Narrative:

I am a fully qualified reserve captain with 8000 hours total time and 660 hours in type. During this flight, however, I was flying as a first officer. The other pilot was the captain, and he is also the company training captain and a ppe. Flight luk-ord- luk. Return, I flew from the left seat with no passenger. For night currency we agreed to do some lndgs at luk. My first landing at luk on runway 25 (wind 290 degrees variable 350 degrees at 10-15 KTS) was uneventful. Taxi back. Takeoff on runway 25, flew south heading 205 degrees and flew a left 90 degree, right 270 degree course reversal and landed on runway 3R. Rolled to the end and taxied into position runway 25, at which time the captain took the airplane and flew from the right seat. He did the takeoff and flew right closed traffic for runway 25. We had about 3000 pounds of fuel on board. Reference was 121 KTS. Runway 25 is 5128 ft long by 100 ft wide. On 1/4 mi final (over the levee), I noted 160 KTS and a little high and said 'you're a little high and fast.' captain acknowledged. Over the numbers, still high and fast, I said, 'suggest you go around.' the captain indicated intent to continue and we touched down approximately 1000 ft down the runway and ballooned back up. I estimate we were 20-30 ft in the air, airplane rocking slightly, PF working with the crosswind. We were approaching the intersection of runway 25 and runway 21R and still flying (approximately 2200 ft remaining). I noted 127 KTS as I advanced the power and took the yoke with my left hand starting a go around. I did not say 'I have it.' captain said something about runaway trim. Did not realize I had started a go around. When he realized I had taken the airplane he said, 'I've got it! I've got it! I've got it!' I relinquished control back to the captain in the right seat after initiating the go around. Subsequent left traffic and landing on runway 25 was uneventful. I believe the night operation, flying from the right seat, and possibly the captain's being tired led to this incident. There is no question in my mind that initiating a go around was appropriate and warranted. The airplane was definitely outside the parameters of normal operation. During postflt discussion with the captain he admitted that he was still trying to save a bad landing, and that the approach was poor. But he took issue with my actions and the resulting confusion because I did not verbally say that I had the airplane, or say go around! I agree I should have spoken up more clearly. This is the first time in 11 1/2 yrs with this company that I have taken control of an airplane from a captain. It is a very hard thing to do. In this instance we had definitely crossed the threshold. I tried to let the captain fix the landing, but once we got to the 'threshold' of safety (not enough runway left, and still plenty of speed) there was no more time to talk, only time to act. I had suggested a go around while we were on short final and put that idea on the table for him to act on. He didn't. After the bounce, with limited runway remaining, I had let it go as far as I could. This event can be viewed as an error chain. Night, flying right seat, landing runway 25 when a better runway was available (runway 3R, longer, wider, better aligned to the wind), and not going around sooner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CORP FO IN THE L SEAT INITIATED A GAR AFTER THE MDT BALLOONED DURING TOUCHDOWN, APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY. CONFUSION AND CREW CONFLICT RESULTED FROM THE FO'S RPTED FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE THAT HE HAD TAKEN CTL OF THE ACFT.

