Narrative:

We were departing runway 24 at roa. Because of surrounding terrain this is a special use airport and has a special company departure procedure and profile. We had a full aircraft and were within 150 pounds of maximum takeoff weight for the runway. Ambient conditions were 95 degrees with high density altitude and mountainous terrain. I was the first officer and PF. I briefed the special departure profile and procedures along with noting the conditions of high, hot and heavy and what we could expect for performance. The captain made standard V1, vr calls and positive rate callout. I called for gear up and rotated the nose to the high pitch attitude required to maintain target airspeed as required for the special departure procedures. Neither the captain or I noticed the fact that the gear handle did not make it fully to the up position and that the gear was still down. Climb performance was poor but I attributed that to the aforementioned unfavorable conditions. I commented aloud that climb performance was pretty poor and both the captain and I glanced at the power setting to make sure it was correct. We were then distraction by conflicting traffic which was descending to the airport and appeared on TCASII at our altitude 1/4 - 1/2 mi away. After that was resolved we were switched to departure and given vectors. Climbing out of approximately 6000 ft, a safe altitude above the mountains the captain started after takeoff checklists and discovered the gear was still down. We raised the gear and continued without further incident. We were quick to believe our poor performance was because of the ambient conditions even though both of us knew intuitively and unspoken something wasn't right. We should have verbalized our concerns and this could have led to discovering the gear sooner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A DHC-8 REALIZED AFTER A SLOW CLBOUT WITH A NEAR MAX LOAD THAT THE LNDG GEAR HAD NOT RETRACTED DUE TO THE LNDG OPERATING HANDLE NOT BEING COMPLETELY IN THE UP DETENT.

Narrative: WE WERE DEPARTING RWY 24 AT ROA. BECAUSE OF SURROUNDING TERRAIN THIS IS A SPECIAL USE ARPT AND HAS A SPECIAL COMPANY DEP PROC AND PROFILE. WE HAD A FULL ACFT AND WERE WITHIN 150 LBS OF MAX TKOF WT FOR THE RWY. AMBIENT CONDITIONS WERE 95 DEGS WITH HIGH DENSITY ALT AND MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN. I WAS THE FO AND PF. I BRIEFED THE SPECIAL DEP PROFILE AND PROCS ALONG WITH NOTING THE CONDITIONS OF HIGH, HOT AND HVY AND WHAT WE COULD EXPECT FOR PERFORMANCE. THE CAPT MADE STANDARD V1, VR CALLS AND POSITIVE RATE CALLOUT. I CALLED FOR GEAR UP AND ROTATED THE NOSE TO THE HIGH PITCH ATTITUDE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN TARGET AIRSPD AS REQUIRED FOR THE SPECIAL DEP PROCS. NEITHER THE CAPT OR I NOTICED THE FACT THAT THE GEAR HANDLE DID NOT MAKE IT FULLY TO THE UP POS AND THAT THE GEAR WAS STILL DOWN. CLB PERFORMANCE WAS POOR BUT I ATTRIBUTED THAT TO THE AFOREMENTIONED UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS. I COMMENTED ALOUD THAT CLB PERFORMANCE WAS PRETTY POOR AND BOTH THE CAPT AND I GLANCED AT THE PWR SETTING TO MAKE SURE IT WAS CORRECT. WE WERE THEN DISTR BY CONFLICTING TFC WHICH WAS DSNDING TO THE ARPT AND APPEARED ON TCASII AT OUR ALT 1/4 - 1/2 MI AWAY. AFTER THAT WAS RESOLVED WE WERE SWITCHED TO DEP AND GIVEN VECTORS. CLBING OUT OF APPROX 6000 FT, A SAFE ALT ABOVE THE MOUNTAINS THE CAPT STARTED AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS AND DISCOVERED THE GEAR WAS STILL DOWN. WE RAISED THE GEAR AND CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. WE WERE QUICK TO BELIEVE OUR POOR PERFORMANCE WAS BECAUSE OF THE AMBIENT CONDITIONS EVEN THOUGH BOTH OF US KNEW INTUITIVELY AND UNSPOKEN SOMETHING WASN'T RIGHT. WE SHOULD HAVE VERBALIZED OUR CONCERNS AND THIS COULD HAVE LED TO DISCOVERING THE GEAR SOONER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.