Narrative:

Ground controller's clearance for us was to taxi for takeoff from ramp to departure runway, hold short of intersecting runway. During the taxi I was accomplishing the taxi checklist and configuring the flight engineer's panel for takeoff when ground control instructed us to 'stop.' my attention was immediately outside the aircraft, our aircraft was stopped just short of the intersecting runway. A light aircraft on the intersecting runway had aborted its takeoff. While discussing the event it became apparent the captain did not understand we were to hold short of the intersecting runway and his intentions were to continue to taxi. The first officer did not recognize the aircraft was continuing past the clearance limit. Both the lack of situational awaren ess and communication were contributing factors. I was accomplishing required checklist tasks and not devoting any attention to the aircraft location. The first officer was a new hire, on IOE, and unfamiliar with the airport. It would have been beneficial had he consulted the airfield diagram to pinpoint the clearance limit and verbally confirmed our clearance with the captain since the first officer acknowledged our instruction with ground control and the captain was the one who would control the aircraft during the taxi.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLC FAILED TO FOLLOW HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS AND THE ACFT DEPARTING ON THE INTERSECTING RWY ABORTED TKOF. UNAUTH RWY ENTRY.

Narrative: GND CTLR'S CLRNC FOR US WAS TO TAXI FOR TKOF FROM RAMP TO DEP RWY, HOLD SHORT OF INTERSECTING RWY. DURING THE TAXI I WAS ACCOMPLISHING THE TAXI CHKLIST AND CONFIGURING THE FE'S PANEL FOR TKOF WHEN GND CTL INSTRUCTED US TO 'STOP.' MY ATTN WAS IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE THE ACFT, OUR ACFT WAS STOPPED JUST SHORT OF THE INTERSECTING RWY. A LIGHT ACFT ON THE INTERSECTING RWY HAD ABORTED ITS TKOF. WHILE DISCUSSING THE EVENT IT BECAME APPARENT THE CAPT DID NOT UNDERSTAND WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF THE INTERSECTING RWY AND HIS INTENTIONS WERE TO CONTINUE TO TAXI. THE FO DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE ACFT WAS CONTINUING PAST THE CLRNC LIMIT. BOTH THE LACK OF SITUATIONAL AWAREN ESS AND COM WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. I WAS ACCOMPLISHING REQUIRED CHKLIST TASKS AND NOT DEVOTING ANY ATTN TO THE ACFT LOCATION. THE FO WAS A NEW HIRE, ON IOE, AND UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL HAD HE CONSULTED THE AIRFIELD DIAGRAM TO PINPOINT THE CLRNC LIMIT AND VERBALLY CONFIRMED OUR CLRNC WITH THE CAPT SINCE THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED OUR INSTRUCTION WITH GND CTL AND THE CAPT WAS THE ONE WHO WOULD CTL THE ACFT DURING THE TAXI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.