING TO RUN AT THE SAME 2000 RPM. HE TOUCHED DOWN ONCE AND BOUNCED BACK INTO THE AIR. HE REALIZED HE WAS TOO FAST AND DECIDED TO TAKE OUT SOME FLAPS TO DECREASE THE LIFT. HE SAID HE TOUCHED DOWN NEXT AND APPLIED FULL PRESSURE TO THE BRAKES. THE ACFT IS DAMAGED WITH A COLLAPSED NOSE GEAR, PROP STRIKE, AND A POST CRASH FIRE. AT THIS POINT IN TIME IT HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED IF THIS IS SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE OR NOT. I, AS WELL AS MANY OTHERS, WERE WITNESS TO THIS EVENT. I WAS FIRST INFORMED OF MY STUDENT'S TROUBLE BY THE EXAMINER OF OUR FLT SCHOOL. AT THE MOMENT I HEARD OF THE TROUBLE I CALLED SANTA MONICA TWR TO FIND OUT THE PROB. THEY RELATED TO ME THAT HE WAS EXPERIENCING ENG ROUGHNESS AND HE WAS ON HIS WAY BACK TO SANTA MONICA ARPT, AND HIS GND SPD WAS APPROX 90 KTS. I WATCHED AS HE MADE HIS FINAL DSCNT TO THE RWY. APPROX 1/2 MI FINAL HE LOOKED TO ME, HIGH. I WATCHED AS HE DSNDED QUICKLY TO THE RWY. HE BOUNCED AND THE NEXT TOUCHDOWN THE ACFT WAS IN A NOSE OVER, TAIL HIGH ATTITUDE. I SPOKE TO HIM AFTER, AND HE REALIZED THAT HE SHOULD HAVE PULLED THE MIXTURE BEFORE LNDG, AFTER HE REALIZED HE COULD NOT REDUCE ANY MORE PWR. BUT, HE SAID AT THE MOMENT IT OCCURRED, HE DID NOT THINK TO DO THAT. HE SAID HE NOTICED THE END OF THE RWY GETTING CLOSER AND NEEDED TO STOP THE ACFT. MAINT AND OPERATOR INSPECTED THE ACFT AND NOTICED THE THROTTLE CABLE DETACHED FROM THE CARB. I PRACTICED WITH MY STUDENT SIMULATED ENG FAILURES OUT AT THE PRACTICE AREA AS WELL AS SHORT APCHS IN THE TFC PATTERN. MY STUDENT IS VERY AWARE OF RESTART (PROB SOLVING) AND SHUTDOWN PROCS. MY STUDENT DID NOT DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF ENG ROUGHNESS UNTIL SHORT FINAL, AND AT THAT POINT STILL DID NOT REACT WITH THE PROPER ACTION. MY STUDENT'S INACTION TO EITHER PULL THE MIXTURE TO LEAN, TURN THE IGNITION OFF OR TURN OFF THE FUEL VALVE, RESULTED IN A VERY HARD LNDG. I BELIEVE HIS LACK OF FLT EXPERIENCE AND HIS LACK OF REAL EMER SITS CONTRIBUTED TO HIS HARD LNDG. IT WOULD BE GOOD PRACTICE FOR INSTRUCTOR TO TEACH STUDENTS WHAT TO DO IF THROTTLE CABLE BECOMES DETACHED FROM THE CARB. IT SHOULD BE IN EMER SECTION OF ACFT OPERATING HANDBOOKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.