Narrative:

I was on an IFR flight, in VMC, from san to my home field sjc at 10000 ft. It was an uneventful flight. At 75 mi from sjc, bay approach instructed me to fly 300 degrees to intercept and track the localizer for runway 30L. About 50 mi out, ATC asked which runway I wanted, and I requested runway 29 as usual, since it is closest to my parking. ATC acknowledged, and told me to continue tracking the runway 30L localizer. There was a fairly busy stream of IFR arrs from the south, and all were being given the same instructions: intercept and track the runway 30L localizer. ATC asked me to maintain maximum forward speed as long as possible, to fit in with other arriving traffic. About 20 mi out, ATC asked me to report the field in sight. While the WX was clear, there was thick haze that made visibility of the surface poor. I did not have the field in sight 20 mi out. About 15 mi out, I was still high and fast when ATC vectored me to turn left to 270 degrees for overtaking traffic. After the B767 had passed, I was again asked to report the field in sight. Although visibility was still poor, I was able to make out the field through the haze, although I could not make out the individual runways. I reported the field in sight. ATC then cleared me for a visual approach to runway 29. I turned back to the field on a 45 degree intercept to the final approach course and started down fast. I captured and began to track the GS for runway 30L, which provides good descent guidance to the numbers on runway 29. I was no longer tracking the runway 30L localizer (at least I didn't intend to), but was using the GS on the HSI as I frequently do on a long, straight-in approach when visibility is poor. About 3-5 mi out, I spotted the PAPI for what I thought was runway 29, and used that as my visual reference for lining up on the runway (it later turned out to be the PAPI for runway 30L). I continued my descent using the GS and the PAPI. As I got closer, I knew that something didn't look right, but couldn't identify the problem, so I continued inbound. Finally, I realized what was wrong when I found myself at 200 ft AGL coming over thedisplaced threshold for runway 30L (runway 29 does not have a displaced threshold). On seeing this, I decided that it would be unsafe at that point to sidestep to runway 29. I knew from monitoring the radios that there was no traffic on short final to runway 30L, and so proceeded to land on runway 30L and to get off the runway as quickly as possible. All worked out ok, tower didn't have to wave anyone off, and I was clear of the runway well before the next plane came in. In 20/20 hindsight, I should have gone around instead of landing, and should have told tower that I was landing on runway 30L before doing so. But in the heat of things I was so intent on completing a safe landing that I just kept flying the plane and didn't communicate until I was safely off the runway. There was no contact from the tower after clearing me to turn back from the 270 degree vector and clearing me to land runway 29, unitl I was off the runway. Tower then asked if I was familiar with the sjc runway layout. I replied that, yes, I was familiar, but that I mistakenly lined up and landed on the wrong runway. Tower replied that they just wanted to make sure that I was aware of what I'd done, and then had me contact ground for taxi to parking. Human performance considerations: while I felt fine when I started the flight from san, I now know that I must have been getting sick even then. That night, I came down with some kind of flu that kept me in bed for the next 2 days, feeling completely exhausted and unable to think clearly. I realize now that I cannot have been thinking clearly by the end of this flight, or else I either would never have lined up on the wrong runway at the home field I know so well, or I would have recognized the error soon enough to correct safely. Being high and fast on final, in response to ATC's request to maintain maximum forward speed, and the haze that made it difficult to see the runway layout clearly, were factors that contributed to make the approach busier than usual. I'm still so stunned that I made such a stupid mistake, I'm sure that I'll never make this mistake again!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE36 PLT LANDS WRONG RWY ON VISUAL APCH IN HAZY CONDITIONS. LAND WRONG RWY. REDUCED VISIBILITY.

