Narrative:

We were being vectored for an approach to runway 33L at bwi. WX was VFR and at night. We were on a left downwind and approximately 5 NM abeam the airport, descending out of 6000 ft MSL for 5000 ft MSL. We were cleared for the visual approach for runway 33L. We had the ILS tuned for runway 33L to backup our visual approach. When cleared for the visual, PF extended 1/2 speed brakes to increase rate of descent and to start slowing. PF selected 200 KIAS on FCU and were still on autoplt. At about 2 NM ssw of ruett OM, PF called autoplt off and flight directors to begin left turn to base. At this time PF selected managed airspeed on FCU (flight control unit) which at this time drove the airspeed bug down to V approach which was approximately 135 KIAS. PF call for flaps 2 on base, we rolled out onto final about 2 NM from ruett OM (altitude 2000 ft MSL) and still descending to 1500 ft MSL. At this point is where we developed our situation, not realizing the speed brake was still extended (only indication of speed brake extension is on the upper ECAM 'speed brake') our airspeed was still above V approach and were still managed airspeed and the autothrust was still engaged. The engines were still idle thrust at this point. PNF called descending through 1500 ft MSL minimum GS/intercept altitude for runway 33L. PF noticed that thrust was not coming up. At that time PF disconnected autothrust to advance towards toga, also the PNF realized the speed brakes were still extended. PF retracted speed brake, stopped the descent at 1200 ft MSL and climb back to 1500 ft prior to ruett OM and after that, made normal approach and landing. During that time there was no conflict with any other aircraft. The situation arose from several factors, PF occupied by the visual approach and diverting much of his attention to the outside of the cockpit during the approach, should have used the PNF to set more of selections on the FCU and not come so dependent on the FMS on these type of aircraft. Develop a better situational awareness of items selected. Also the location speed brake annunciation in lower right corner of the upper ECAM, with it being green (memo section of the upper ECAM, east/wd). PNF was the one that noticed that the speed brake was still extended and made the call and also PF decided to advance thrust levers to toga, to let situation go any further. I feel we were doing everything by company procedure, but being occupied by the night time visual approach and (in my opinion) the poor indication of 'speed brake extended,' we developed a situation where we had a high rate of descent, but correction before any conflicts developed. I feel a better 'speed brake extended' annunciator, ie, aural horn or flashing amber speed brake message on the upper ECAM would have alerted us that the speed brakes were still extended and better cockpit awareness.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SPD BRAKE EXTENDED ON APCH, ACFT WENT LOW ON PROFILE. CONFUSION WITH AUTOTHROTTLES AND MANAGED SPD.

Narrative: WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR AN APCH TO RWY 33L AT BWI. WX WAS VFR AND AT NIGHT. WE WERE ON A L DOWNWIND AND APPROX 5 NM ABEAM THE ARPT, DSNDING OUT OF 6000 FT MSL FOR 5000 FT MSL. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 33L. WE HAD THE ILS TUNED FOR RWY 33L TO BACKUP OUR VISUAL APCH. WHEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL, PF EXTENDED 1/2 SPD BRAKES TO INCREASE RATE OF DSCNT AND TO START SLOWING. PF SELECTED 200 KIAS ON FCU AND WERE STILL ON AUTOPLT. AT ABOUT 2 NM SSW OF RUETT OM, PF CALLED AUTOPLT OFF AND FLT DIRECTORS TO BEGIN L TURN TO BASE. AT THIS TIME PF SELECTED MANAGED AIRSPD ON FCU (FLT CTL UNIT) WHICH AT THIS TIME DROVE THE AIRSPD BUG DOWN TO V APCH WHICH WAS APPROX 135 KIAS. PF CALL FOR FLAPS 2 ON BASE, WE ROLLED OUT ONTO FINAL ABOUT 2 NM FROM RUETT OM (ALT 2000 FT MSL) AND STILL DSNDING TO 1500 FT MSL. AT THIS POINT IS WHERE WE DEVELOPED OUR SIT, NOT REALIZING THE SPD BRAKE WAS STILL EXTENDED (ONLY INDICATION OF SPD BRAKE EXTENSION IS ON THE UPPER ECAM 'SPD BRAKE') OUR AIRSPD WAS STILL ABOVE V APCH AND WERE STILL MANAGED AIRSPD AND THE AUTOTHRUST WAS STILL ENGAGED. THE ENGS WERE STILL IDLE THRUST AT THIS POINT. PNF CALLED DSNDING THROUGH 1500 FT MSL MINIMUM GS/INTERCEPT ALT FOR RWY 33L. PF NOTICED THAT THRUST WAS NOT COMING UP. AT THAT TIME PF DISCONNECTED AUTOTHRUST TO ADVANCE TOWARDS TOGA, ALSO THE PNF REALIZED THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL EXTENDED. PF RETRACTED SPD BRAKE, STOPPED THE DSCNT AT 1200 FT MSL AND CLB BACK TO 1500 FT PRIOR TO RUETT OM AND AFTER THAT, MADE NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. DURING THAT TIME THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH ANY OTHER ACFT. THE SIT AROSE FROM SEVERAL FACTORS, PF OCCUPIED BY THE VISUAL APCH AND DIVERTING MUCH OF HIS ATTN TO THE OUTSIDE OF THE COCKPIT DURING THE APCH, SHOULD HAVE USED THE PNF TO SET MORE OF SELECTIONS ON THE FCU AND NOT COME SO DEPENDENT ON THE FMS ON THESE TYPE OF ACFT. DEVELOP A BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF ITEMS SELECTED. ALSO THE LOCATION SPD BRAKE ANNUNCIATION IN LOWER R CORNER OF THE UPPER ECAM, WITH IT BEING GREEN (MEMO SECTION OF THE UPPER ECAM, E/WD). PNF WAS THE ONE THAT NOTICED THAT THE SPD BRAKE WAS STILL EXTENDED AND MADE THE CALL AND ALSO PF DECIDED TO ADVANCE THRUST LEVERS TO TOGA, TO LET SIT GO ANY FURTHER. I FEEL WE WERE DOING EVERYTHING BY COMPANY PROC, BUT BEING OCCUPIED BY THE NIGHT TIME VISUAL APCH AND (IN MY OPINION) THE POOR INDICATION OF 'SPD BRAKE EXTENDED,' WE DEVELOPED A SIT WHERE WE HAD A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT, BUT CORRECTION BEFORE ANY CONFLICTS DEVELOPED. I FEEL A BETTER 'SPD BRAKE EXTENDED' ANNUNCIATOR, IE, AURAL HORN OR FLASHING AMBER SPD BRAKE MESSAGE ON THE UPPER ECAM WOULD HAVE ALERTED US THAT THE SPD BRAKES WERE STILL EXTENDED AND BETTER COCKPIT AWARENESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.