Narrative:

I was taxiing for takeoff on runway 29R at fat. The airport has undergone extensive modification. Runway 29L is now secondary runway to runway 29R for carrier operations. I stopped for fuel and arrived at dusk, which had become night by time of departure. Due to changes, I asked for ground directions several times and was told to follow next aircraft to runup area. He departed and I moved to his prior position for runup to left side of runway 29L. I then taxied towards the runway intending to stop at hold short line and call tower for IFR release. I saw hold bars in my taxi light, but upon reaching them discovered they were on far side of active runway 29L -- I had crossed runway. Ground controller called and informed me of the error at this moment, and I told them I had failed to see an earlier hold line. Several anonymous voices broke in on frequency to state in essence, 'don't feel bad, I've done that too.' I was told to switch to tower frequency, cleared for takeoff on runway 29R and later asked to contact tower after landing. I did so and was asked if I had a runway diagram at hand. I replied that I did, but was not giving it primary attention during the time of my incursion. The controller advised me that the hold bars were back at the run-up area as a result of changes in runway configns to accommodate carriers on runway 29R and that I had probably missed seeing them since I was on top of them at run-up. He, too, seemed sympathetic. There was never any danger, since it is my habit to look for incoming traffic before moving from run-up. I realize that I should have been more attentive to the airport plan but was preoccupied with the details of setting up an IFR segment. Suggestions: 1) airmen such as I should remember that situational awareness can be just as vital on the ground and that if something feels wrong, more assistance should be sought. 2) I was the only aircraft on the ground at this time, might have recognized from earlier requests that I needed monitoring. 3) the airport, if this kind of incursion is common, might improve orientation markers, including a 'stop here' indication. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states that the tower supervisor called him later and stated that there would be no further action on the incident. He indicated they had been having problems with the new location of the hold lines. Reporter thinks they may have moved them by this time, but still feels that there should be a lighted sign to alert pilots to the position of the hold lines. Even the supervisor said they are hard to see at night.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182 PLT TAXIES PAST HOLD LINES AFTER COMPLETING RUNUP. ACTUALLY CROSSES ACTIVE RWY BEFORE SIGHTING HOLD LINES ON FAR SIDE OF RWY.

Narrative: I WAS TAXIING FOR TKOF ON RWY 29R AT FAT. THE ARPT HAS UNDERGONE EXTENSIVE MODIFICATION. RWY 29L IS NOW SECONDARY RWY TO RWY 29R FOR CARRIER OPS. I STOPPED FOR FUEL AND ARRIVED AT DUSK, WHICH HAD BECOME NIGHT BY TIME OF DEP. DUE TO CHANGES, I ASKED FOR GND DIRECTIONS SEVERAL TIMES AND WAS TOLD TO FOLLOW NEXT ACFT TO RUNUP AREA. HE DEPARTED AND I MOVED TO HIS PRIOR POS FOR RUNUP TO L SIDE OF RWY 29L. I THEN TAXIED TOWARDS THE RWY INTENDING TO STOP AT HOLD SHORT LINE AND CALL TWR FOR IFR RELEASE. I SAW HOLD BARS IN MY TAXI LIGHT, BUT UPON REACHING THEM DISCOVERED THEY WERE ON FAR SIDE OF ACTIVE RWY 29L -- I HAD CROSSED RWY. GND CTLR CALLED AND INFORMED ME OF THE ERROR AT THIS MOMENT, AND I TOLD THEM I HAD FAILED TO SEE AN EARLIER HOLD LINE. SEVERAL ANONYMOUS VOICES BROKE IN ON FREQ TO STATE IN ESSENCE, 'DON'T FEEL BAD, I'VE DONE THAT TOO.' I WAS TOLD TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ, CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 29R AND LATER ASKED TO CONTACT TWR AFTER LNDG. I DID SO AND WAS ASKED IF I HAD A RWY DIAGRAM AT HAND. I REPLIED THAT I DID, BUT WAS NOT GIVING IT PRIMARY ATTN DURING THE TIME OF MY INCURSION. THE CTLR ADVISED ME THAT THE HOLD BARS WERE BACK AT THE RUN-UP AREA AS A RESULT OF CHANGES IN RWY CONFIGNS TO ACCOMMODATE CARRIERS ON RWY 29R AND THAT I HAD PROBABLY MISSED SEEING THEM SINCE I WAS ON TOP OF THEM AT RUN-UP. HE, TOO, SEEMED SYMPATHETIC. THERE WAS NEVER ANY DANGER, SINCE IT IS MY HABIT TO LOOK FOR INCOMING TFC BEFORE MOVING FROM RUN-UP. I REALIZE THAT I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ATTENTIVE TO THE ARPT PLAN BUT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE DETAILS OF SETTING UP AN IFR SEGMENT. SUGGESTIONS: 1) AIRMEN SUCH AS I SHOULD REMEMBER THAT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CAN BE JUST AS VITAL ON THE GND AND THAT IF SOMETHING FEELS WRONG, MORE ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE SOUGHT. 2) I WAS THE ONLY ACFT ON THE GND AT THIS TIME, MIGHT HAVE RECOGNIZED FROM EARLIER REQUESTS THAT I NEEDED MONITORING. 3) THE ARPT, IF THIS KIND OF INCURSION IS COMMON, MIGHT IMPROVE ORIENTATION MARKERS, INCLUDING A 'STOP HERE' INDICATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT THE TWR SUPVR CALLED HIM LATER AND STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER ACTION ON THE INCIDENT. HE INDICATED THEY HAD BEEN HAVING PROBS WITH THE NEW LOCATION OF THE HOLD LINES. RPTR THINKS THEY MAY HAVE MOVED THEM BY THIS TIME, BUT STILL FEELS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A LIGHTED SIGN TO ALERT PLTS TO THE POS OF THE HOLD LINES. EVEN THE SUPVR SAID THEY ARE HARD TO SEE AT NIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.