Narrative:

On the 7TH touch and go of the mission, I decided to retard the throttle just after lift-off. (Approximately 10 ft.) I was so focused on how much energy would be available and making sure the student reacted quickly enough that it didn't register that we had already retracted the gear. He also only focused on the maneuver, with no regard for the gear. The gear warning did not sound because the gear was in transit. We landed smoothly with minimal damage. Retracting the gear too early contributed, but my not realizing it wasn't down was the cause. What I can't understand is the delay between the time the student said 'gear up' and the time I was conscious of him having said it. There were no obvious human factors such as stress, fatigue, preoccupation with other matters, complacency, etc. The cockpit environment for the whole flight had been professional and easy. As a matter of fact, it had been an excellent mission so far. Desensitization to the phrase 'gear up' may have been a factor. Our school's solution is to stop practicing the maneuver altogether. We had another more serious accident only the previous month during the same maneuver. That is what I was thinking about when I pulled the throttle. So actually maybe I was preoccupied. I certainly wasn't 100 percent. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter distinctly recalls hearing the stall warning horn, but does not recall the gear warning. He does not know if there was an aircraft equipment problem. A 'hole in the logic' that would allow the stall warning to override the landing gear warning, or if there is an aircraft design problem that does not require a landing gear warning with the gear in transit to the up position. The reporter no longer works at the FBO supplying the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN INSTRUCTOR PLT RPTS THAT HE LANDED A BE-F33A GEAR UP. ERROR ADMITTED.

Narrative: ON THE 7TH TOUCH AND GO OF THE MISSION, I DECIDED TO RETARD THE THROTTLE JUST AFTER LIFT-OFF. (APPROX 10 FT.) I WAS SO FOCUSED ON HOW MUCH ENERGY WOULD BE AVAILABLE AND MAKING SURE THE STUDENT REACTED QUICKLY ENOUGH THAT IT DIDN'T REGISTER THAT WE HAD ALREADY RETRACTED THE GEAR. HE ALSO ONLY FOCUSED ON THE MANEUVER, WITH NO REGARD FOR THE GEAR. THE GEAR WARNING DID NOT SOUND BECAUSE THE GEAR WAS IN TRANSIT. WE LANDED SMOOTHLY WITH MINIMAL DAMAGE. RETRACTING THE GEAR TOO EARLY CONTRIBUTED, BUT MY NOT REALIZING IT WASN'T DOWN WAS THE CAUSE. WHAT I CAN'T UNDERSTAND IS THE DELAY BTWN THE TIME THE STUDENT SAID 'GEAR UP' AND THE TIME I WAS CONSCIOUS OF HIM HAVING SAID IT. THERE WERE NO OBVIOUS HUMAN FACTORS SUCH AS STRESS, FATIGUE, PREOCCUPATION WITH OTHER MATTERS, COMPLACENCY, ETC. THE COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT FOR THE WHOLE FLT HAD BEEN PROFESSIONAL AND EASY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAD BEEN AN EXCELLENT MISSION SO FAR. DESENSITIZATION TO THE PHRASE 'GEAR UP' MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR. OUR SCHOOL'S SOLUTION IS TO STOP PRACTICING THE MANEUVER ALTOGETHER. WE HAD ANOTHER MORE SERIOUS ACCIDENT ONLY THE PREVIOUS MONTH DURING THE SAME MANEUVER. THAT IS WHAT I WAS THINKING ABOUT WHEN I PULLED THE THROTTLE. SO ACTUALLY MAYBE I WAS PREOCCUPIED. I CERTAINLY WASN'T 100 PERCENT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR DISTINCTLY RECALLS HEARING THE STALL WARNING HORN, BUT DOES NOT RECALL THE GEAR WARNING. HE DOES NOT KNOW IF THERE WAS AN ACFT EQUIP PROB. A 'HOLE IN THE LOGIC' THAT WOULD ALLOW THE STALL WARNING TO OVERRIDE THE LNDG GEAR WARNING, OR IF THERE IS AN ACFT DESIGN PROB THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE A LNDG GEAR WARNING WITH THE GEAR IN TRANSIT TO THE UP POS. THE RPTR NO LONGER WORKS AT THE FBO SUPPLYING THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.