Narrative:

I was on an IFR from teb to bdl being vectored for a VOR 15 approach at bdl. Multiple approachs were in progress with numerous aircraft using VOR 15 and ILS runway 24. Because of the congestion they had to keep me up at 5000 ft until very close to the field. IAF altitude beyond 10 mi is 3500 ft inside 10 DME, it's 2000 ft. I had just been cleared down to 4000 ft when I was turned tightly onto final. I had to lose 2300 ft, level out, slow up to 140 KTS to extend the gear and flaps, all in just 3.8 mi to start my final descent to 1080 ft at the 5 DME FAF. By the time I got down to 2000 ft and slowed up to lower the gear, I was 3.5 mi out. I began a very rapid descent which pushed my airspeed up to 150 KTS. When I switched over to tower he needed me to get slow because of a B737 on the ILS runway 24. I was so high it was impossible to get as slow as the tower controller would have liked. I broke out very high on the glide path at 1500 ft MSL when I saw the runway. It was then that I saw the B737 approaching the runway 15-24 intersection. We were both very close to reaching the intersection at the same time, however, I believe without any further action I would have touched down after the B737 had cleared my intersection. However, it was close enough for the tower to command me to go around in the interest of safety. As I started to go around the B737 was past my intersection and I still had enough runway to land on, so quickly I called tower and said, 'can aircraft X take it?' meaning can aircraft X get my landing clearance back. He responded with 'that is your discretion.' so I made the landing with plenty of runway to spare. As I rolled out I realized it was a bad situation which led to rushed and very vague or ambiguous communications. Factors I believe contributed to the situation are typical lengthy delays out of teb in the morning. 15-20 min waits are typical for IFR releases. This is devastating to my time critical run hauling checks. Further delays en route made my ETA into bdl at the last possible min for us to make our deadlines for the bank work. Finally the delays and heavy traffic into bdl made it almost impossible to make it. As these delays build up and you see your ETA get closer and closer to missing the deadline you get into a 'got to get on the ground fast, no matter what' mentality. Had the approach controller vectored me just 1 or 2 mi further out, it would have made my approach much more reasonable and the B737 would have been well past my intersection when I landed. I knew the landing could be salvaged if immediate action was taken and I rushed out a poorly worded request that was easily open for misinterp. I believe the delays and the pressure of the deadlines put me in a mindset to push a bad situation that was created by marginal WX, an approach controller trying to give me a close vector to final to save valuable time, but not realizing my high altitude would cause me to have a very high approach speed and eliminate the difference in time the B737 and I would reach the intersection.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA60 AIR TAXI PLT VECTORED TOO HIGH TO FINAL HAS CONFLICT WITH B737 ARRIVING ON INTERSECTING RWY. GIVEN A GAR THEN REQUESTS CLRNC TO LAND.

Narrative: I WAS ON AN IFR FROM TEB TO BDL BEING VECTORED FOR A VOR 15 APCH AT BDL. MULTIPLE APCHS WERE IN PROGRESS WITH NUMEROUS ACFT USING VOR 15 AND ILS RWY 24. BECAUSE OF THE CONGESTION THEY HAD TO KEEP ME UP AT 5000 FT UNTIL VERY CLOSE TO THE FIELD. IAF ALT BEYOND 10 MI IS 3500 FT INSIDE 10 DME, IT'S 2000 FT. I HAD JUST BEEN CLRED DOWN TO 4000 FT WHEN I WAS TURNED TIGHTLY ONTO FINAL. I HAD TO LOSE 2300 FT, LEVEL OUT, SLOW UP TO 140 KTS TO EXTEND THE GEAR AND FLAPS, ALL IN JUST 3.8 MI TO START MY FINAL DSCNT TO 1080 FT AT THE 5 DME FAF. BY THE TIME I GOT DOWN TO 2000 FT AND SLOWED UP TO LOWER THE GEAR, I WAS 3.5 MI OUT. I BEGAN A VERY RAPID DSCNT WHICH PUSHED MY AIRSPD UP TO 150 KTS. WHEN I SWITCHED OVER TO TWR HE NEEDED ME TO GET SLOW BECAUSE OF A B737 ON THE ILS RWY 24. I WAS SO HIGH IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET AS SLOW AS THE TWR CTLR WOULD HAVE LIKED. I BROKE OUT VERY HIGH ON THE GLIDE PATH AT 1500 FT MSL WHEN I SAW THE RWY. IT WAS THEN THAT I SAW THE B737 APCHING THE RWY 15-24 INTXN. WE WERE BOTH VERY CLOSE TO REACHING THE INTXN AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER ACTION I WOULD HAVE TOUCHED DOWN AFTER THE B737 HAD CLRED MY INTXN. HOWEVER, IT WAS CLOSE ENOUGH FOR THE TWR TO COMMAND ME TO GAR IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY. AS I STARTED TO GAR THE B737 WAS PAST MY INTXN AND I STILL HAD ENOUGH RWY TO LAND ON, SO QUICKLY I CALLED TWR AND SAID, 'CAN ACFT X TAKE IT?' MEANING CAN ACFT X GET MY LNDG CLRNC BACK. HE RESPONDED WITH 'THAT IS YOUR DISCRETION.' SO I MADE THE LNDG WITH PLENTY OF RWY TO SPARE. AS I ROLLED OUT I REALIZED IT WAS A BAD SIT WHICH LED TO RUSHED AND VERY VAGUE OR AMBIGUOUS COMS. FACTORS I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SIT ARE TYPICAL LENGTHY DELAYS OUT OF TEB IN THE MORNING. 15-20 MIN WAITS ARE TYPICAL FOR IFR RELEASES. THIS IS DEVASTATING TO MY TIME CRITICAL RUN HAULING CHKS. FURTHER DELAYS ENRTE MADE MY ETA INTO BDL AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MIN FOR US TO MAKE OUR DEADLINES FOR THE BANK WORK. FINALLY THE DELAYS AND HVY TFC INTO BDL MADE IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE IT. AS THESE DELAYS BUILD UP AND YOU SEE YOUR ETA GET CLOSER AND CLOSER TO MISSING THE DEADLINE YOU GET INTO A 'GOT TO GET ON THE GND FAST, NO MATTER WHAT' MENTALITY. HAD THE APCH CTLR VECTORED ME JUST 1 OR 2 MI FURTHER OUT, IT WOULD HAVE MADE MY APCH MUCH MORE REASONABLE AND THE B737 WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL PAST MY INTXN WHEN I LANDED. I KNEW THE LNDG COULD BE SALVAGED IF IMMEDIATE ACTION WAS TAKEN AND I RUSHED OUT A POORLY WORDED REQUEST THAT WAS EASILY OPEN FOR MISINTERP. I BELIEVE THE DELAYS AND THE PRESSURE OF THE DEADLINES PUT ME IN A MINDSET TO PUSH A BAD SIT THAT WAS CREATED BY MARGINAL WX, AN APCH CTLR TRYING TO GIVE ME A CLOSE VECTOR TO FINAL TO SAVE VALUABLE TIME, BUT NOT REALIZING MY HIGH ALT WOULD CAUSE ME TO HAVE A VERY HIGH APCH SPD AND ELIMINATE THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME THE B737 AND I WOULD REACH THE INTXN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.