Narrative:

While flying a scheduled flight between mdw and stl, in cruise, the flight engineer said that he smelled smoke. The captain and I immediately donned our oxygen masks and the flight engineer left the cockpit to identify the smoke source, which was somewhere in the cabin. It turned out to be a stack of napkins that were set fire by a flight attendant that left them in the oven for storage and then turned the oven on for use. The flight attendant and flight engineer extinguished the fire with water. No emergency was declared by direction of the captain, and we tried to clear the smoke from the cabin in the pressurization system successfully. The captain and I both maintained use of our masks until the smoke cleared, by direction of the flight engineer. It seemed to me that the situation was caught and handled immediately and effectively by the flight crew, in particular the flight engineer, and the actions of the cabin crew was suspect as they didn't realize the potential seriousness of the situation, even afterwards upon reflecting on it. Flight attendant training on the seriousness of fire in, on, or near an aircraft might help this in the future. In our case the seriousness was conveyed by the captain upon reaching the ground. He also faxed our chief pilot a letter explaining the situation but no contact was made with the FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GALLEY FIRE ON A B727-200 DURING HIGH ALT CRUISE CAUSED BY NAPKINS LAYING IN A HOT OVEN CAUSED THE FIRE WHICH WAS PUT OUT BY THE SO AND CABIN ATTENDANT.

Narrative: WHILE FLYING A SCHEDULED FLT BTWN MDW AND STL, IN CRUISE, THE FE SAID THAT HE SMELLED SMOKE. THE CAPT AND I IMMEDIATELY DONNED OUR OXYGEN MASKS AND THE FE LEFT THE COCKPIT TO IDENT THE SMOKE SOURCE, WHICH WAS SOMEWHERE IN THE CABIN. IT TURNED OUT TO BE A STACK OF NAPKINS THAT WERE SET FIRE BY A FLT ATTENDANT THAT LEFT THEM IN THE OVEN FOR STORAGE AND THEN TURNED THE OVEN ON FOR USE. THE FLT ATTENDANT AND FE EXTINGUISHED THE FIRE WITH WATER. NO EMER WAS DECLARED BY DIRECTION OF THE CAPT, AND WE TRIED TO CLR THE SMOKE FROM THE CABIN IN THE PRESSURIZATION SYS SUCCESSFULLY. THE CAPT AND I BOTH MAINTAINED USE OF OUR MASKS UNTIL THE SMOKE CLRED, BY DIRECTION OF THE FE. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE SIT WAS CAUGHT AND HANDLED IMMEDIATELY AND EFFECTIVELY BY THE FLC, IN PARTICULAR THE FE, AND THE ACTIONS OF THE CABIN CREW WAS SUSPECT AS THEY DIDN'T REALIZE THE POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS OF THE SIT, EVEN AFTERWARDS UPON REFLECTING ON IT. FLT ATTENDANT TRAINING ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF FIRE IN, ON, OR NEAR AN ACFT MIGHT HELP THIS IN THE FUTURE. IN OUR CASE THE SERIOUSNESS WAS CONVEYED BY THE CAPT UPON REACHING THE GND. HE ALSO FAXED OUR CHIEF PLT A LETTER EXPLAINING THE SIT BUT NO CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.