Narrative:

The aircraft was on a post maintenance test flight for the purpose of conducting acceleration tests on the right engine at successively higher altitudes from FL310 to FL420. The flight was on an IFR flight plan and was coordinating with ZOB. Center was providing vectors and/or a portion of airspace within approximately 30 mi radius of mbs (saginaw) from 270 degree radial south to 090 degree radial in which to conduct the tests. At 37000 ft, after successful tests at FL310 and FL350, the right engine experienced a flameout, followed almost immediately by a flameout on the left engine. At the time of the flameout, I (the first officer) immediately transferred the flight controls to the captain and took over the communications with ATC. I first advised ATC that we were requesting an immediate descent to a lower altitude. Center authority/authorized a descent to FL310. At this time, I informed center that we were declaring an emergency and would need a lower altitude. Center again assigned FL310. I again declared an emergency, requested FL240 as a maximum altitude, and explained that we had experienced a dual flameout. Center replied that they were unable to authority/authorized a lower altitude due to conflicting traffic at FL290, and inquired as to the nature of the emergency. I repeated that we had experienced a dual engine failure. Center finally asked if we could accept a vector for the descent. We were assigned a vector of 150 degrees for willow run and authority/authorized to descend to FL180. During the descent, both engines relit and center was advised that the problem was under control. Center asked us to repeat for verification that we no longer had an emergency. At the time, although both engines had relit, we were still having difficulty with cabin pressurization. The cabin altitude was pegged at the maximum altitude on the indicator (16000 ft) and the cabin altitude annunciator and warning horn were going off. Even with both engines running again, the cabin did not pressurize properly until we switched to manual control. ATC was not advised of the pressurization problem. The remainder of the flight was completed without further incident. The possibility of a single or dual flameout had been discussed prior to the flight. The ignitors were on on the left engine as a preventative measure against a dual flameout. The captain was using oxygen from FL350 up, and I and an additional crew member (company mechanic) were wearing quick donning masks around our necks for the entire flight that were donned in seconds after the flameout occurred. The transfer of flight controls and responsibility for communications had also been briefed prior to the flight. The aircraft had been on 3 test flts prior to this one where single flameouts had occurred but no dual flameout and no pressurization problems encountered. Although we could have anticipated a loss of cabin pressurization following the dual flameout, there was no reason to expect an inability of the aircraft to repressurize once both engines were relit. I believe the biggest problem was getting ZOB to understand the necessity for an immediate descent to a lower altitude. Even after they were informed of the dual flameout, center seemed unwilling to clear us to our requested altitude. Some things that could have been done to prevent or correct this problem are as follows: although center was informed that we were conducting engine acceleration tests, we could have forewarned them of the possibility of an engine failure occurring and that we might require an immediate descent. They could also have been informed of the altitude we would require for a relight attempt. In previous test flts with the same aircraft when single flameouts occurred, the captain had not declared an emergency, but rather, simply requested and was granted a descent during which the engine was relit. I was initially reluctant to declare an emergency and also reluctant to inform them of the nature of the emergency. I think this is a common problem, the perception is that you always want to avoid declaring an emergency when possible. I should have declared an emergency on the first call to ATC, let them know the nature of the emergency, and requested a specific lower altitude. This action should also have been briefed prior to our flight because, once we were wearing the oxygen masks, communications between the crew were very difficult. We also found after departure that the captain's mask microphone was inoperative so he was unable to communication with ATC. Even after ATC knew the nature of the emergency and therefore our inability to maintain level flight, they still were slow to authority/authorized a descent. I think the conflicting traffic should have been vectored out of our way, or the decision to vector us for our descent could have been made quicker/earlier.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BOTH ENGS FLAMED OUT ON AN LTT JET ON TEST FLT AT A HIGH ALT RESULTING IN THE FO ASKING FOR AN IMMEDIATE LOWER ALT FOR HOPEFUL RELIGHTING OF THE ENGS. THE REQUEST WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY GRANTED SINCE ATC HAD OTHER CONFLICTING TFC AND DID NOT KNOW THAT A REAL EMER EXISTED.