Narrative:

The traffic management unit was not effective in creating a continuous safe, effective and orderly flow of traffic into the los angeles airport. All of the aircraft arrived at the outer fixes virtually at the same time. The supervisor, who was working the arrival coordinator position and subsequently responsible for balancing the workload, chose to take all of the aircraft and not put anyone into hold. I was working the stadium radar position and during this 1 hour session, I did not take a single radar handoff, but the aircraft continued to check in on my frequency. I heard the downey associate advise the supervisor that he was going to spin an aircraft and was instructed by the supervisor 'no you have room behind air carrier X.' there were several downey aircraft that were moved over to runway 24R and this is what caused my stadium downwind to get extended beyond the normal base leg. I was forced to slow jet aircraft to 150 KTS 50 flying mi from the point of intended landing. In addition I had numerous aircraft penetrating both burbank area and empire area airspace without prior approval. I estimate this happened a minimum of 10 times. The supervisor advised me to slow down all of my aircraft as I was going to get extended because of this additional traffic. Having full knowledge that my aircraft would soon be forced to leave not only class B airspace, but the lateral limits of my airspace, the supervisor continued to accept handoffs from adjacent sectors on aircraft that would enter my airspace. I was talking to aircraft that I knew nothing about until they checked on my frequency. The supervisor then attempted to intimidate me by stating 'keep the aircraft in your airspace.' this feat was futile with the number of aircraft already east of smo and additional aircraft west of smo. I was forced to take nearly all of the aircraft under my control out of class B airspace on their downwind and they would not reenter class B until 20 mi east of los angeles established on the straight-in ILS. Many of these aircraft were being vectored at 2500 ft in the vicinity of a 7700 ft MVA, I do not believe any of the aircraft entered the higher MVA. All of these aircraft were in or within 1 1/2 mi of the adjacent airspace without prior coordination with the affected controller. I believe the inability of the traffic management unit (tmc) at sct to provide an expeditious orderly and safe sector saturation flow of traffic into the los angeles area was a factor in the above mentioned circumstances. I further believe that the lack of direction given to the tmc unit resulted in a breakdown in the integrity and safety of the system. The disregard for integrity and safety by the tmc and supervisor, their unwillingness or inability to ensure the above, causes me grave concern over their abilities. The supervisor, while performing in the arrival coordinator position, has the duty and responsibility to ensure required coordination is accomplished per the facility SOP. The supervisor is also required to ensure that the tmc is aware of any sits that 'have an impact on the operation.' it is by the grace of higher authority/authorized that something more severe did not occur. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated maximum number of aircraft under control in the sector was at one time 15. This continued after the reporter asked the supervisor to cut traffic off to the sector because of sector overload. Reporter stated he was unable to have adjoining sectors quick look the traffic because of ARTS IIIA limitations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH UNCOORD PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE CAUSED BY POS OVERLOAD.