Narrative: I WAS ON AN IFR FLT, IN VMC, FROM SAN TO MY HOME FIELD SJC AT 10000 FT. IT WAS AN UNEVENTFUL FLT. AT 75 MI FROM SJC, BAY APCH INSTRUCTED ME TO FLY 300 DEGS TO INTERCEPT AND TRACK THE LOC FOR RWY 30L. ABOUT 50 MI OUT, ATC ASKED WHICH RWY I WANTED, AND I REQUESTED RWY 29 AS USUAL, SINCE IT IS CLOSEST TO MY PARKING. ATC ACKNOWLEDGED, AND TOLD ME TO CONTINUE TRACKING THE RWY 30L LOC. THERE WAS A FAIRLY BUSY STREAM OF IFR ARRS FROM THE S, AND ALL WERE BEING GIVEN THE SAME INSTRUCTIONS: INTERCEPT AND TRACK THE RWY 30L LOC. ATC ASKED ME TO MAINTAIN MAX FORWARD SPD AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, TO FIT IN WITH OTHER ARRIVING TFC. ABOUT 20 MI OUT, ATC ASKED ME TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT. WHILE THE WX WAS CLR, THERE WAS THICK HAZE THAT MADE VISIBILITY OF THE SURFACE POOR. I DID NOT HAVE THE FIELD IN SIGHT 20 MI OUT. ABOUT 15 MI OUT, I WAS STILL HIGH AND FAST WHEN ATC VECTORED ME TO TURN L TO 270 DEGS FOR OVERTAKING TFC. AFTER THE B767 HAD PASSED, I WAS AGAIN ASKED TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT. ALTHOUGH VISIBILITY WAS STILL POOR, I WAS ABLE TO MAKE OUT THE FIELD THROUGH THE HAZE, ALTHOUGH I COULD NOT MAKE OUT THE INDIVIDUAL RWYS. I RPTED THE FIELD IN SIGHT. ATC THEN CLRED ME FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 29. I TURNED BACK TO THE FIELD ON A 45 DEG INTERCEPT TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE AND STARTED DOWN FAST. I CAPTURED AND BEGAN TO TRACK THE GS FOR RWY 30L, WHICH PROVIDES GOOD DSCNT GUIDANCE TO THE NUMBERS ON RWY 29. I WAS NO LONGER TRACKING THE RWY 30L LOC (AT LEAST I DIDN'T INTEND TO), BUT WAS USING THE GS ON THE HSI AS I FREQUENTLY DO ON A LONG, STRAIGHT-IN APCH WHEN VISIBILITY IS POOR. ABOUT 3-5 MI OUT, I SPOTTED THE PAPI FOR WHAT I THOUGHT WAS RWY 29, AND USED THAT AS MY VISUAL REF FOR LINING UP ON THE RWY (IT LATER TURNED OUT TO BE THE PAPI FOR RWY 30L). I CONTINUED MY DSCNT USING THE GS AND THE PAPI. AS I GOT CLOSER, I KNEW THAT SOMETHING DIDN'T LOOK RIGHT, BUT COULDN'T IDENT THE PROB, SO I CONTINUED INBOUND. FINALLY, I REALIZED WHAT WAS WRONG WHEN I FOUND MYSELF AT 200 FT AGL COMING OVER THEDISPLACED THRESHOLD FOR RWY 30L (RWY 29 DOES NOT HAVE A DISPLACED THRESHOLD). ON SEEING THIS, I DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE UNSAFE AT THAT POINT TO SIDESTEP TO RWY 29. I KNEW FROM MONITORING THE RADIOS THAT THERE WAS NO TFC ON SHORT FINAL TO RWY 30L, AND SO PROCEEDED TO LAND ON RWY 30L AND TO GET OFF THE RWY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. ALL WORKED OUT OK, TWR DIDN'T HAVE TO WAVE ANYONE OFF, AND I WAS CLR OF THE RWY WELL BEFORE THE NEXT PLANE CAME IN. IN 20/20 HINDSIGHT, I SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND INSTEAD OF LNDG, AND SHOULD HAVE TOLD TWR THAT I WAS LNDG ON RWY 30L BEFORE DOING SO. BUT IN THE HEAT OF THINGS I WAS SO INTENT ON COMPLETING A SAFE LNDG THAT I JUST KEPT FLYING THE PLANE AND DIDN'T COMMUNICATE UNTIL I WAS SAFELY OFF THE RWY. THERE WAS NO CONTACT FROM THE TWR AFTER CLRING ME TO TURN BACK FROM THE 270 DEG VECTOR AND CLRING ME TO LAND RWY 29, UNITL I WAS OFF THE RWY. TWR THEN ASKED IF I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE SJC RWY LAYOUT. I REPLIED THAT, YES, I WAS FAMILIAR, BUT THAT I MISTAKENLY LINED UP AND LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY. TWR REPLIED THAT THEY JUST WANTED TO MAKE SURE THAT I WAS AWARE OF WHAT I'D DONE, AND THEN HAD ME CONTACT GND FOR TAXI TO PARKING. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: WHILE I FELT FINE WHEN I STARTED THE FLT FROM SAN, I NOW KNOW THAT I MUST HAVE BEEN GETTING SICK EVEN THEN. THAT NIGHT, I CAME DOWN WITH SOME KIND OF FLU THAT KEPT ME IN BED FOR THE NEXT 2 DAYS, FEELING COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED AND UNABLE TO THINK CLRLY. I REALIZE NOW THAT I CANNOT HAVE BEEN THINKING CLRLY BY THE END OF THIS FLT, OR ELSE I EITHER WOULD NEVER HAVE LINED UP ON THE WRONG RWY AT THE HOME FIELD I KNOW SO WELL, OR I WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE ERROR SOON ENOUGH TO CORRECT SAFELY. BEING HIGH AND FAST ON FINAL, IN RESPONSE TO ATC'S REQUEST TO MAINTAIN MAX FORWARD SPD, AND THE HAZE THAT MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE THE RWY LAYOUT CLRLY, WERE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO MAKE THE APCH BUSIER THAN USUAL. I'M STILL SO STUNNED THAT I MADE SUCH A STUPID MISTAKE, I'M SURE THAT I'LL NEVER MAKE THIS MISTAKE AGAIN!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.