Narrative:

The preflight, push back, before-start, and after-start checklists were completed. The jetway was moved away from the aircraft. The ramp agent gave the signal for us to begin a right 180 degree turn out of the gate area. While turning I noted the relative position of our nose to the left wing of another air carrier's B757 which was parked on the adjacent gate, approximately 45 degrees relative to both aircraft parked. Although the clearance was close it was not any closer than other close turns that I have made in the past. Continuing in the turn, I kept pressure on the right brake and power on the left engine with the right engine at idle. The ground agent was waving us on and running backwards in order to keep up with the turning motion of the aircraft. The turn seemed uneventful with no more than the uneven movement of the wheels over packed snow and ice. Once the B757's wingtip moved out of view, I had a heightened awareness that the ground agent was working under extremely dangerous conditions. The engines were blowing snow and he was running backwards away from the intake of the left engines. The B757's position required that he remain closer to our aircraft. He began the turn standing at my 11:30 position. Due to poor footing on the ice and snow he continued to lose ground and finally reached my 9 O'clock position. After the turn was completed the agent signaled me towards the taxiway and I nodded him off. We contacted ground control and began the taxi checklist. About 2/3 of the way to runway 19, the tower informed us that operations had requested that we return to the gate. Upon returning we found that our left position light had contacted the left wing of the B757. Note: although the logistics of powered egress from gate X at fai appears normal, it is far from normal when the ingredients of ice, blowing snow and poor footing for both the agents and the aircraft are taken into consideration. Considering the possibility of skidding, the improper positioning of either or both aircraft due to obscured ctrlines, and last but not least the safety of the agents as well as the possibility of damage to the aircraft, warrant another alternative to the present practice.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING POWERING AWAY FROM THE GATE A B757'S WINGTIP STRUCK THE ACFT WINGTIP OF A B757 ON AN ADJACENT GATE.

Narrative: THE PREFLT, PUSH BACK, BEFORE-START, AND AFTER-START CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED. THE JETWAY WAS MOVED AWAY FROM THE ACFT. THE RAMP AGENT GAVE THE SIGNAL FOR US TO BEGIN A R 180 DEG TURN OUT OF THE GATE AREA. WHILE TURNING I NOTED THE RELATIVE POS OF OUR NOSE TO THE L WING OF ANOTHER ACR'S B757 WHICH WAS PARKED ON THE ADJACENT GATE, APPROX 45 DEGS RELATIVE TO BOTH ACFT PARKED. ALTHOUGH THE CLRNC WAS CLOSE IT WAS NOT ANY CLOSER THAN OTHER CLOSE TURNS THAT I HAVE MADE IN THE PAST. CONTINUING IN THE TURN, I KEPT PRESSURE ON THE R BRAKE AND PWR ON THE L ENG WITH THE R ENG AT IDLE. THE GND AGENT WAS WAVING US ON AND RUNNING BACKWARDS IN ORDER TO KEEP UP WITH THE TURNING MOTION OF THE ACFT. THE TURN SEEMED UNEVENTFUL WITH NO MORE THAN THE UNEVEN MOVEMENT OF THE WHEELS OVER PACKED SNOW AND ICE. ONCE THE B757'S WINGTIP MOVED OUT OF VIEW, I HAD A HEIGHTENED AWARENESS THAT THE GND AGENT WAS WORKING UNDER EXTREMELY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS. THE ENGS WERE BLOWING SNOW AND HE WAS RUNNING BACKWARDS AWAY FROM THE INTAKE OF THE L ENGS. THE B757'S POS REQUIRED THAT HE REMAIN CLOSER TO OUR ACFT. HE BEGAN THE TURN STANDING AT MY 11:30 POS. DUE TO POOR FOOTING ON THE ICE AND SNOW HE CONTINUED TO LOSE GND AND FINALLY REACHED MY 9 O'CLOCK POS. AFTER THE TURN WAS COMPLETED THE AGENT SIGNALED ME TOWARDS THE TXWY AND I NODDED HIM OFF. WE CONTACTED GND CTL AND BEGAN THE TAXI CHKLIST. ABOUT 2/3 OF THE WAY TO RWY 19, THE TWR INFORMED US THAT OPS HAD REQUESTED THAT WE RETURN TO THE GATE. UPON RETURNING WE FOUND THAT OUR L POS LIGHT HAD CONTACTED THE L WING OF THE B757. NOTE: ALTHOUGH THE LOGISTICS OF POWERED EGRESS FROM GATE X AT FAI APPEARS NORMAL, IT IS FAR FROM NORMAL WHEN THE INGREDIENTS OF ICE, BLOWING SNOW AND POOR FOOTING FOR BOTH THE AGENTS AND THE ACFT ARE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF SKIDDING, THE IMPROPER POSITIONING OF EITHER OR BOTH ACFT DUE TO OBSCURED CTRLINES, AND LAST BUT NOT LEAST THE SAFETY OF THE AGENTS AS WELL AS THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO THE ACFT, WARRANT ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT PRACTICE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.