Narrative: THE TFC MGMNT UNIT WAS NOT EFFECTIVE IN CREATING A CONTINUOUS SAFE, EFFECTIVE AND ORDERLY FLOW OF TFC INTO THE LOS ANGELES ARPT. ALL OF THE ACFT ARRIVED AT THE OUTER FIXES VIRTUALLY AT THE SAME TIME. THE SUPVR, WHO WAS WORKING THE ARR COORDINATOR POS AND SUBSEQUENTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR BALANCING THE WORKLOAD, CHOSE TO TAKE ALL OF THE ACFT AND NOT PUT ANYONE INTO HOLD. I WAS WORKING THE STADIUM RADAR POS AND DURING THIS 1 HR SESSION, I DID NOT TAKE A SINGLE RADAR HDOF, BUT THE ACFT CONTINUED TO CHK IN ON MY FREQ. I HEARD THE DOWNEY ASSOCIATE ADVISE THE SUPVR THAT HE WAS GOING TO SPIN AN ACFT AND WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE SUPVR 'NO YOU HAVE ROOM BEHIND ACR X.' THERE WERE SEVERAL DOWNEY ACFT THAT WERE MOVED OVER TO RWY 24R AND THIS IS WHAT CAUSED MY STADIUM DOWNWIND TO GET EXTENDED BEYOND THE NORMAL BASE LEG. I WAS FORCED TO SLOW JET ACFT TO 150 KTS 50 FLYING MI FROM THE POINT OF INTENDED LNDG. IN ADDITION I HAD NUMEROUS ACFT PENETRATING BOTH BURBANK AREA AND EMPIRE AREA AIRSPACE WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL. I ESTIMATE THIS HAPPENED A MINIMUM OF 10 TIMES. THE SUPVR ADVISED ME TO SLOW DOWN ALL OF MY ACFT AS I WAS GOING TO GET EXTENDED BECAUSE OF THIS ADDITIONAL TFC. HAVING FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT MY ACFT WOULD SOON BE FORCED TO LEAVE NOT ONLY CLASS B AIRSPACE, BUT THE LATERAL LIMITS OF MY AIRSPACE, THE SUPVR CONTINUED TO ACCEPT HDOFS FROM ADJACENT SECTORS ON ACFT THAT WOULD ENTER MY AIRSPACE. I WAS TALKING TO ACFT THAT I KNEW NOTHING ABOUT UNTIL THEY CHKED ON MY FREQ. THE SUPVR THEN ATTEMPTED TO INTIMIDATE ME BY STATING 'KEEP THE ACFT IN YOUR AIRSPACE.' THIS FEAT WAS FUTILE WITH THE NUMBER OF ACFT ALREADY E OF SMO AND ADDITIONAL ACFT W OF SMO. I WAS FORCED TO TAKE NEARLY ALL OF THE ACFT UNDER MY CTL OUT OF CLASS B AIRSPACE ON THEIR DOWNWIND AND THEY WOULD NOT REENTER CLASS B UNTIL 20 MI E OF LOS ANGELES ESTABLISHED ON THE STRAIGHT-IN ILS. MANY OF THESE ACFT WERE BEING VECTORED AT 2500 FT IN THE VICINITY OF A 7700 FT MVA, I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY OF THE ACFT ENTERED THE HIGHER MVA. ALL OF THESE ACFT WERE IN OR WITHIN 1 1/2 MI OF THE ADJACENT AIRSPACE WITHOUT PRIOR COORD WITH THE AFFECTED CTLR. I BELIEVE THE INABILITY OF THE TFC MGMNT UNIT (TMC) AT SCT TO PROVIDE AN EXPEDITIOUS ORDERLY AND SAFE SECTOR SATURATION FLOW OF TFC INTO THE LOS ANGELES AREA WAS A FACTOR IN THE ABOVE MENTIONED CIRCUMSTANCES. I FURTHER BELIEVE THAT THE LACK OF DIRECTION GIVEN TO THE TMC UNIT RESULTED IN A BREAKDOWN IN THE INTEGRITY AND SAFETY OF THE SYSTEM. THE DISREGARD FOR INTEGRITY AND SAFETY BY THE TMC AND SUPVR, THEIR UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY TO ENSURE THE ABOVE, CAUSES ME GRAVE CONCERN OVER THEIR ABILITIES. THE SUPVR, WHILE PERFORMING IN THE ARR COORDINATOR POS, HAS THE DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE REQUIRED COORD IS ACCOMPLISHED PER THE FACILITY SOP. THE SUPVR IS ALSO REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT THE TMC IS AWARE OF ANY SITS THAT 'HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE OP.' IT IS BY THE GRACE OF HIGHER AUTH THAT SOMETHING MORE SEVERE DID NOT OCCUR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED MAX NUMBER OF ACFT UNDER CTL IN THE SECTOR WAS AT ONE TIME 15. THIS CONTINUED AFTER THE RPTR ASKED THE SUPVR TO CUT TFC OFF TO THE SECTOR BECAUSE OF SECTOR OVERLOAD. RPTR STATED HE WAS UNABLE TO HAVE ADJOINING SECTORS QUICK LOOK THE TFC BECAUSE OF ARTS IIIA LIMITATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.