Narrative:

This was a scheduled air carrier flight at FL330. The aircraft was an A320 en route lax-ewr and was 17000 pounds above maximum landing weight when event occurred. We had been at cruise about 30-40 mins when re received an electronic centralized aircraft monitor (ECAM) warning message and subsequent fluctuation of #2 engine. We requested a lower altitude as aircraft was losing airspeed and power. A separation vector and clearance to FL270 was given by ZAB. Shortly thereafter #2 engine failed completely, and emergency was declared and we requested clearance to abq, the nearest suitable airfield approximately 100 NM southeast of our position. Descent was continued, handoffs to approach and tower were accepted and a VFR emergency landing completed on runway 3. All agencies performed in an expeditious and professional manner including the abq fire department which followed us to the gate and monitored the aircraft and passenger deplaning. The combination of the heavy weight landing, airport elevation, and outside air temperature, 87 degrees, caused hot brakes resulting in deflation of #3 and #4 tire at the gate. Callback conversation with reporter on acn 339303 revealed the following information: callback to captain who had no narrative in the acn. The A320 which they were flying was a new aircraft, on the line for just 8 days. The initial ECAM message read '#2 compressor vane þ don't change thrust.' reporter captain disconnected autothrottles and matched thrust levers to bugs. Shortly thereafter the engine shut itself down and relight attempts were unsuccessful. Because they had an engine out, they diverted to the closest, suitable airport. Reporter chose abq because he knew they had a long runway, 13770 ft but, when they arrived they found the runway to be under construction and closed. However, runway 3 was 9000 ft and adequate. Reporter states that, in hindsight, he would have chosen another airport that was not such high altitude and hot. During approach the flight crew chose not to use automatic brakes thinking that by not using automatic brakes there would be less likelihood of excessive brake heating. The aircraft was 16000 pounds overweight for landing. An emergency was declared and the emergency fire crew followed the aircraft to the gate. The brakes were smoking a lot and the brake temperatures were reading 525 on the left and 710 on the right. They taxied to the gate, ground personnel quickly installed chocks. Shortly thereafter the fuse plugs melted and tires #3 and #4 went flat. A mechanic from another air carrier, who was A320 qualified, examined the engine and found a fuel controller that came apart and ate itself up þ the cause of the engine failure. The next day the flight crew was planning to ferry the aircraft and when the arrived mechanics had the APU open because they found a failed bleed valve. Reporter captain says he is sure his air carrier doesn't deal with questionable parts manufacturers, but is concerned that perhaps airbus subcontracts parts that are not reliable, ie, fuel controller.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB. ENG FAILURE DUE TO FAILED FUEL CTLR. ENG SHUT ITSELF DOWN AND UNABLE TO RESTART. FLT DIVERTED AND LANDED OVERWT, RESULTED IN FLAT TIRES.

Narrative: THIS WAS A SCHEDULED ACR FLT AT FL330. THE ACFT WAS AN A320 ENRTE LAX-EWR AND WAS 17000 LBS ABOVE MAX LNDG WT WHEN EVENT OCCURRED. WE HAD BEEN AT CRUISE ABOUT 30-40 MINS WHEN RE RECEIVED AN ELECTRONIC CENTRALIZED ACFT MONITOR (ECAM) WARNING MESSAGE AND SUBSEQUENT FLUCTUATION OF #2 ENG. WE REQUESTED A LOWER ALT AS ACFT WAS LOSING AIRSPD AND PWR. A SEPARATION VECTOR AND CLRNC TO FL270 WAS GIVEN BY ZAB. SHORTLY THEREAFTER #2 ENG FAILED COMPLETELY, AND EMER WAS DECLARED AND WE REQUESTED CLRNC TO ABQ, THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRFIELD APPROX 100 NM SE OF OUR POS. DSCNT WAS CONTINUED, HDOFS TO APCH AND TWR WERE ACCEPTED AND A VFR EMER LNDG COMPLETED ON RWY 3. ALL AGENCIES PERFORMED IN AN EXPEDITIOUS AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER INCLUDING THE ABQ FIRE DEPT WHICH FOLLOWED US TO THE GATE AND MONITORED THE ACFT AND PAX DEPLANING. THE COMBINATION OF THE HVY WT LNDG, ARPT ELEVATION, AND OUTSIDE AIR TEMP, 87 DEGS, CAUSED HOT BRAKES RESULTING IN DEFLATION OF #3 AND #4 TIRE AT THE GATE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ON ACN 339303 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK TO CAPT WHO HAD NO NARRATIVE IN THE ACN. THE A320 WHICH THEY WERE FLYING WAS A NEW ACFT, ON THE LINE FOR JUST 8 DAYS. THE INITIAL ECAM MESSAGE READ '#2 COMPRESSOR VANE þ DON'T CHANGE THRUST.' RPTR CAPT DISCONNECTED AUTOTHROTTLES AND MATCHED THRUST LEVERS TO BUGS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE ENG SHUT ITSELF DOWN AND RELIGHT ATTEMPTS WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BECAUSE THEY HAD AN ENG OUT, THEY DIVERTED TO THE CLOSEST, SUITABLE ARPT. RPTR CHOSE ABQ BECAUSE HE KNEW THEY HAD A LONG RWY, 13770 FT BUT, WHEN THEY ARRIVED THEY FOUND THE RWY TO BE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND CLOSED. HOWEVER, RWY 3 WAS 9000 FT AND ADEQUATE. RPTR STATES THAT, IN HINDSIGHT, HE WOULD HAVE CHOSEN ANOTHER ARPT THAT WAS NOT SUCH HIGH ALT AND HOT. DURING APCH THE FLC CHOSE NOT TO USE AUTO BRAKES THINKING THAT BY NOT USING AUTO BRAKES THERE WOULD BE LESS LIKELIHOOD OF EXCESSIVE BRAKE HEATING. THE ACFT WAS 16000 LBS OVERWT FOR LNDG. AN EMER WAS DECLARED AND THE EMER FIRE CREW FOLLOWED THE ACFT TO THE GATE. THE BRAKES WERE SMOKING A LOT AND THE BRAKE TEMPS WERE READING 525 ON THE L AND 710 ON THE R. THEY TAXIED TO THE GATE, GND PERSONNEL QUICKLY INSTALLED CHOCKS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE FUSE PLUGS MELTED AND TIRES #3 AND #4 WENT FLAT. A MECH FROM ANOTHER ACR, WHO WAS A320 QUALIFIED, EXAMINED THE ENG AND FOUND A FUEL CTLR THAT CAME APART AND ATE ITSELF UP þ THE CAUSE OF THE ENG FAILURE. THE NEXT DAY THE FLC WAS PLANNING TO FERRY THE ACFT AND WHEN THE ARRIVED MECHS HAD THE APU OPEN BECAUSE THEY FOUND A FAILED BLEED VALVE. RPTR CAPT SAYS HE IS SURE HIS ACR DOESN'T DEAL WITH QUESTIONABLE PARTS MANUFACTURERS, BUT IS CONCERNED THAT PERHAPS AIRBUS SUBCONTRACTS PARTS THAT ARE NOT RELIABLE, IE, FUEL CTLR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.