Narrative:

Aircraft AT42-500 oct/xa/96, XB15. We departed houston at XJ10 pm on our way to lake charles, la. Climbed to our cruise altitude of 13000 ft. We were then told to descend to 7000 ft at which time we completed the in-range checklist. We then contacted lake charles approach and were told to descend to 1700 ft at which time we completed the approach checklist. Lake charles approach told us that the airport was at 11 O'clock. The captain said he had the airport in sight and I turned the aircraft toward the airport at which time we completed the landing checklist. The airport lights were on bright. I followed the VASI and landed at the airport. After landing the captain said we landed at the wrong airport we taxied to the ramp and the captain went in and made all the necessary phone calls. Vans were provided for the passenger. What I feel caused the problem: 1) trusting the judgement and experience of the captain when he told me he had the airport in sight. I was a new first officer. 2) lake charles approach calling the airport at 11 O'clock. The only airport at 11 O'clock was southland. What I feel would correct this from happening again: 1) treat every approach as an instrument approach, even in visual conditions. On oct/xg/96 I was terminated. Supplemental information from acn 349290: some contributing factors for this incident are: 1) the late time of day. Though we had a fairly short work day, I was tired. 2) night. Reduced visibility due to night time. 3) WX. Ragged ceilings lower than reported by an old ATIS report and reduced visibility did not allow us to pick up the correct runway and airport. 4) rushed approach. Instead of making a normal pattern and slow approach we allowed ourselves to be pressured into a rushed situation. 5) lack of diligence. Too complacent. Instead of checking our DME with the charts, or DME on the ILS to runway 15 at lch, or location of the ADF north of lch in relation to our point of arrival, etc, etc. We accepted a visual approach and landed at a runway which we had not confirmed (by any one of the above) was the correct airport. 6) close proximity of airports with same runway numbers. Identical numbers 15/33. 7) after he cleared us for approach and landing to runway 33, lch approach also mentioned that he was controling the lights at the field and said he could adjust them for us if we needed. The lights (runway and approach) were all on at southland airport that night. They are normally pilot controled lights, but the contractor, whose phone we used, told me he had all the lights up and running because he was an electrical contractor and was just completing the addition of a new lighting system at southland.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AT NIGHT TIME THE FLC LANDED THEIR AT42-500 AT SOUTHLAND ARPT THINKING THEY WERE LNDG AT LAKE CHARLES ARPT.

Narrative: ACFT AT42-500 OCT/XA/96, XB15. WE DEPARTED HOUSTON AT XJ10 PM ON OUR WAY TO LAKE CHARLES, LA. CLBED TO OUR CRUISE ALT OF 13000 FT. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO DSND TO 7000 FT AT WHICH TIME WE COMPLETED THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST. WE THEN CONTACTED LAKE CHARLES APCH AND WERE TOLD TO DSND TO 1700 FT AT WHICH TIME WE COMPLETED THE APCH CHKLIST. LAKE CHARLES APCH TOLD US THAT THE ARPT WAS AT 11 O'CLOCK. THE CAPT SAID HE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND I TURNED THE ACFT TOWARD THE ARPT AT WHICH TIME WE COMPLETED THE LNDG CHKLIST. THE ARPT LIGHTS WERE ON BRIGHT. I FOLLOWED THE VASI AND LANDED AT THE ARPT. AFTER LNDG THE CAPT SAID WE LANDED AT THE WRONG ARPT WE TAXIED TO THE RAMP AND THE CAPT WENT IN AND MADE ALL THE NECESSARY PHONE CALLS. VANS WERE PROVIDED FOR THE PAX. WHAT I FEEL CAUSED THE PROB: 1) TRUSTING THE JUDGEMENT AND EXPERIENCE OF THE CAPT WHEN HE TOLD ME HE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I WAS A NEW FO. 2) LAKE CHARLES APCH CALLING THE ARPT AT 11 O'CLOCK. THE ONLY ARPT AT 11 O'CLOCK WAS SOUTHLAND. WHAT I FEEL WOULD CORRECT THIS FROM HAPPENING AGAIN: 1) TREAT EVERY APCH AS AN INST APCH, EVEN IN VISUAL CONDITIONS. ON OCT/XG/96 I WAS TERMINATED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 349290: SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR THIS INCIDENT ARE: 1) THE LATE TIME OF DAY. THOUGH WE HAD A FAIRLY SHORT WORK DAY, I WAS TIRED. 2) NIGHT. REDUCED VISIBILITY DUE TO NIGHT TIME. 3) WX. RAGGED CEILINGS LOWER THAN RPTED BY AN OLD ATIS RPT AND REDUCED VISIBILITY DID NOT ALLOW US TO PICK UP THE CORRECT RWY AND ARPT. 4) RUSHED APCH. INSTEAD OF MAKING A NORMAL PATTERN AND SLOW APCH WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO BE PRESSURED INTO A RUSHED SIT. 5) LACK OF DILIGENCE. TOO COMPLACENT. INSTEAD OF CHKING OUR DME WITH THE CHARTS, OR DME ON THE ILS TO RWY 15 AT LCH, OR LOCATION OF THE ADF N OF LCH IN RELATION TO OUR POINT OF ARR, ETC, ETC. WE ACCEPTED A VISUAL APCH AND LANDED AT A RWY WHICH WE HAD NOT CONFIRMED (BY ANY ONE OF THE ABOVE) WAS THE CORRECT ARPT. 6) CLOSE PROX OF ARPTS WITH SAME RWY NUMBERS. IDENTICAL NUMBERS 15/33. 7) AFTER HE CLRED US FOR APCH AND LNDG TO RWY 33, LCH APCH ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE WAS CTLING THE LIGHTS AT THE FIELD AND SAID HE COULD ADJUST THEM FOR US IF WE NEEDED. THE LIGHTS (RWY AND APCH) WERE ALL ON AT SOUTHLAND ARPT THAT NIGHT. THEY ARE NORMALLY PLT CTLED LIGHTS, BUT THE CONTRACTOR, WHOSE PHONE WE USED, TOLD ME HE HAD ALL THE LIGHTS UP AND RUNNING BECAUSE HE WAS AN ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR AND WAS JUST COMPLETING THE ADDITION OF A NEW LIGHTING SYS AT SOUTHLAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.