Narrative:

Arriving to tlh, approach control gave the flight a descend to 3000 ft. We left 10000 ft. A heading was given and we reported the airport in sight. Approach control pointed out VFR traffic inbound from the sse, a helicopter. The helicopter reported having us in sight and was instructed to follow a visual to runway 27. We were given our present heading to join the final and cleared the visual approach to runway 27. Shortly after receiving this clearance we heard the controller giving a clearance to a military aircraft, we were unable to understand the full clearance because the controller was transmitting to the aircraft on UHF. At first I had thought that it was on a military route which are around tlh. Prior to joining the final we received a TCASII traffic warning. As we looked at the indicator it read, 0.1 NM 0.0. The display showed traffic at our 6 O'clock position. Unable to look behind us, we thought that this must be in error. As we continued after joining the final approach course, another TCASII traffic warning was received. We again looked at the TCASII dial. It read, 0.1 NM 0.0. This time like before the traffic was at the 6 O'clock position. This time we were no more than 3 mi from the runway. Still nothing from the control tower concerning any traffic. As we continued we noticed a single engine cessna approaching from our left and knew of his intentions, he was instructed to follow us. As we looked on our TCASII dial we showed him at the right distance and altitude from us, so this made us think that those other 2 warnings might not have been wrong. At about 1/2 mi final we received another TCASII alert, and as before the reading was the same, 0.1 NM 0.0. As we started the flare, a fast moving military jet flew past us on the right side, his altitude could not have been more than 300 ft, if even that high. Before he reached the departure end of the runway, he made a sharp right hand climbing turn to the downwind, from which he returned and landed. After we made the blocks, I requested the local telephone number for the tower supervisor. Later that afternoon I made a call to the tower supervisor at tlh. He stated that the controller didn't inform us of the T2 (toad) and that he should, and as to my question of why he was allowed to get so close during a visual behind, he stated that he had slowed the T2 to 250 KTS when he saw that we had slowed, and he had given him a speed of 190 KTS when we had slowed even further. I told him of our TCASII alerts and he couldn't understand why we got them.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER BEING CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH, FLC RECEIVED 3 TCASII ALERTS WHILE ON THE APCH. CAUSE OF TCASII WAS A MIL T2 ON APCH BEHIND RPTR AND TWR NEVER ALERTED FLC TO TFC. COM WITH MIL ACFT WAS ON UHF SO RPTR ACFT DIDN'T HEAR COM. TWR SHOULD HAVE NOTIFIED RPTR FLC OF TFC PROX.

Narrative: ARRIVING TO TLH, APCH CTL GAVE THE FLT A DSND TO 3000 FT. WE LEFT 10000 FT. A HDG WAS GIVEN AND WE RPTED THE ARPT IN SIGHT. APCH CTL POINTED OUT VFR TFC INBOUND FROM THE SSE, A HELI. THE HELI RPTED HAVING US IN SIGHT AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW A VISUAL TO RWY 27. WE WERE GIVEN OUR PRESENT HDG TO JOIN THE FINAL AND CLRED THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 27. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING THIS CLRNC WE HEARD THE CTLR GIVING A CLRNC TO A MIL ACFT, WE WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE FULL CLRNC BECAUSE THE CTLR WAS XMITTING TO THE ACFT ON UHF. AT FIRST I HAD THOUGHT THAT IT WAS ON A MIL RTE WHICH ARE AROUND TLH. PRIOR TO JOINING THE FINAL WE RECEIVED A TCASII TFC WARNING. AS WE LOOKED AT THE INDICATOR IT READ, 0.1 NM 0.0. THE DISPLAY SHOWED TFC AT OUR 6 O'CLOCK POS. UNABLE TO LOOK BEHIND US, WE THOUGHT THAT THIS MUST BE IN ERROR. AS WE CONTINUED AFTER JOINING THE FINAL APCH COURSE, ANOTHER TCASII TFC WARNING WAS RECEIVED. WE AGAIN LOOKED AT THE TCASII DIAL. IT READ, 0.1 NM 0.0. THIS TIME LIKE BEFORE THE TFC WAS AT THE 6 O'CLOCK POS. THIS TIME WE WERE NO MORE THAN 3 MI FROM THE RWY. STILL NOTHING FROM THE CTL TWR CONCERNING ANY TFC. AS WE CONTINUED WE NOTICED A SINGLE ENG CESSNA APCHING FROM OUR L AND KNEW OF HIS INTENTIONS, HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO FOLLOW US. AS WE LOOKED ON OUR TCASII DIAL WE SHOWED HIM AT THE RIGHT DISTANCE AND ALT FROM US, SO THIS MADE US THINK THAT THOSE OTHER 2 WARNINGS MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN WRONG. AT ABOUT 1/2 MI FINAL WE RECEIVED ANOTHER TCASII ALERT, AND AS BEFORE THE READING WAS THE SAME, 0.1 NM 0.0. AS WE STARTED THE FLARE, A FAST MOVING MIL JET FLEW PAST US ON THE R SIDE, HIS ALT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE THAN 300 FT, IF EVEN THAT HIGH. BEFORE HE REACHED THE DEP END OF THE RWY, HE MADE A SHARP R HAND CLBING TURN TO THE DOWNWIND, FROM WHICH HE RETURNED AND LANDED. AFTER WE MADE THE BLOCKS, I REQUESTED THE LCL TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE TWR SUPVR. LATER THAT AFTERNOON I MADE A CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AT TLH. HE STATED THAT THE CTLR DIDN'T INFORM US OF THE T2 (TOAD) AND THAT HE SHOULD, AND AS TO MY QUESTION OF WHY HE WAS ALLOWED TO GET SO CLOSE DURING A VISUAL BEHIND, HE STATED THAT HE HAD SLOWED THE T2 TO 250 KTS WHEN HE SAW THAT WE HAD SLOWED, AND HE HAD GIVEN HIM A SPD OF 190 KTS WHEN WE HAD SLOWED EVEN FURTHER. I TOLD HIM OF OUR TCASII ALERTS AND HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY WE GOT THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.