Narrative:

Today there was no occurrence, but that may not be the case next time. Staffing was 3 fpl's, plus 2 air traffic area's, plus 1 pq certified on clearance delivery-FD plus 1 supervisor certified ground controller. Due to lack of staffing cba north, cba south, handoff, and cabin attendant coordinator, were all combined to one controller by supervisor's order (supervisor not certified on any of the above position). This occurred during the XA00 am departure push and the start of the YA00 am departure push. The controller was distraction and unable to provide the best service on the cba position due to some conflicts with cc duties. The real problem, as if that was not enough, is that at lga, cc provides an added safety factor by observing, monitoring, and assisting ground controller, local controller, and cba. Cc is our 'backup pair of eyes' watching xings, departure to insure safe rolls, final to check spacing, cba to check separation, in addition to internal and external coordination. For over 1 hour cc was unable to perform those duties and, in the past 12 months, the cc controllers have prevented at least 20 incidents if not actual accidents. This safety margin was denied to the hundreds of travelers during this period. Cc is critical to safety at lga and must be staffed, either by increasing staffing at lga or increasing overtime. Management prefers not to call in overtime as witnessed by the fact that when the supervisor arrived at XA30 am, he ordered the mid-controller (who was trying to call in overtime) to stop calling for overtime, that we would have to run the shift as is!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TWR CTLR CLAIMS THAT STAFFING SHORTAGE CAUSED POS TO BE COMBINED DURING HVY TFC CONDITIONS.

Narrative: TODAY THERE WAS NO OCCURRENCE, BUT THAT MAY NOT BE THE CASE NEXT TIME. STAFFING WAS 3 FPL'S, PLUS 2 ATA'S, PLUS 1 PQ CERTIFIED ON CD-FD PLUS 1 SUPVR CERTIFIED GND CTLR. DUE TO LACK OF STAFFING CBA N, CBA S, HDOF, AND CAB COORDINATOR, WERE ALL COMBINED TO ONE CTLR BY SUPVR'S ORDER (SUPVR NOT CERTIFIED ON ANY OF THE ABOVE POS). THIS OCCURRED DURING THE XA00 AM DEP PUSH AND THE START OF THE YA00 AM DEP PUSH. THE CTLR WAS DISTR AND UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE BEST SVC ON THE CBA POS DUE TO SOME CONFLICTS WITH CC DUTIES. THE REAL PROB, AS IF THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH, IS THAT AT LGA, CC PROVIDES AN ADDED SAFETY FACTOR BY OBSERVING, MONITORING, AND ASSISTING GND CTLR, LCL CTLR, AND CBA. CC IS OUR 'BACKUP PAIR OF EYES' WATCHING XINGS, DEP TO INSURE SAFE ROLLS, FINAL TO CHK SPACING, CBA TO CHK SEPARATION, IN ADDITION TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COORD. FOR OVER 1 HR CC WAS UNABLE TO PERFORM THOSE DUTIES AND, IN THE PAST 12 MONTHS, THE CC CTLRS HAVE PREVENTED AT LEAST 20 INCIDENTS IF NOT ACTUAL ACCIDENTS. THIS SAFETY MARGIN WAS DENIED TO THE HUNDREDS OF TRAVELERS DURING THIS PERIOD. CC IS CRITICAL TO SAFETY AT LGA AND MUST BE STAFFED, EITHER BY INCREASING STAFFING AT LGA OR INCREASING OVERTIME. MGMNT PREFERS NOT TO CALL IN OVERTIME AS WITNESSED BY THE FACT THAT WHEN THE SUPVR ARRIVED AT XA30 AM, HE ORDERED THE MID-CTLR (WHO WAS TRYING TO CALL IN OVERTIME) TO STOP CALLING FOR OVERTIME, THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO RUN THE SHIFT AS IS!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.