Narrative:

I was flying, receiving IOE in preparation for an far obsn that would take place the following day. During this procedure the captain candidate in the left seat (me in this case) is supposed to act as captain and 'run the show.' however, this is obviously inhibited by the fact that the first officer is really a check airman (and PIC) who ultimately can have the candidate removed from his status or worse if he is displeased. There is a chameleon like shifting of roles by many check airmen in this situation, ie, 'what if this were a dark rainy night and I were a low time weak first officer?' (when the reality is that it is a sunny day and you are an experienced check airman.) with that as backgnd, we were taking off on runway 36 dca, noise abatement procedures (which are in themselves not depicted as clearly as possible), follow the river to 4.0 DME, then either follow the river or 328 degree radial dca. I told the PNF to slow my heading bug so I could follow the river (since sometimes the aircraft structure obscures the view). I had misdialed the VOR frequency (probably 110.0 or 110.1 instead of 111.0 -- too many ones! It's easy to misdial this one). I was inhibited in telling this guy to do anything since he actually reverted to the 'captain' personality and would retort to my instructions/request, 'I know that..., etc.' at about 4 DME he asked if I could see the river. I replied in the negative. He responded the river was to his right. I said, 'I told you to slow the heading bug so I would follow the river.' ATC then asked where we were with reference to the radial. I had noticed the red 'off' flags on my VOR previously. In any other situation I would have asked the first officer to retune my radio but I was almost paranoid about calling the check airman's attention to my error. Had he followed my instructions regarding the heading bug (second item in the chain) we would have stayed over the river. After IOE was over, I flew a trip with this pilot in which he made many procedural errors, some identical to ones he had criticized me for and many worse. I prefer a cockpit atmosphere where unintentional errors are treated constructively and without destructive criticism.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG PLT ON IOE FOR CAPT HAS DIFFICULTY WITH CKP AND THEY HAVE A HDG DEV ON CLBOUT.

Narrative: I WAS FLYING, RECEIVING IOE IN PREPARATION FOR AN FAR OBSN THAT WOULD TAKE PLACE THE FOLLOWING DAY. DURING THIS PROC THE CAPT CANDIDATE IN THE L SEAT (ME IN THIS CASE) IS SUPPOSED TO ACT AS CAPT AND 'RUN THE SHOW.' HOWEVER, THIS IS OBVIOUSLY INHIBITED BY THE FACT THAT THE FO IS REALLY A CHK AIRMAN (AND PIC) WHO ULTIMATELY CAN HAVE THE CANDIDATE REMOVED FROM HIS STATUS OR WORSE IF HE IS DISPLEASED. THERE IS A CHAMELEON LIKE SHIFTING OF ROLES BY MANY CHK AIRMEN IN THIS SIT, IE, 'WHAT IF THIS WERE A DARK RAINY NIGHT AND I WERE A LOW TIME WEAK FO?' (WHEN THE REALITY IS THAT IT IS A SUNNY DAY AND YOU ARE AN EXPERIENCED CHK AIRMAN.) WITH THAT AS BACKGND, WE WERE TAKING OFF ON RWY 36 DCA, NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS (WHICH ARE IN THEMSELVES NOT DEPICTED AS CLRLY AS POSSIBLE), FOLLOW THE RIVER TO 4.0 DME, THEN EITHER FOLLOW THE RIVER OR 328 DEG RADIAL DCA. I TOLD THE PNF TO SLOW MY HDG BUG SO I COULD FOLLOW THE RIVER (SINCE SOMETIMES THE ACFT STRUCTURE OBSCURES THE VIEW). I HAD MISDIALED THE VOR FREQ (PROBABLY 110.0 OR 110.1 INSTEAD OF 111.0 -- TOO MANY ONES! IT'S EASY TO MISDIAL THIS ONE). I WAS INHIBITED IN TELLING THIS GUY TO DO ANYTHING SINCE HE ACTUALLY REVERTED TO THE 'CAPT' PERSONALITY AND WOULD RETORT TO MY INSTRUCTIONS/REQUEST, 'I KNOW THAT..., ETC.' AT ABOUT 4 DME HE ASKED IF I COULD SEE THE RIVER. I REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE. HE RESPONDED THE RIVER WAS TO HIS R. I SAID, 'I TOLD YOU TO SLOW THE HDG BUG SO I WOULD FOLLOW THE RIVER.' ATC THEN ASKED WHERE WE WERE WITH REF TO THE RADIAL. I HAD NOTICED THE RED 'OFF' FLAGS ON MY VOR PREVIOUSLY. IN ANY OTHER SIT I WOULD HAVE ASKED THE FO TO RETUNE MY RADIO BUT I WAS ALMOST PARANOID ABOUT CALLING THE CHK AIRMAN'S ATTN TO MY ERROR. HAD HE FOLLOWED MY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE HDG BUG (SECOND ITEM IN THE CHAIN) WE WOULD HAVE STAYED OVER THE RIVER. AFTER IOE WAS OVER, I FLEW A TRIP WITH THIS PLT IN WHICH HE MADE MANY PROCEDURAL ERRORS, SOME IDENTICAL TO ONES HE HAD CRITICIZED ME FOR AND MANY WORSE. I PREFER A COCKPIT ATMOSPHERE WHERE UNINTENTIONAL ERRORS ARE TREATED CONSTRUCTIVELY AND WITHOUT DESTRUCTIVE CRITICISM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.