Narrative:

During cruise at FL370 en route to msp from sfo, the #2 engine flamed out. We attempted a relight which failed. Declared an emergency with ATC and diverted to slc airport. All ECAM and company checklists were performed and landing was normal. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter captain had no specific feedback on the cause of the flameout, but the mechanics did say that there were minute brass shavings in the fuel strainers. Complete fuel system was replaced, aircraft ferried back to the air carrier home base, the engine removed and sent back to the company that leased it out. The postflt printout of the aircraft monitoring system showed a long list of fadec #1 and #2 faults which probably were probably detecting a slight fuel problem and then, when it became more pronounced, brought on the ECAM message as the engine flamed out. Reporter flight crew tried to restart the engine with no luck. The captain was quite concerned that, when the aircraft was on 1 engine, if another fadec fault occurred on the other engine and it shut down, that there would be no way to restart either of the engines. He says, as far as he knows, there is not interconnect that would block an automatic shutdown of a second engine after the first had failed. Though it probably is a very extremely unlikely situation, if it is as suspected, it could be very serious. Relating to the A320, though not specifically related to this incident or report, the captain also believes there is another potential problem with operating the engines. That is, power available for windshear recovery. Whereas in other aircraft the engines can be 'firewalled,' even though it may be greater than maximum takeoff go around (toga), the engines on the A320 are limited to maximum toga. The question the reporter captain addresses is, what if you need everything the engine is capable of putting out, even if it damages the engine, it is better to recover than to save the engine. Again, it is highly unlikely that such a situation could develop, but the potential is there. Reporter would like to see some interconnect that, when encountering windshear, would bypass the toga limits and allow the engine to go to its absolute maximum capability.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT EQUIP PROB ENG FLAMEOUT AND WOULDN'T RELIGHT. EMER DECLARED AND FLC DIVERTED TO CLOSE ARPT. POSTFLT DISCOVERED MULTIPLE FULL AUTH DIGITAL ENG CTL, FADEC #1 AND #2 FAULTS DETECTED BY 'LEGS' PRINTOUT, BUT NO FAULTS EVER CAME UP ON ECAM UNTIL THE FLAMEOUT. SUSPECTED FUEL SYS PROB, THOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY IDENTED. ENG WAS SENT BACK TO LESSOR FOR INSPECTION.

Narrative: DURING CRUISE AT FL370 ENRTE TO MSP FROM SFO, THE #2 ENG FLAMED OUT. WE ATTEMPTED A RELIGHT WHICH FAILED. DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND DIVERTED TO SLC ARPT. ALL ECAM AND COMPANY CHKLISTS WERE PERFORMED AND LNDG WAS NORMAL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CAPT HAD NO SPECIFIC FEEDBACK ON THE CAUSE OF THE FLAMEOUT, BUT THE MECHS DID SAY THAT THERE WERE MINUTE BRASS SHAVINGS IN THE FUEL STRAINERS. COMPLETE FUEL SYS WAS REPLACED, ACFT FERRIED BACK TO THE ACR HOME BASE, THE ENG REMOVED AND SENT BACK TO THE COMPANY THAT LEASED IT OUT. THE POSTFLT PRINTOUT OF THE ACFT MONITORING SYS SHOWED A LONG LIST OF FADEC #1 AND #2 FAULTS WHICH PROBABLY WERE PROBABLY DETECTING A SLIGHT FUEL PROB AND THEN, WHEN IT BECAME MORE PRONOUNCED, BROUGHT ON THE ECAM MESSAGE AS THE ENG FLAMED OUT. RPTR FLC TRIED TO RESTART THE ENG WITH NO LUCK. THE CAPT WAS QUITE CONCERNED THAT, WHEN THE ACFT WAS ON 1 ENG, IF ANOTHER FADEC FAULT OCCURRED ON THE OTHER ENG AND IT SHUT DOWN, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO WAY TO RESTART EITHER OF THE ENGS. HE SAYS, AS FAR AS HE KNOWS, THERE IS NOT INTERCONNECT THAT WOULD BLOCK AN AUTO SHUTDOWN OF A SECOND ENG AFTER THE FIRST HAD FAILED. THOUGH IT PROBABLY IS A VERY EXTREMELY UNLIKELY SIT, IF IT IS AS SUSPECTED, IT COULD BE VERY SERIOUS. RELATING TO THE A320, THOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO THIS INCIDENT OR RPT, THE CAPT ALSO BELIEVES THERE IS ANOTHER POTENTIAL PROB WITH OPERATING THE ENGS. THAT IS, PWR AVAILABLE FOR WINDSHEAR RECOVERY. WHEREAS IN OTHER ACFT THE ENGS CAN BE 'FIREWALLED,' EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE GREATER THAN MAX TKOF GAR (TOGA), THE ENGS ON THE A320 ARE LIMITED TO MAX TOGA. THE QUESTION THE RPTR CAPT ADDRESSES IS, WHAT IF YOU NEED EVERYTHING THE ENG IS CAPABLE OF PUTTING OUT, EVEN IF IT DAMAGES THE ENG, IT IS BETTER TO RECOVER THAN TO SAVE THE ENG. AGAIN, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT SUCH A SIT COULD DEVELOP, BUT THE POTENTIAL IS THERE. RPTR WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOME INTERCONNECT THAT, WHEN ENCOUNTERING WINDSHEAR, WOULD BYPASS THE TOGA LIMITS AND ALLOW THE ENG TO GO TO ITS ABSOLUTE MAX CAPABILITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.