Narrative:

Aircraft was dispatched to my crew for passenger flight to rdu. Dispatch release included a filed altitude of 33000 ft. Dispatch release indicated an MEL item, but did not indicate any associated restrs or operational requirements. Flight was conducted with no problems. ATC assigned a final cruising altitude of FL290. On jun/tue/96 I was advised that the MEL on aircraft was one which required the aircraft to be flown unpressurized and at altitudes below 10000 ft. My chief pilot's office notified me that a letter of investigation was being initiated by the FAA. I think the company dispatcher should ensure the flight crew is aware of MEL requirements which require other than normal operating parameters. These requirements should be listed on the dispatch release. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting first officer admits that he was at fault in this incident, he did not properly check the MEL. However, the flight plan was delivered to the flight crew at the last min with no operational restr noted and the flight planned at FL330, not the 10000 ft as required by the MEL item. The MEL item number was listed on the dispatch release with no hint of any operational requirements. The air carrier is under close scrutiny by the FAA who found this discrepancy 2 weeks after the flight. The flight crew immediately filed ASRS reports. There was a civil proceeding in which the first officer received a 2 month suspension of his certificate. The first officer does not know if the captain or the dispatcher also received a suspension. The captain's statement, as reported by the first officer, stated that the captain told the first officer to check the MEL but did not do so himself. The first officer is not yet back to work as the air carrier was shut down after an accident and his seniority did not allow a recall. The first officer believes that the MEL could be written in a more user friendly fashion. Supplemental information from acn 337238: the MEL item was a door stop screw missing on the cargo door (MEL #5204). I made the mistake of not physically checking the MEL procedures myself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR DC9 CREW FLEW IN VIOLATION OF A MEL REQUIREMENT.

Narrative: ACFT WAS DISPATCHED TO MY CREW FOR PAX FLT TO RDU. DISPATCH RELEASE INCLUDED A FILED ALT OF 33000 FT. DISPATCH RELEASE INDICATED AN MEL ITEM, BUT DID NOT INDICATE ANY ASSOCIATED RESTRS OR OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. FLT WAS CONDUCTED WITH NO PROBS. ATC ASSIGNED A FINAL CRUISING ALT OF FL290. ON JUN/TUE/96 I WAS ADVISED THAT THE MEL ON ACFT WAS ONE WHICH REQUIRED THE ACFT TO BE FLOWN UNPRESSURIZED AND AT ALTS BELOW 10000 FT. MY CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE NOTIFIED ME THAT A LETTER OF INVESTIGATION WAS BEING INITIATED BY THE FAA. I THINK THE COMPANY DISPATCHER SHOULD ENSURE THE FLC IS AWARE OF MEL REQUIREMENTS WHICH REQUIRE OTHER THAN NORMAL OPERATING PARAMETERS. THESE REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE LISTED ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING FO ADMITS THAT HE WAS AT FAULT IN THIS INCIDENT, HE DID NOT PROPERLY CHK THE MEL. HOWEVER, THE FLT PLAN WAS DELIVERED TO THE FLC AT THE LAST MIN WITH NO OPERATIONAL RESTR NOTED AND THE FLT PLANNED AT FL330, NOT THE 10000 FT AS REQUIRED BY THE MEL ITEM. THE MEL ITEM NUMBER WAS LISTED ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE WITH NO HINT OF ANY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. THE ACR IS UNDER CLOSE SCRUTINY BY THE FAA WHO FOUND THIS DISCREPANCY 2 WKS AFTER THE FLT. THE FLC IMMEDIATELY FILED ASRS RPTS. THERE WAS A CIVIL PROCEEDING IN WHICH THE FO RECEIVED A 2 MONTH SUSPENSION OF HIS CERTIFICATE. THE FO DOES NOT KNOW IF THE CAPT OR THE DISPATCHER ALSO RECEIVED A SUSPENSION. THE CAPT'S STATEMENT, AS RPTED BY THE FO, STATED THAT THE CAPT TOLD THE FO TO CHK THE MEL BUT DID NOT DO SO HIMSELF. THE FO IS NOT YET BACK TO WORK AS THE ACR WAS SHUT DOWN AFTER AN ACCIDENT AND HIS SENIORITY DID NOT ALLOW A RECALL. THE FO BELIEVES THAT THE MEL COULD BE WRITTEN IN A MORE USER FRIENDLY FASHION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 337238: THE MEL ITEM WAS A DOOR STOP SCREW MISSING ON THE CARGO DOOR (MEL #5204). I MADE THE MISTAKE OF NOT PHYSICALLY CHKING THE MEL PROCS MYSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.