Narrative:

Flight lax to sea. MD80 fuel load 24000 pounds. Fuel was loaded as per normal fueling procedures, 9250 pounds in the left main, 9250 pounds in the right main and 5500 pounds in the center tank. The inbound flight crew had briefed us that a trim problem requiring an abnormal amount of aileron and rudder was noted in the log book and a trim report for maintenance had been filled out. Upon reviewing the logbook the trim write-up was noted along with an identical squawk from another crew. Departure was normal and approximately 10 mins after reaching cruising altitude 31000 ft (approximately 50 mi north of efh VOR on a radar vector direct to lmt), the center fuel tank was depleted of fuel, and the center tank fuel boost pumps were turned off. I commented to the first officer that the plane seemed to be flying in a normal trim confign. Approximately 50 mins out of seattle, on J189 just north of lmt VOR, the master caution light came from a 'left inlet fuel pressure low' indicator. The autoplt was on and we were experiencing some turbulence, but no unusual control yoke input had been noticed at this time. My reaction to the warning light was to check the overhead and confirm that the main tank fuel boost pumps were on and that the ignition was on. Having confirmed both, I then looked to the fuel temperature gauges and noted fuel temperatures at zero degrees. When I turned on the left fuel heat the left engine flamed out. The first officer reported that there was no fuel in the left main tank. The fuel from the left main had transferred into the center tank. Fuel tank readings were left main 0000 pounds, center tank 5600 pounds, and right main 5500 pounds. Our next step was to turn on the center fuel tank boost pumps, which caused an egt rise, but no increase in N1 or N2. The fuel control lever was closed and a descent was requested to FL240. During our descent, with all 6 boost pumps on, fuel began to transfer back into the left main fuel tank. A successful engine start was accomplished and the flight continued with our descent into seattle. During our descent we discussed our options for landing. If we opened the fuel xfeed lever to supply both engines from the right fuel tank, with our puzzling fuel flow, we could not accurately predict the fuel transfer. The decision was made to stay with the confign that we were in -- all 6 boost pumps on, xfeed closed. The aircraft was flying with zero rudder and aileron trim inputs and the fuel quantity was increasing in the left main fuel tank. A normal flaps 28 degrees landing was made carrying 15 extra KTS of speed. Only 2 degrees of left wing aileron trim was required on final approach. Fuel quantity gauges on landing indicated left main 350 pounds, center 450 pounds, and right main 5500 pounds. After clearing the runway, I agreed to let the first officer turn off the left main boost pump. Fuel transferred from the center tank to the left main tank at the rate of 50 pounds per min while taxiing to the gate. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that after 12 days the airplane problem has not been resolved. The airplane is still grounded and in the hangar. There is metal contamination in the left tank which seems to have rendered the check valves and plumbing inoperative. The airplane had just had its fuel tanks modified by contract to have a heater blanket system installed in the main fuel tanks that would prevent ice and frost from forming on the wings from cold fuel in the main wing tanks. Ice and frost forming on the wings at the gate from the cold fuel in the wings has been a problem with the MD80. The reporter stated he and the copilot had ran a how goes it fuel check just prior to the engines flaming out. Unfortunately, the crew determined the fuel used by the totalizer and not by reading the individual tank. The reporter stated he was told the 4 inch pipes and fuel boost pump arrangements in the involved plumbing are designed to move 32000 pounds of fuel per hour. So, it does not take long for 5000 pounds to move from 1 tank to the other if the check valves are not functioning. The maximum lateral fuel imbal for landing is 1500 pounds for his airline. The reporter stated that other than doing a better job of writing up the problem in the book he would not have done anything differently.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL MIGRATED FROM THE L MAIN TANK TO THE CTR TANK INFLT. THE ENG FLAMED OUT WHEN THE L TANK WENT DRY. THE CREW HAD TO DSND TO FL240 TO GET THE L ENG TO RELIGHT. THE CREW ELECTED TO RUN BOTH ENGS THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT ON THE CTR TANK RATHER THAN OPEN ANY XFEEDS. THE ACFT WAS LANDED WITH 350 LBS IN THE L MAIN TANK, 5500 LBS IN THE R MAIN TANK, AND 450 LBS IN THE CTR TANK.