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS ON A POST MAINT TEST FLT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING ACCELERATION TESTS ON THE R ENG AT SUCCESSIVELY HIGHER ALTS FROM FL310 TO FL420. THE FLT WAS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN AND WAS COORDINATING WITH ZOB. CTR WAS PROVIDING VECTORS AND/OR A PORTION OF AIRSPACE WITHIN APPROX 30 MI RADIUS OF MBS (SAGINAW) FROM 270 DEG RADIAL S TO 090 DEG RADIAL IN WHICH TO CONDUCT THE TESTS. AT 37000 FT, AFTER SUCCESSFUL TESTS AT FL310 AND FL350, THE R ENG EXPERIENCED A FLAMEOUT, FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY A FLAMEOUT ON THE L ENG. AT THE TIME OF THE FLAMEOUT, I (THE FO) IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED THE FLT CTLS TO THE CAPT AND TOOK OVER THE COMS WITH ATC. I FIRST ADVISED ATC THAT WE WERE REQUESTING AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT TO A LOWER ALT. CTR AUTH A DSCNT TO FL310. AT THIS TIME, I INFORMED CTR THAT WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER AND WOULD NEED A LOWER ALT. CTR AGAIN ASSIGNED FL310. I AGAIN DECLARED AN EMER, REQUESTED FL240 AS A MAX ALT, AND EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD EXPERIENCED A DUAL FLAMEOUT. CTR REPLIED THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO AUTH A LOWER ALT DUE TO CONFLICTING TFC AT FL290, AND INQUIRED AS TO THE NATURE OF THE EMER. I REPEATED THAT WE HAD EXPERIENCED A DUAL ENG FAILURE. CTR FINALLY ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT A VECTOR FOR THE DSCNT. WE WERE ASSIGNED A VECTOR OF 150 DEGS FOR WILLOW RUN AND AUTH TO DSND TO FL180. DURING THE DSCNT, BOTH ENGS RELIT AND CTR WAS ADVISED THAT THE PROB WAS UNDER CTL. CTR ASKED US TO REPEAT FOR VERIFICATION THAT WE NO LONGER HAD AN EMER. AT THE TIME, ALTHOUGH BOTH ENGS HAD RELIT, WE WERE STILL HAVING DIFFICULTY WITH CABIN PRESSURIZATION. THE CABIN ALT WAS PEGGED AT THE MAX ALT ON THE INDICATOR (16000 FT) AND THE CABIN ALT ANNUNCIATOR AND WARNING HORN WERE GOING OFF. EVEN WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING AGAIN, THE CABIN DID NOT PRESSURIZE PROPERLY UNTIL WE SWITCHED TO MANUAL CTL. ATC WAS NOT ADVISED OF THE PRESSURIZATION PROB. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SINGLE OR DUAL FLAMEOUT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED PRIOR TO THE FLT. THE IGNITORS WERE ON ON THE L ENG AS A PREVENTATIVE MEASURE AGAINST A DUAL FLAMEOUT. THE CAPT WAS USING OXYGEN FROM FL350 UP, AND I AND AN ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBER (COMPANY MECH) WERE WEARING QUICK DONNING MASKS AROUND OUR NECKS FOR THE ENTIRE FLT THAT WERE DONNED IN SECONDS AFTER THE FLAMEOUT OCCURRED. THE TRANSFER OF FLT CTLS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMS HAD ALSO BEEN BRIEFED PRIOR TO THE FLT. THE ACFT HAD BEEN ON 3 TEST FLTS PRIOR TO THIS ONE WHERE SINGLE FLAMEOUTS HAD OCCURRED BUT NO DUAL FLAMEOUT AND NO PRESSURIZATION PROBS ENCOUNTERED. ALTHOUGH WE COULD HAVE ANTICIPATED A LOSS OF CABIN PRESSURIZATION FOLLOWING THE DUAL FLAMEOUT, THERE WAS NO REASON TO EXPECT AN INABILITY OF THE ACFT TO REPRESSURIZE ONCE BOTH ENGS WERE RELIT. I BELIEVE THE BIGGEST PROB WAS GETTING ZOB TO UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT TO A LOWER ALT. EVEN AFTER THEY WERE INFORMED OF THE DUAL FLAMEOUT, CTR SEEMED UNWILLING TO CLR US TO OUR REQUESTED ALT. SOME THINGS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE TO PREVENT OR CORRECT THIS PROB ARE AS FOLLOWS: ALTHOUGH CTR WAS INFORMED THAT WE WERE CONDUCTING ENG ACCELERATION TESTS, WE COULD HAVE FOREWARNED THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ENG FAILURE OCCURRING AND THAT WE MIGHT REQUIRE AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. THEY COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF THE ALT WE WOULD REQUIRE FOR A RELIGHT ATTEMPT. IN PREVIOUS TEST FLTS WITH THE SAME ACFT WHEN SINGLE FLAMEOUTS OCCURRED, THE CAPT HAD NOT DECLARED AN EMER, BUT RATHER, SIMPLY REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A DSCNT DURING WHICH THE ENG WAS RELIT. I WAS INITIALLY RELUCTANT TO DECLARE AN EMER AND ALSO RELUCTANT TO INFORM THEM OF THE NATURE OF THE EMER. I THINK THIS IS A COMMON PROB, THE PERCEPTION IS THAT YOU ALWAYS WANT TO AVOID DECLARING AN EMER WHEN POSSIBLE. I SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER ON THE FIRST CALL TO ATC, LET THEM KNOW THE NATURE OF THE EMER, AND REQUESTED A SPECIFIC LOWER ALT. THIS ACTION SHOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN BRIEFED PRIOR TO OUR FLT BECAUSE, ONCE WE WERE WEARING THE OXYGEN MASKS, COMS BTWN THE CREW WERE VERY DIFFICULT. WE ALSO FOUND AFTER DEP THAT THE CAPT'S MASK MIKE WAS INOP SO HE WAS UNABLE TO COM WITH ATC. EVEN AFTER ATC KNEW THE NATURE OF THE EMER AND THEREFORE OUR INABILITY TO MAINTAIN LEVEL FLT, THEY STILL WERE SLOW TO AUTH A DSCNT. I THINK THE CONFLICTING TFC SHOULD HAVE BEEN VECTORED OUT OF OUR WAY, OR THE DECISION TO VECTOR US FOR OUR DSCNT COULD HAVE BEEN MADE QUICKER/EARLIER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.