Narrative:

At XA50 a large thunderstorm was visible to the west moving toward the field. Radar indicated a large area of level 4, 5, and 6 echoes about 15-20 mi from the airport. I was assigned to the TRACON, so I left the tower cabin attendant. I first heard thunder downstairs at XB22 (remember, a lot of very active and very vivid lightning was visible long before that). At XB25 or so, the wind shifted from 060 degrees at 18 KTS, gusting to 30 KTS, to 280 degrees at 23 KTS. During this entire time, the only WX on the ATIS read M38 overcast 10+ wind 060 degrees at 19 KTS. There was never any report of thunderstorm or lightning, and no special observations were taken (at least by tower observers for ATIS use -- we do have ASOS, with no thunderstorm detection). At about XB28, the ATIS was turned off. It remained off, with no automatic WX or approach information available, until XC10 -- 40 mins. During this time, 1 aircraft approached from the east, deviated around the line of WX, and landed at cid. He made the approach safely, with WX information from the approach controller, but approach also had to issue all the WX information -- including some that was outdated. I lay the blame for this entire incident on the FAA's policy of eliminating professional, trained WX observers at airports in favor of letting controllers do the job as part of their duties. We cannot provide the level of expertise or the essential time-critical elements of WX effectively as part-time WX observers and full-time controllers. The FAA is letting the bottom line overrule safety!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR IS CONCERNED THAT CTLRS CANNOT HANDLE THE DUTIES OF SUPPLEMENTING THE WX RPTING AND STILL DO THEIR PRIMARY JOB OF ATC. THEIR ARPT NWS PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY ASOS RPTING EQUIP.

Narrative: AT XA50 A LARGE TSTM WAS VISIBLE TO THE W MOVING TOWARD THE FIELD. RADAR INDICATED A LARGE AREA OF LEVEL 4, 5, AND 6 ECHOES ABOUT 15-20 MI FROM THE ARPT. I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE TRACON, SO I LEFT THE TWR CAB. I FIRST HEARD THUNDER DOWNSTAIRS AT XB22 (REMEMBER, A LOT OF VERY ACTIVE AND VERY VIVID LIGHTNING WAS VISIBLE LONG BEFORE THAT). AT XB25 OR SO, THE WIND SHIFTED FROM 060 DEGS AT 18 KTS, GUSTING TO 30 KTS, TO 280 DEGS AT 23 KTS. DURING THIS ENTIRE TIME, THE ONLY WX ON THE ATIS READ M38 OVCST 10+ WIND 060 DEGS AT 19 KTS. THERE WAS NEVER ANY RPT OF TSTM OR LIGHTNING, AND NO SPECIAL OBSERVATIONS WERE TAKEN (AT LEAST BY TWR OBSERVERS FOR ATIS USE -- WE DO HAVE ASOS, WITH NO TSTM DETECTION). AT ABOUT XB28, THE ATIS WAS TURNED OFF. IT REMAINED OFF, WITH NO AUTOMATIC WX OR APCH INFO AVAILABLE, UNTIL XC10 -- 40 MINS. DURING THIS TIME, 1 ACFT APCHED FROM THE E, DEVIATED AROUND THE LINE OF WX, AND LANDED AT CID. HE MADE THE APCH SAFELY, WITH WX INFO FROM THE APCH CTLR, BUT APCH ALSO HAD TO ISSUE ALL THE WX INFO -- INCLUDING SOME THAT WAS OUTDATED. I LAY THE BLAME FOR THIS ENTIRE INCIDENT ON THE FAA'S POLICY OF ELIMINATING PROFESSIONAL, TRAINED WX OBSERVERS AT ARPTS IN FAVOR OF LETTING CTLRS DO THE JOB AS PART OF THEIR DUTIES. WE CANNOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF EXPERTISE OR THE ESSENTIAL TIME-CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF WX EFFECTIVELY AS PART-TIME WX OBSERVERS AND FULL-TIME CTLRS. THE FAA IS LETTING THE BOTTOM LINE OVERRULE SAFETY!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.