Narrative: FLT LAX TO SEA. MD80 FUEL LOAD 24000 LBS. FUEL WAS LOADED AS PER NORMAL FUELING PROCS, 9250 LBS IN THE L MAIN, 9250 LBS IN THE R MAIN AND 5500 LBS IN THE CTR TANK. THE INBOUND FLC HAD BRIEFED US THAT A TRIM PROB REQUIRING AN ABNORMAL AMOUNT OF AILERON AND RUDDER WAS NOTED IN THE LOG BOOK AND A TRIM RPT FOR MAINT HAD BEEN FILLED OUT. UPON REVIEWING THE LOGBOOK THE TRIM WRITE-UP WAS NOTED ALONG WITH AN IDENTICAL SQUAWK FROM ANOTHER CREW. DEP WAS NORMAL AND APPROX 10 MINS AFTER REACHING CRUISING ALT 31000 FT (APPROX 50 MI N OF EFH VOR ON A RADAR VECTOR DIRECT TO LMT), THE CTR FUEL TANK WAS DEPLETED OF FUEL, AND THE CTR TANK FUEL BOOST PUMPS WERE TURNED OFF. I COMMENTED TO THE FO THAT THE PLANE SEEMED TO BE FLYING IN A NORMAL TRIM CONFIGN. APPROX 50 MINS OUT OF SEATTLE, ON J189 JUST N OF LMT VOR, THE MASTER CAUTION LIGHT CAME FROM A 'L INLET FUEL PRESSURE LOW' INDICATOR. THE AUTOPLT WAS ON AND WE WERE EXPERIENCING SOME TURB, BUT NO UNUSUAL CTL YOKE INPUT HAD BEEN NOTICED AT THIS TIME. MY REACTION TO THE WARNING LIGHT WAS TO CHK THE OVERHEAD AND CONFIRM THAT THE MAIN TANK FUEL BOOST PUMPS WERE ON AND THAT THE IGNITION WAS ON. HAVING CONFIRMED BOTH, I THEN LOOKED TO THE FUEL TEMP GAUGES AND NOTED FUEL TEMPS AT ZERO DEGS. WHEN I TURNED ON THE L FUEL HEAT THE L ENG FLAMED OUT. THE FO RPTED THAT THERE WAS NO FUEL IN THE L MAIN TANK. THE FUEL FROM THE L MAIN HAD TRANSFERRED INTO THE CTR TANK. FUEL TANK READINGS WERE L MAIN 0000 LBS, CTR TANK 5600 LBS, AND R MAIN 5500 LBS. OUR NEXT STEP WAS TO TURN ON THE CTR FUEL TANK BOOST PUMPS, WHICH CAUSED AN EGT RISE, BUT NO INCREASE IN N1 OR N2. THE FUEL CTL LEVER WAS CLOSED AND A DSCNT WAS REQUESTED TO FL240. DURING OUR DSCNT, WITH ALL 6 BOOST PUMPS ON, FUEL BEGAN TO TRANSFER BACK INTO THE L MAIN FUEL TANK. A SUCCESSFUL ENG START WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND THE FLT CONTINUED WITH OUR DSCNT INTO SEATTLE. DURING OUR DSCNT WE DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS FOR LNDG. IF WE OPENED THE FUEL XFEED LEVER TO SUPPLY BOTH ENGS FROM THE R FUEL TANK, WITH OUR PUZZLING FUEL FLOW, WE COULD NOT ACCURATELY PREDICT THE FUEL TRANSFER. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO STAY WITH THE CONFIGN THAT WE WERE IN -- ALL 6 BOOST PUMPS ON, XFEED CLOSED. THE ACFT WAS FLYING WITH ZERO RUDDER AND AILERON TRIM INPUTS AND THE FUEL QUANTITY WAS INCREASING IN THE L MAIN FUEL TANK. A NORMAL FLAPS 28 DEGS LNDG WAS MADE CARRYING 15 EXTRA KTS OF SPD. ONLY 2 DEGS OF L WING AILERON TRIM WAS REQUIRED ON FINAL APCH. FUEL QUANTITY GAUGES ON LNDG INDICATED L MAIN 350 LBS, CTR 450 LBS, AND R MAIN 5500 LBS. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, I AGREED TO LET THE FO TURN OFF THE L MAIN BOOST PUMP. FUEL TRANSFERRED FROM THE CTR TANK TO THE L MAIN TANK AT THE RATE OF 50 LBS PER MIN WHILE TAXIING TO THE GATE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT AFTER 12 DAYS THE AIRPLANE PROB HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED. THE AIRPLANE IS STILL GNDED AND IN THE HANGAR. THERE IS METAL CONTAMINATION IN THE L TANK WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE RENDERED THE CHK VALVES AND PLUMBING INOP. THE AIRPLANE HAD JUST HAD ITS FUEL TANKS MODIFIED BY CONTRACT TO HAVE A HEATER BLANKET SYS INSTALLED IN THE MAIN FUEL TANKS THAT WOULD PREVENT ICE AND FROST FROM FORMING ON THE WINGS FROM COLD FUEL IN THE MAIN WING TANKS. ICE AND FROST FORMING ON THE WINGS AT THE GATE FROM THE COLD FUEL IN THE WINGS HAS BEEN A PROB WITH THE MD80. THE RPTR STATED HE AND THE COPLT HAD RAN A HOW GOES IT FUEL CHK JUST PRIOR TO THE ENGS FLAMING OUT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE CREW DETERMINED THE FUEL USED BY THE TOTALIZER AND NOT BY READING THE INDIVIDUAL TANK. THE RPTR STATED HE WAS TOLD THE 4 INCH PIPES AND FUEL BOOST PUMP ARRANGEMENTS IN THE INVOLVED PLUMBING ARE DESIGNED TO MOVE 32000 LBS OF FUEL PER HR. SO, IT DOES NOT TAKE LONG FOR 5000 LBS TO MOVE FROM 1 TANK TO THE OTHER IF THE CHK VALVES ARE NOT FUNCTIONING. THE MAX LATERAL FUEL IMBAL FOR LNDG IS 1500 LBS FOR HIS AIRLINE. THE RPTR STATED THAT OTHER THAN DOING A BETTER JOB OF WRITING UP THE PROB IN THE BOOK HE WOULD NOT HAVE DONE ANYTHING DIFFERENTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.