Narrative:

I was providing dual instruction for a commercial candidate in a C172RG. We were completing the day's lesson with a few performance takeoff and lndgs. After the second touch-and-go, we requested and were cleared for a full stop landing as we were turning from the crosswind to the downwind leg for runway 26. At the point where the gumps check is normally completed, I created a simulated emergency with an elevator failure. The student then was tasked with properly configuring the aircraft according to the emergency procedure checklist which involved trimming for an airspeed of 70 KIAS and using only 10 degrees of flaps. The gear up warning horn does not activate until the flaps are extended beyond 10 degrees. Also, the gear up warning horn will sound when the power is pulled below 15 inches manifold pressure. The student was able to trim the aircraft for 70 KIAS and controled the rate of descent with the throttle. Power was removed slowly as to prevent a rapid pitch down of the nose allowing time to adjust the trim during the roundout. Once the power was below 15 inches, the gear warning horn would have been audible. This occurred as the plane crossed the threshold. At that point, both the instructor and the student were distracted with the simulated emergency and did not take appropriate action when the gear up warning horn was audible. A gear up landing ensued with the plane resting just left of the centerline with the throttle at idle and 10 degrees of flaps. Factors leading to the incident include creating a distraction and deviating from normal pattern procedures. The simulated emergency distraction myself and the student from completing the landing checklist and putting the gear down abeam the numbers. Also, failure to complete the standard final landing checklist on short final due to the distraction prevented another opportunity to extend the landing gear. It should also be noted that while practicing steep spirals earlier in the practice area, it is possible that we became conditioned to hearing and disregarding the gear up warning horn as we performed the maneuver with the gear up and extended the gear at the completion of the third turn and on downwind to the emergency landing point. This may have contributed to our inaction when the power was finally reduced below 15 inches manifold pressure while leveling off for landing. The simulated emergency is valuable practice for the student. However, the decision to initiate the maneuver at the point where the gear is normally lowered contributed heavily to the incident. Any time a deviation is made from normal procedures, it should be clearly stated in the cockpit that 'a deviation to normal procedures is taking place, check gear down.' if that statement was made at the onset of the maneuver, again on base and on final approach, the incident would have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRAINING IN PROGRESS IN A C172RG. ACFT LANDED WITH GEAR UP. INSTRUCTOR PLT RPTR CITES INSTRUCTOR PLT DISTR.

Narrative: I WAS PROVIDING DUAL INSTRUCTION FOR A COMMERCIAL CANDIDATE IN A C172RG. WE WERE COMPLETING THE DAY'S LESSON WITH A FEW PERFORMANCE TKOF AND LNDGS. AFTER THE SECOND TOUCH-AND-GO, WE REQUESTED AND WERE CLRED FOR A FULL STOP LNDG AS WE WERE TURNING FROM THE XWIND TO THE DOWNWIND LEG FOR RWY 26. AT THE POINT WHERE THE GUMPS CHK IS NORMALLY COMPLETED, I CREATED A SIMULATED EMER WITH AN ELEVATOR FAILURE. THE STUDENT THEN WAS TASKED WITH PROPERLY CONFIGURING THE ACFT ACCORDING TO THE EMER PROC CHKLIST WHICH INVOLVED TRIMMING FOR AN AIRSPD OF 70 KIAS AND USING ONLY 10 DEGS OF FLAPS. THE GEAR UP WARNING HORN DOES NOT ACTIVATE UNTIL THE FLAPS ARE EXTENDED BEYOND 10 DEGS. ALSO, THE GEAR UP WARNING HORN WILL SOUND WHEN THE PWR IS PULLED BELOW 15 INCHES MANIFOLD PRESSURE. THE STUDENT WAS ABLE TO TRIM THE ACFT FOR 70 KIAS AND CTLED THE RATE OF DSCNT WITH THE THROTTLE. PWR WAS REMOVED SLOWLY AS TO PREVENT A RAPID PITCH DOWN OF THE NOSE ALLOWING TIME TO ADJUST THE TRIM DURING THE ROUNDOUT. ONCE THE PWR WAS BELOW 15 INCHES, THE GEAR WARNING HORN WOULD HAVE BEEN AUDIBLE. THIS OCCURRED AS THE PLANE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD. AT THAT POINT, BOTH THE INSTRUCTOR AND THE STUDENT WERE DISTRACTED WITH THE SIMULATED EMER AND DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION WHEN THE GEAR UP WARNING HORN WAS AUDIBLE. A GEAR UP LNDG ENSUED WITH THE PLANE RESTING JUST L OF THE CTRLINE WITH THE THROTTLE AT IDLE AND 10 DEGS OF FLAPS. FACTORS LEADING TO THE INCIDENT INCLUDE CREATING A DISTR AND DEVIATING FROM NORMAL PATTERN PROCS. THE SIMULATED EMER DISTR MYSELF AND THE STUDENT FROM COMPLETING THE LNDG CHKLIST AND PUTTING THE GEAR DOWN ABEAM THE NUMBERS. ALSO, FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE STANDARD FINAL LNDG CHKLIST ON SHORT FINAL DUE TO THE DISTR PREVENTED ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND THE LNDG GEAR. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT WHILE PRACTICING STEEP SPIRALS EARLIER IN THE PRACTICE AREA, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE BECAME CONDITIONED TO HEARING AND DISREGARDING THE GEAR UP WARNING HORN AS WE PERFORMED THE MANEUVER WITH THE GEAR UP AND EXTENDED THE GEAR AT THE COMPLETION OF THE THIRD TURN AND ON DOWNWIND TO THE EMER LNDG POINT. THIS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO OUR INACTION WHEN THE PWR WAS FINALLY REDUCED BELOW 15 INCHES MANIFOLD PRESSURE WHILE LEVELING OFF FOR LNDG. THE SIMULATED EMER IS VALUABLE PRACTICE FOR THE STUDENT. HOWEVER, THE DECISION TO INITIATE THE MANEUVER AT THE POINT WHERE THE GEAR IS NORMALLY LOWERED CONTRIBUTED HEAVILY TO THE INCIDENT. ANY TIME A DEV IS MADE FROM NORMAL PROCS, IT SHOULD BE CLRLY STATED IN THE COCKPIT THAT 'A DEV TO NORMAL PROCS IS TAKING PLACE, CHK GEAR DOWN.' IF THAT STATEMENT WAS MADE AT THE ONSET OF THE MANEUVER, AGAIN ON BASE AND ON FINAL APCH, THE INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.