Narrative:

The local controller informed me that a portion of the runway lights were OTS. I attempted to contact the assistant airport manager (home and mobile telephones). He was no longer employed by the airport. I then attempted to contact the airport manager. The home number was busy, his mobile phone went unanswered. I tried to contact airport security (office phone and pager number) and neither responded. I then tried the home number of the airport manager. It was still busy. I contacted the operator and asked her to interrupt the phone call. She then told me that the telephone was not in use! I questioned the operator and was told the phone and been left off the hook. The tower controller had 4-5 military jets training in the pattern and the arrival end of the runway lights were OTS and we, as tower personnel, were unable to contact any airport personnel to issue a NOTAM, close the runway, or repair the outage! Had there been a rptable incident or accident on the airport during this outage, no airport representative would have been readily available. (After being informed that the airport manager's phone was off the hook, I contacted the crash station and asked them to contact somebody with some authority/authorized. I was working radar and was unable to devote any more time playing phone tag.) callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter filed an unsafe condition report. Since this incident, the reporter's supervisor has updated the emergency contact phone numbers, but the reporter (working a radar sector at the time of the incident), states that no one really ever said anything to the airport manager. Reporter's feeling is that the airport manager is a critical part of the response team in the event of any newsworthy occurrence (emergency, accident, or incident) and that the airport manager should be available on the first phone call. Reporter spent over 20 mins, while working radar, trying to reach someone who could respond to the situation. When the news did get out (through the crash crew), the runway was closed for the night and a NOTAM was immediately issued. Nothing unsafe occurred while the aircraft were practicing on the runway involved and the pilots of those aircraft had been informed of the outage. This approach controller is not satisfied with the action taken. The airport manager has not been made aware of the risks involved in his not being accessible and in reporter's mind, the issue is still open because of this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ONE THIRD OF THE RWY LIGHTS BECAME INOP AT FSM DURING NIGHT OPS. THE RPTR, AN APCH CTLR, USED THE CONTACT NUMBERS FOR THE ASSISTANT ARPT MGR, THE ARPT MGR, AND THE ARPT SECURITY, BUT WAS UNABLE TO CONTACT ANYONE. AS A LAST RESORT THE CRASH CREW WAS CALLED AND ASKED TO HANDLE THE SIT SO THAT THE CTLR COULD FOCUS ON WORKING THE RADAR.

Narrative: THE LCL CTLR INFORMED ME THAT A PORTION OF THE RWY LIGHTS WERE OTS. I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE ASSISTANT ARPT MGR (HOME AND MOBILE TELEPHONES). HE WAS NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY THE ARPT. I THEN ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE ARPT MGR. THE HOME NUMBER WAS BUSY, HIS MOBILE PHONE WENT UNANSWERED. I TRIED TO CONTACT ARPT SECURITY (OFFICE PHONE AND PAGER NUMBER) AND NEITHER RESPONDED. I THEN TRIED THE HOME NUMBER OF THE ARPT MGR. IT WAS STILL BUSY. I CONTACTED THE OPERATOR AND ASKED HER TO INTERRUPT THE PHONE CALL. SHE THEN TOLD ME THAT THE TELEPHONE WAS NOT IN USE! I QUESTIONED THE OPERATOR AND WAS TOLD THE PHONE AND BEEN LEFT OFF THE HOOK. THE TWR CTLR HAD 4-5 MIL JETS TRAINING IN THE PATTERN AND THE ARR END OF THE RWY LIGHTS WERE OTS AND WE, AS TWR PERSONNEL, WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT ANY ARPT PERSONNEL TO ISSUE A NOTAM, CLOSE THE RWY, OR REPAIR THE OUTAGE! HAD THERE BEEN A RPTABLE INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT ON THE ARPT DURING THIS OUTAGE, NO ARPT REPRESENTATIVE WOULD HAVE BEEN READILY AVAILABLE. (AFTER BEING INFORMED THAT THE ARPT MGR'S PHONE WAS OFF THE HOOK, I CONTACTED THE CRASH STATION AND ASKED THEM TO CONTACT SOMEBODY WITH SOME AUTH. I WAS WORKING RADAR AND WAS UNABLE TO DEVOTE ANY MORE TIME PLAYING PHONE TAG.) CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR FILED AN UNSAFE CONDITION RPT. SINCE THIS INCIDENT, THE RPTR'S SUPVR HAS UPDATED THE EMER CONTACT PHONE NUMBERS, BUT THE RPTR (WORKING A RADAR SECTOR AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT), STATES THAT NO ONE REALLY EVER SAID ANYTHING TO THE ARPT MGR. RPTR'S FEELING IS THAT THE ARPT MGR IS A CRITICAL PART OF THE RESPONSE TEAM IN THE EVENT OF ANY NEWSWORTHY OCCURRENCE (EMER, ACCIDENT, OR INCIDENT) AND THAT THE ARPT MGR SHOULD BE AVAILABLE ON THE FIRST PHONE CALL. RPTR SPENT OVER 20 MINS, WHILE WORKING RADAR, TRYING TO REACH SOMEONE WHO COULD RESPOND TO THE SIT. WHEN THE NEWS DID GET OUT (THROUGH THE CRASH CREW), THE RWY WAS CLOSED FOR THE NIGHT AND A NOTAM WAS IMMEDIATELY ISSUED. NOTHING UNSAFE OCCURRED WHILE THE ACFT WERE PRACTICING ON THE RWY INVOLVED AND THE PLTS OF THOSE ACFT HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE OUTAGE. THIS APCH CTLR IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE ACTION TAKEN. THE ARPT MGR HAS NOT BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE RISKS INVOLVED IN HIS NOT BEING ACCESSIBLE AND IN RPTR'S MIND, THE ISSUE IS STILL OPEN BECAUSE OF THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.