Narrative: I AM A FULLY QUALIFIED RESERVE CAPT WITH 8000 HRS TOTAL TIME AND 660 HRS IN TYPE. DURING THIS FLT, HOWEVER, I WAS FLYING AS A FO. THE OTHER PLT WAS THE CAPT, AND HE IS ALSO THE COMPANY TRAINING CAPT AND A PPE. FLT LUK-ORD- LUK. RETURN, I FLEW FROM THE L SEAT WITH NO PAX. FOR NIGHT CURRENCY WE AGREED TO DO SOME LNDGS AT LUK. MY FIRST LNDG AT LUK ON RWY 25 (WIND 290 DEGS VARIABLE 350 DEGS AT 10-15 KTS) WAS UNEVENTFUL. TAXI BACK. TKOF ON RWY 25, FLEW S HDG 205 DEGS AND FLEW A L 90 DEG, R 270 DEG COURSE REVERSAL AND LANDED ON RWY 3R. ROLLED TO THE END AND TAXIED INTO POS RWY 25, AT WHICH TIME THE CAPT TOOK THE AIRPLANE AND FLEW FROM THE R SEAT. HE DID THE TKOF AND FLEW R CLOSED TFC FOR RWY 25. WE HAD ABOUT 3000 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD. REF WAS 121 KTS. RWY 25 IS 5128 FT LONG BY 100 FT WIDE. ON 1/4 MI FINAL (OVER THE LEVEE), I NOTED 160 KTS AND A LITTLE HIGH AND SAID 'YOU'RE A LITTLE HIGH AND FAST.' CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED. OVER THE NUMBERS, STILL HIGH AND FAST, I SAID, 'SUGGEST YOU GAR.' THE CAPT INDICATED INTENT TO CONTINUE AND WE TOUCHED DOWN APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY AND BALLOONED BACK UP. I ESTIMATE WE WERE 20-30 FT IN THE AIR, AIRPLANE ROCKING SLIGHTLY, PF WORKING WITH THE XWIND. WE WERE APCHING THE INTXN OF RWY 25 AND RWY 21R AND STILL FLYING (APPROX 2200 FT REMAINING). I NOTED 127 KTS AS I ADVANCED THE PWR AND TOOK THE YOKE WITH MY L HAND STARTING A GAR. I DID NOT SAY 'I HAVE IT.' CAPT SAID SOMETHING ABOUT RUNAWAY TRIM. DID NOT REALIZE I HAD STARTED A GAR. WHEN HE REALIZED I HAD TAKEN THE AIRPLANE HE SAID, 'I'VE GOT IT! I'VE GOT IT! I'VE GOT IT!' I RELINQUISHED CTL BACK TO THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT AFTER INITIATING THE GAR. SUBSEQUENT L TFC AND LNDG ON RWY 25 WAS UNEVENTFUL. I BELIEVE THE NIGHT OP, FLYING FROM THE R SEAT, AND POSSIBLY THE CAPT'S BEING TIRED LED TO THIS INCIDENT. THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT INITIATING A GAR WAS APPROPRIATE AND WARRANTED. THE AIRPLANE WAS DEFINITELY OUTSIDE THE PARAMETERS OF NORMAL OP. DURING POSTFLT DISCUSSION WITH THE CAPT HE ADMITTED THAT HE WAS STILL TRYING TO SAVE A BAD LNDG, AND THAT THE APCH WAS POOR. BUT HE TOOK ISSUE WITH MY ACTIONS AND THE RESULTING CONFUSION BECAUSE I DID NOT VERBALLY SAY THAT I HAD THE AIRPLANE, OR SAY GAR! I AGREE I SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP MORE CLRLY. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN 11 1/2 YRS WITH THIS COMPANY THAT I HAVE TAKEN CTL OF AN AIRPLANE FROM A CAPT. IT IS A VERY HARD THING TO DO. IN THIS INSTANCE WE HAD DEFINITELY CROSSED THE THRESHOLD. I TRIED TO LET THE CAPT FIX THE LNDG, BUT ONCE WE GOT TO THE 'THRESHOLD' OF SAFETY (NOT ENOUGH RWY LEFT, AND STILL PLENTY OF SPD) THERE WAS NO MORE TIME TO TALK, ONLY TIME TO ACT. I HAD SUGGESTED A GAR WHILE WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL AND PUT THAT IDEA ON THE TABLE FOR HIM TO ACT ON. HE DIDN'T. AFTER THE BOUNCE, WITH LIMITED RWY REMAINING, I HAD LET IT GO AS FAR AS I COULD. THIS EVENT CAN BE VIEWED AS AN ERROR CHAIN. NIGHT, FLYING R SEAT, LNDG RWY 25 WHEN A BETTER RWY WAS AVAILABLE (RWY 3R, LONGER, WIDER, BETTER ALIGNED TO THE WIND), AND NOT GOING AROUND SOONER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.