Narrative:

Our flight originated in austin to continue on to phx and geg. In the logbook we noted 2 'T' checks which fills out the airworthiness block and a service check on jun/xx/96, which also fills out the airworthiness block. We finished flying the next day and a pilot, of the crew which flew this aircraft a day later, asked if we realized that this aircraft did not have a valid airworthiness release. Evidently, either in phoenix or after we turned the aircraft over in geg or later that pm at a maintenance stop, the portion of the log containing the jun/xx/96 release had been removed and sent to maintenance records. The 2 sets of new pilots missed that fact and assumed the 'T' check airworthiness release was a service check (or better) and continued. My response to this event centers around the 'T' check airworthiness release block. If an event does not trigger a valid airworthiness release, then that block should remain blank. I don't believe we should 'set up' our air crews with a signed off airworthiness block which isn't. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies the B737. The 'T' check to which he refers was a 'partial check, but not enough for an airworthiness check.' many pilots and maintenance men did not fully understand the 'T' check notation in the aircraft logbook. After complaints were made to air carrier management, a date was put in the logbook stating when the next 'airworthiness check' must be completed, basically eliminating the 'T' check. The problem has been solved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B737 PLT RPTS THAT HIS ACR'S LOGBOOK PROC WITH A 'T' CHK LED TO AIR AND GND CREWS BELIEVING THAT AN 'AIRWORTHINESS CHK' HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WHEN IT WASN'T. THIS LED TO FAR VIOLATIONS FLYING UNAIRWORTHY ACFT. THE PROC HAS BEEN CHANGED.

Narrative: OUR FLT ORIGINATED IN AUSTIN TO CONTINUE ON TO PHX AND GEG. IN THE LOGBOOK WE NOTED 2 'T' CHKS WHICH FILLS OUT THE AIRWORTHINESS BLOCK AND A SVC CHK ON JUN/XX/96, WHICH ALSO FILLS OUT THE AIRWORTHINESS BLOCK. WE FINISHED FLYING THE NEXT DAY AND A PLT, OF THE CREW WHICH FLEW THIS ACFT A DAY LATER, ASKED IF WE REALIZED THAT THIS ACFT DID NOT HAVE A VALID AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE. EVIDENTLY, EITHER IN PHOENIX OR AFTER WE TURNED THE ACFT OVER IN GEG OR LATER THAT PM AT A MAINT STOP, THE PORTION OF THE LOG CONTAINING THE JUN/XX/96 RELEASE HAD BEEN REMOVED AND SENT TO MAINT RECORDS. THE 2 SETS OF NEW PLTS MISSED THAT FACT AND ASSUMED THE 'T' CHK AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE WAS A SVC CHK (OR BETTER) AND CONTINUED. MY RESPONSE TO THIS EVENT CENTERS AROUND THE 'T' CHK AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE BLOCK. IF AN EVENT DOES NOT TRIGGER A VALID AIRWORTHINESS RELEASE, THEN THAT BLOCK SHOULD REMAIN BLANK. I DON'T BELIEVE WE SHOULD 'SET UP' OUR AIR CREWS WITH A SIGNED OFF AIRWORTHINESS BLOCK WHICH ISN'T. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES THE B737. THE 'T' CHK TO WHICH HE REFERS WAS A 'PARTIAL CHK, BUT NOT ENOUGH FOR AN AIRWORTHINESS CHK.' MANY PLTS AND MAINT MEN DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE 'T' CHK NOTATION IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. AFTER COMPLAINTS WERE MADE TO ACR MGMNT, A DATE WAS PUT IN THE LOGBOOK STATING WHEN THE NEXT 'AIRWORTHINESS CHK' MUST BE COMPLETED, BASICALLY ELIMINATING THE 'T' CHK. THE PROB HAS BEEN SOLVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.